The 1980s: The
Debt Crisis & The Lost Decade
By Enrique R. Carrasco
We will end Part One with a look at the debt
crisis of the 1980s. That event was significant in many ways. First, as you
will learn from the first two parts of the section, it gave the IMF a highly
visible role in crisis management, not unlike its current role in the Asian
financial crisis. Although many observers have criticized the Fund (and the
World Bank) for its handling of the debt crisis, no one would disagree that the
institution helped bring about a system (however muddled) that eventually
resolved the acute phase of the crisis. The Fund was able to do this by
bringing together commercial banks, debtor countries, and other entities
involved in the crisis.
The debt crisis also illustrated the deep
involvement of the IMF in development issues. With the collapse of the Bretton
Woods System of fixed exchange rates, the Fund, some say, became an institution
without a purpose. The debt crisis gave the IMF a reason for existing. Along
with the World Bank, the IMF required debtor countries to implement
market-based reforms in exchange for financial assistance. This marked a
widespread "market friendly" movement in Latin America and elsewhere.
Indeed, the reforms recently adopted in the wake of the Asian financial crisis
are linked to reforms that began in the 1980s.
The IMF and World Bank adjustment programs have
been very controversial, of course. The third part of this section will address
the social costs resulting from the debt crisis. In light of the halt in Latin
America's economic growth after the onset of the debt crisis, virtually
everyone agreed that the label "lost decade of development" was
accurate. Even today, the region's poverty rates have not uniformly fallen to
pre-crisis levels (which were high to begin with).
Are the IMF and the World Bank to blame for the
lost decade? Studies have yielded mixed analysis. Some produce clear evidence
that IMF/World Bank adjustment programs have hurt the poor and widened the gap
between the rich and the poor. Other studies provide evidence to the contrary.
The mixed results have allowed the IMF and World Bank to insist that the
short-term pain is worth the long-term gain.
A.
An
Overview of the Debt Crisis
Let's begin with a brief overview of the debt
crisis and the measures taken to resolve it.
1.
Petrodollar
Recycling by Commercial Banks to Developing Countries Gave Rise to the Debt
Crisis.
Most observers believe the "petrodollar
recycling" of the 1970s gave rise to the debt crisis. During that period,
the price of oil rose dramatically. Oil-exporting countries in the Middle East
deposited billions of dollars in profits they received from the price hike in
U.S. and European banks. Commercial banks were eager to make profitable loans
to governments and state-owned entities (as well as private companies) in
developing countries, using the dollars flowing from the Middle Eastern
countries. Developing countries, particularly in Latin America, were also eager
to borrow relatively cheap money from the banks.
2.
Decreased
Exports and High Interest Rates in the Early 1980s Caused Debtor Countries to
Default on Their Foreign Loans.
The frenzied lending and borrowing came to a
halt with the global recession in the early 1980s. The significant drop in
debtor countries' exports, combined with a strong dollar, (i.e., the value of
the dollar increased relative to the value of other currencies) and high global
interest rates, depleted foreign exchange reserves that debtor countries relied
upon for international financial transactions. Debtor countries consequently
began to feel the strain of having to make timely payments on their foreign
debt, which became much more expensive to pay off because the loans carried
floating interest rates that increased along with global rates. These problems
were compounded by massive capital flight - outward transfers of money by
private individuals and entities in developing countries.
In August 1982, Mexico stunned the financial
world by declaring that it could no longer continue to pay its foreign debt.
Not long after Mexico's declaration came similar announcements from other Latin
American debtor countries, such as Brazil,
Venezuela, Argentina, and Chile. The prospect of massive defaults
posed grave problems for creditor countries, such as the United States.
Government regulators discovered that commercial bank creditors, particularly
the big U.S. ("money center") banks, had dangerously low levels of
capital that could be used to absorb losses resulting from massive loan
defaults. Policymakers were also worried that there was no central authority or
forum that could oversee an orderly resolution of the crisis, such as a global
bankruptcy system.
3.
Case-by-Case
Debt Restructuring Negotiations Saved the International Financial System from
Collapse.
Yet the principal players in the
crisis - governments, banks, the IMF and the World Bank - averted a
collapse of the international financial system by resorting to case-by-case debt
restructuring negotiations, popularly known as the "muddling
through" approach. The approach entailed engaging in a series of work-outs
with hundreds of commercial bank creditors throughout the world via Bank
Advisory Committees or Steering Committees, which were composed of banks with
the greatest exposures to debtor countries. (Work-outs for
government-to-government lending took place under the auspices of the Paris Club,
a forum open only to sovereign states.)
Under this approach, commercial banks agreed to
(i) provide new loans to debtor countries, and (ii) stretch out external debt
payments. In return, debtor countries agreed to abide by IMF and World Bank
stabilization and structural adjustment programs intended to correct domestic
economic problems that gave rise to the crisis. IMF stabilization programs
typically included drastic reductions in government spending in order to reduce
fiscal deficits, a tight monetary policy to curb inflation, and steep currency
devaluations in order to increase exports. World Bank structural adjustment
programs focused on longer-term and deeper "structural" reforms in
debtor countries.
4.
"Debt
Fatigue" Appeared in the Mid-1980s.
After a few years of repeated restructuring
deals, "debt fatigue" began to appear. New loans to debtor countries
plummeted as commercial bank creditors contemplated the possibility that debtor
countries were facing insolvency rather than a temporary drop in their ability
to pay back the foreign debt.
In October 1985, U.S. Treasury Secretary James
Baker proposed a strategy, dubbed the Baker Plan, that attempted to alleviate
the debt fatigue. The plan was designed to renew growth in fifteen highly
indebted countries through $29 billion in new lending by commercial banks and
multilateral institutions in return for structural economic reforms such as
privatization of state-owned entities and deregulation of the economy. The
strategy failed, however, because the projected financing did not materialize
and, to the extent it did, the new lending merely added to debtor countries'
already crushing debt burden. During this period, Latin American debtor
countries were making massive net outward transfers of resources.
In light of what appeared to be an intractable
problem, government officials, academics, and private entities began to propose
plans that would provide debtor countries with debt relief rather than debt restructuring. In the meantime, various debtor countries
suspended debt payments and fell out of compliance with, or otherwise refused
to adopt, IMF adjustment programs. This eventually prompted the big creditor
banks to admit publicly (by adding to "loan loss reserves") that many
of the loans to debtor countries would not be repaid.
5.
The Brady
Initiative in 1989 Focused on Debt Reduction Strategies.
The Brady Initiative, announced in March 1989
by U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady, marked a change in U.S. policy
towards the debt crisis. Given the persistently high levels of foreign debt,
the Initiative shifted the focus of the strategy from increased lending to
voluntary, market-based debt reduction (reduction of outstanding principal) and
debt service reduction (reduction of interest payments) in exchange for continued
economic reform by debtor countries.
Debtor countries obtained significant (but not
massive) debt relief under the Brady Initiative through: (i) direct cash
buybacks; (ii) exchange of existing debt for "discount bonds" (bonds
issued by the debtor country with a reduced (discounted) face value but
carrying a market rate of interest); (iii) exchange of existing debt for
"par bonds" (bonds that carry the same face value as the old loans
but carry a below-market interest rate); and (iv) interest rate reduction bonds
(bonds that initially carry a below-market interest rate that rises eventually
to the market rate). Commercial bank creditors that did not wish to participate
in a debt or debt service reduction option could choose to give debtor countries
new loans or receive bonds created from interest payments owed by debtor
countries. Debtor countries sweetened the deals by providing
"enhancements," such as principal and interest collateral (U.S.
Treasury bonds).
6.
Brady Deals
Combined with Economic Reforms and Increased Flows of Capital to Debtor
Countries Led Some Observers in the Early 1990s to Declare that the Debt Crisis
was Over.
Commercial bank creditors agreed to Brady deals
with a good handful of countries, including Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nigeria,
the Philippines, Venezuela, Uruguay and Brazil. In the meantime, Latin American
countries implemented substantial economic reforms. In 1991, the region
registered capital inflows that exceeded outflows for the first time since the
onset of the debt crisis. This led some observers to proclaim that the debt
crisis was over for major Latin American debtor countries.
B.
Stabilization
and Adjustment Programs
Here we provide more detail regarding IMF
stabilization programs and World Bank structural adjustment programs.
The IMF's stabilization programs applied
short-term "emergency" measures intended to reduce domestic demand
for goods and services (IMF stand-by arrangements). The World Bank engaged in
policy-based lending through structural adjustment loans (SALs) and sector
adjustment loans (SECALs), medium- to long-term loans that supported structural
changes to improve supply and prevent the recurrence of a crisis. The
distinction between IMF and Bank programs often blurred in practice, however,
because of the close collaboration between the two institutions and the
complementary nature of their programs. Both programs carried
"conditionality," releasing funds in installments and requiring
recipients to meet performance criteria for each installment.
1.
IMF Stabilization
Measures Tried to Cool Down Overheated Economies.
The idea behind stabilization is that a drop in
demand will result in a reduction of the current account deficit (more imports
than exports), which the IMF believed was one of the major causes of the
financial crises in debtor countries. In most cases, governments reduced demand
by cutting public expenditures, devaluing the country's currency, and reducing
the money supply. The expenditure-cutting included drastic cuts in
infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, and dams), freezing state employees'
wages or laying off state employees, reducing consumer subsidies, and cutting
health and education expenditures. Central banks devalued the currency in part
to reduce imports and increase exports. Authorities reduced the money supply to
check inflation.
2.
World Bank
Structural Adjustment Measures Promoted Market-Based Reforms to Increase
Efficiency.
World Bank structural adjustment programs
complemented stabilization efforts by seeking to increase economic efficiency,
which, in turn, would increase the domestic supply of goods and services.
Although such programs differed among countries, they shared two themes:
liberalization of domestic and foreign trade, and privatization of often large
and inefficient public enterprises. Domestic liberalizations included
abolishing price controls, freeing interest rates, ending credit rationing, and
establishing a capital market. Liberalization of external trade typically
included reduction of high tariffs, elimination of quotas on imports and import
licenses, abolition of export duties and licenses, devaluation of the currency,
and product diversification. Public enterprises were also subject to market
discipline via privatizations, reduction or abolition of subsidies, and other
streamlining measures.
C.
The
Social Costs of the Debt Crisis: The Lost Decade of Development
A great number of observers criticized the IMF
and the World Bank for their handling of the debt crisis. Indeed, the
criticisms of that crisis resemble much of what we have heard about the Asian
financial crisis: the IMF and World Bank stabilization and structural
adjustment programs (SSAPs) imposed great costs on the poor and vulnerable in
developing countries while "bailing out" foreign players such as
banks and investors.
1.
The Debt
Crisis Brought Debtor Countries' Economies to a Halt and Wiped Out Gains in
Social Welfare.
It is not hard to find evidence showing that
the poor, women, children and other groups (indigenous peoples) suffered
disproportionately as a result of structural adjustment programs during the
1980s. As Latin America's economies stagnated (experiencing zero or negative
economic growth), per capita income plummeted, poverty increased, and the
already wide gap between the rich and the poor widened further. The debt crisis
seriously eroded whatever gains had been made in reducing poverty through
improved social welfare measures over the preceding three decades. These
developments led policymakers to label the 1980s "the lost decade of development."
2.
Post-Crisis
Studies have Shown that Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programs have
had Mixed Effects on Poverty and Income Distribution.
Post-crisis studies of the impact of SSAPs have
helped policymakers evaluate whether such programs have had a negative impact
on poverty and income distribution. The studies show that SSAPs have had mixed
effects. Some studies indicate that SSAPs have adversely affected the poor and
increased the gap between the rich and the poor in developing countries. This
is because SSAPs have resulted in lower wages for laborers and increased
unemployment. Funds earmarked by governments or the World Bank for "social
safety nets" have fallen short of the amount required to prevent overall
increases in poverty.
As one might expect, other studies have shown
that SSAPs are not as detrimental as critics have claimed. Some have pointed
out that the impact of SSAPs varies from country to country--they are not
uniformly detrimental across developing countries. Others have shown that the
plight of the poor can be improved after the implementation of SSAPs. For
example, an overvalued exchange rate can reduce agricultural exports by making
them more expensive for foreign consumers, thereby impoverishing people in the
agricultural sector. A devaluation may improve those exports by making them
less expensive and may indirectly increase the income of the rural poor. Still
other studies have shown that avoiding adjustment or implementing adjustment
policies that depart from IMF/World Bank criteria have resulted in skyrocketing
inflation, which disproportionately hurts the poor who use most of their income
for consumption.
[OUTLINE] [PART 1:V] [BIBLIOGRAPHY]

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