Summary of a Discussion on "functionalist vs generativist approaches to language" from: FUNKNET -- Discussion of issues in Functional Linguistics ============ On Wed, 30 Dec 1998, Guy Deutscher wrote: ... > I have been asked by a palaeontologist colleague if there is a good article > which summarises the differences between the functionalist and generativist > approaches to language. Can anyone recommend an article (or even a book) > which (1) would be accessible to non-linguists and (2) would give a fair > assessment of the functionalist view of language and its development? > > Thanks, > > Guy Deutscher > Dr Guy Deutscher > St. John's College > Cambridge CB2 1TP > England -------------------- Dr. Deutscher, The following journal issue might also be of use: Language and Communication, 1991, vol 11, num 1/2, pp 3-114. This can be seen as a special issue on 'formalism vs. functionalism', although no such designation per se appears on the covers. It starts with a stage-setting article dealing with (and supporting) "the autonomy thesis", followed by 16 response articles from the same number of noted scholars (many on the functional side, see below), and ends with the first author's counter-response. This collection may thus not constitute a pure introduction to formalism or functionalism for those with 'no' background at all in linguistics, but I gather that it will nonetheless interest paleontologists, as the central theme concerns "the role of natural selection in the origin of and ... the 'progress' of language" (from the prefatory statement to the issue). The table of contents might help you get a better idea: Opening: F. J. Newmeyer/ Functional explanation in linguistics and the origins of language Commentary: J. T. Andersen/ On genetic encoding and communication A. L. Becker/ Language and languaging D. Bickerton/ Language origins and evolutionary plausibility R. S. Fouts/ Dirty bathwater, innateness neonates and the dating game O. J. Hopper/ Functional explanation in linguistics and the origins of language D. Hymes/ Is poetics original and functional? G. Lakoff/ Cognitive versus generative linguistics: how commitments influence results P. Lieberman/ Preadaptation, natural selection and function D. Lightfoot/ Subjacency and sex N. Love/ Generativism, genes and grammar P. Muhlhausler/ Comments on Newmeyer's 'Functional explanation in linguistics and the origins of language' E. F. Prince/ On 'Functional explanation in linguistics and the origins of language' S. Romaine/ Last tango in Paris J. Scancarelli/ An unwarranted dismissal of functional linguistics S. G. Shanker/ Selective forces at work S. A. Thompson/ On addressing functional explanation in linguistics Author's Response: F. J. Newmeyer/ O, what a tangoed web they weave ... As noted above, this issue may be a bit too rich in content, but it does make clearer some of the fundamental differences between 'formalism' and 'functionalism'. I hope this helps. Masa Yamazaki East Asian Studies University of Arizona ---------------- From: Susanna Cumming I think every functionalist would make a slightly different statement (which is why we tend to resist calling ourselves a "theory" with a catchy acronym), but I can't resist the opportunity to mention the chapter by me & Yoshi Ono: Cumming, Susanna & Tsuyoshi Ono (1996). "Discourse and grammar." In Teun A. van Dijk (ed.), Discourse: a multidisciplinary introduction, vol. 1: Discourse as structure and process, 112-137. Beverly Hills: Sage. I'm posting this to the list since some of you might not have run across it & might find it useful for students or colleagues. (There are also many other good papers in the collection.) This chapter does not, however, compare functional & generative approaches -- it is simply an introductory-level overview of what we take to be the major findings & trends of discourse-functional approaches to grammar. Susanna Cumming ---------------------- From: Frederick Newmeyer If I might also be so immodest as to suggest something that I wrote myself, you might consider my book LANGUAGE FORM AND LANGUAGE FUNCTION, published just this month by MIT Press. In it, I lay out what I see as the differences between functionalist and generativist approaches and argue that the autonomy of language structure is compatible with central aspects of that structure being functionally motivated. Fritz Frederick J. Newmeyer Professor and Chair Department of Linguistics University of Washington Seattle, WA 98195-4340 USA E-MAIL: fjn@u.washington.edu -------------- From: Dick Hudson Guy Deutscher's query implies that there are only two positions: functionalism or generativism. Those who align themselves with one of these positions may like to think this is so, but it ain't. There's also cognitivism (non-modular, but also not functionalist in the `discourse' sense), and Labov's view (explicitly non-functional but not generativist in the normal sense either), and .... The binary game is very dangerous: if A and B are the only possibilities, then arguments against A must count as evidence for B. If functionalism is wrong, generativism must be right (or vice versa). But that conclusion is only as safe as the assumption that there are no other options. Let a thousand theories bloom - so that we can eliminate 999 of them. Richard (= Dick) Hudson Phonetics and Linguistics, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT. ---------------------- From: Brian MacWhinney My guess is that Guy's paleontologist colleague might find the functionalist-generativist contrast interesting because of the centrality of a parallel contrast inside paleontology and systematic biology more generally. I believe the opposition there is between "cladists" and "non-cladists". I think that the cladists emphasize autonomy of species classifications and the non-cladists focus on statistical properties and the functional bases of speciation. If your colleague manages to learn about the functionalist-generativist contrast, I would love to hear how he/she thinks it parallels or fails to parallel the contrast in linguistics. By the way, I agree with Dick Hudson about the misleading nature of binary contrasts. They are typically social groupings whose existence is grounded on primate urges toward group formation, rather than intellectual phenomena. Dick might have read the classic article by Allan Newell titled "You can't play 20 questions with nature". Newell argues that attempts to divide the world by opposition between scientific yin and yang are scientifically misguided. But they are real facts of the sociology of science and worth understanding on that level. --Brian MacWhinney -------------------- From: Scott Delancey I have no argument with Dick's larger point, but I want to take issue with the definition of functionalism which is implied here. The differences between functional and formal approaches have always been described, and in part defined, by arguments about what counts as data. As generative grammar has come to take more and more cognizance of typological and historical data, it may be true, by this point in time, that functionalism defined by the database differs from formalism primarily in its inclusion of discourse structure as both explanans and explanandum. But while there are functionalists who attempt to explain everything in discourse terms, this can't be taken as a definition of functionalism, unless we want to exclude the likes of Givon or Bybee or Heine from that label. Such a restriction would certainly be controversial. The basic difference between functionalism and formalism is in where explanations are lodged, and what counts as an explanation. Formal linguistics generates explanations out of structure--so that a structural category like Subjacency counts as an explanation for certain facts about various syntactic structures and constructions. Most contemporary formal theories, certainly generative grammar, provide ontological grounding for these explanations in a hypothesized, but unexplored and unexplained, biologically based universal language faculty. Functionalists, in contrast, find explanations in function. Formal principles can be no more than generalizations over data, so that most generative "explanation" seems to functionalists to proceed on the dormitive principle. There is a range of different functional arenas in which explanation can be sought--sentence processing / memory constraints, discourse functions, cognitive structure, even historical tendencies. Of course most researchers specialize in one of these areas, (or at least in one at a time; think of Chafe's earlier work on semantic patterns as explanation for structure, and his later work primarily on discourse). And sometimes--as everywhere in science and scholarship--some of us come to believe that all real explanation lies in our own bailiwick. But in truth the different domains of functional explanation don't separate out all that easily. In particular, when we talk about cognitive explanations, we're explicitly claiming that linguistic structure is informed by general patterns of thought. Obviously these same cognitive factors must inform other domains such as discourse structure as well, so that at a sufficiently deep level of analysis "cognitive" and "discourse-functional" theories are complementary. While it is certainly true that, on the contemporary linguistic scene, "cognitive" and "functional" linguists represent distinct (though overlapping) social-interactional sets, I think it is a mistake to regard them as competing theoretical frameworks. Scott DeLancey Department of Linguistics University of Oregon Eugene, OR 97403, USA delancey@darkwing.uoregon.edu --------------- From: Dick Hudson Thanks to Scott Delancey for the helpful explanation of functionalism. I'm very happy to hear such an inclusive definition, but I wonder what it excludes. What would an explanation have to be like to count as non-functional? After all, even an explanation like subjacency would count as functional if we assumed that it was a cognitive constraint (as Chomskians would assume, I think). And the original functionalists in phonology insisted that elements were defined by contrasts within the system, i.e. by their function of contrasting with other elements. My memory of Systemic Functional Grammar is that the same is true there. This sounds like an extra kind of function, which isn't included in Scott's list - a `formal function'? So maybe *any* explanation is by definition functional, even if the word 'function' isn't used? Richard (= Dick) Hudson Phonetics and Linguistics, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT. --------------------- From: Martin Haspelmath Dick Hudson asks: > So maybe *any* explanation is by definition functional, even if the word > 'function' isn't used? Chomskyans wouldn't like to hear it, but in a sense, this is true. I would put it as follows: Functionalists are primarily interested in explaining language structure, whereas Chomskyans are interested in this only secondarily. Their primary interest is explaining Plato's Problem, the possibility of language acquisition despite the poverty of the stimulus. This involves the postulation of UG as the central explanatory hypothesis, and the fleshing out of UG as the central descriptive task. We have no disagreements when describing low-level generalizations, which are of course also explanations in a sense (e.g. the rule that English nouns form their plural by adding -s, which explains that the plural of _book_ is _book-s_). But when it comes to higher-level generalizations, we differ, because Chomskyans never seek generalizations going beyond the language system. So some obvious functional explanations have no status in Chomskyan linguistics (e.g. the economic-motivation explanation for universal overt marking in plurals). Thus, in a way, Chomskyan linguists are more modest as far as the level of explanatory depth is concerned. They generally don't admit this, but I've found a remarkable quotation concerning diachronic linguistics: "...people seeking a substantive theory of change [i.e. functionalists, MH] are too ambitious, too principled, and seek to explain too much..." (David Lightfoot, The development of language, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, 225) Martin Dr. Martin Haspelmath (haspelmath@eva.mpg.de) Max-Planck-Institut fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie, Inselstr. 22 D-04103 Leipzig ----------------------- Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1999 11:19:49 -0800 From: Scott Delancey On Mon, 4 Jan 1999, Dick Hudson wrote: > Thanks to Scott Delancey for the helpful explanation of functionalism. I'm > very happy to hear such an inclusive definition, but I wonder what it > excludes. What would an explanation have to be like to count as > non-functional? After all, even an explanation like subjacency would count > as functional if we assumed that it was a cognitive constraint (as > Chomskians would assume, I think). Indeed they would, and do, and in fact one sometimes hears a certain amount of annoyance expressed by generativists as what they regard as misappropriation of the term "cognitive" by Cognitive Grammarians. And yes, obviously, whatever's going on in the brain is "cognitive" in some sense. The crucial difference here is that explanatory constructs of generative theory, like subjacency, are assumed to be specifically linguistic, while cognitive explanations within functional grammar* appeal to constructs which are presumed to be aspects of general cognition, not part of a distinct, modular language faculty. The essential difference is whether explanation is being sought outside of linguistic structure itself. Thus an explanation of the cross-linguistic tendency for topics to come in sentence-initial position which is stated in terms of phrase structure is not functionalist, while one which is stated in terms of the psychology of perception is. *I would definitely include Cognitive Grammar here, and I'm not alone in that; see for example Langacker's discussion of the relation between his proposals and other frameworks in vol. I of Foundations of Cognitive Grammar (p. 4) Scott DeLancey Department of Linguistics University of Oregon Eugene, OR 97403, USA delancey@darkwing.uoregon.edu