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Published in
Global Justice: Democracy
and the Rule of Law in a Changing World
(Washington: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 2001.
Norman Dorsen & Prosser
Gifford, eds.).
«Trophy Art Law»
as an Illustration of the Current Status
of Separation of Powers
and Legislative Process in Russia
Alexander N. Domrin
Legislative history of the Law is really dramatic.
The original version of the bill was passed by the Duma in the Fall of
1996, but rejected by the Federation Council 21*. By February 1997, when
the Duma passed a revised version of the law, gubernatorial elections had
been held in about 50 out of 89 regions of the Russian Federation. The
elections increased the independence of governors who, unlike in the past,
could no longer be appointed or dismissed by a President’s decree 22*.
Since governors form one half of the Federation Council, the upper chamber
of the Russian parliament got a better opportunity to reassert its position
in the system of separation of powers in the Russian Federation.
On March 5, 1997, the bill declaring that the art taken from Germany during
and immediately after World War II, would be the «sole property of
the Russian Federation» was adopted by the Federation Council.
If signed into effect, the law would make it practically impossible for
Germany to reclaim the remains of the trophy art seized from the Nazis
by Soviet troops at the end of World War II, and subsequently would have
a negative effect on German-Russian relations. In an attempt to appease
the largest creditor of Yeltsin’s regime 23* and arguably its closest
ally in the West, on March 18, 1997, the Russian President vetoed the bill
calling it (in a letter to Federation Council Chairman Yegor Stroev) a
«unilateral decision» made «without regard for generally
accepted norms of international law,» and adding that it did not
differentiate between the art works of Germany and its allies in World
War II and art valuables originating in the nations of anti-Hitler coalition
and Nazi-occupied countries. As a result, according to Yeltsin, the bill
«weakens Russian positions in difficult negotiations now under way
with France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Poland, Hungary, the Netherlands and
other countries» (ITAR-TASS, March 19, 1997).
Strangely, a correct statement of the President that the Law in that form,
as it was adopted by the Federal Assembly in February-March 1997, «would
hinder efforts to retrieve artworks seized from the Soviet Union during
the war» was accepted by Western media as an «apparent bid
to somewhat appease the nationalists» 24*.
Although, as it was revealed in an opinion poll conducted by the Public
Opinion fund in late May 1997, the law was supported by 53 percent and
disapproved by only 23 percent of respondents 25*, Western observers have
been persistently demonizing the supporters of the Trophy Art Law and associating
the bill exclusively with «Nationalists and Communists» in
Russia and its parliament 26*. In reality, the Trophy Art Law is
quite consistent with the views and feelings of most Russians who never
forgot that in the days of what we call Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)
German Nazis and their allies destroyed 1,710 Soviet cities and towns,
more than 70,000 villages, 32,000 plants and factories, about 100,000 collective
and state farms, approximately 65,000 kilometers of railroads (one-and-a-half
the length of equator). The country’s national wealth diminished by 30
percent 27*.
Just like during a previous European invasion to Russia in the 19th Century,
when Napoleon’s soldiers were making stables in Russian churches, Hitler’s
soldiers looted and destroyed 427 museums, 1,670 Russian Orthodox churches,
237 Catholic churches, 532 synagogues, 43,000 libraries, 6,000 hospitals,
82,000 schools. According to incomplete data, in the 73 richest museums
of the USSR 564,723 exhibits were destroyed or looted by Nazis; the 15
richest museums lost 269,515 exhibits 28*. As Lynn H. Nicholas wrote
in her remarkable book: «Everywhere in the USSR special attention
was given to the trashing of the houses and museums of great cultural figures:
Pushkin’s house was ransacked, as was Tolstoy’s Yasnaya Polyana, where
manuscripts were burned in the stoves and German war dead were buried all
around Tolstoy’s solitary grave. The museums honoring Chekhov, Rimsky-Korsakov,
and Tchaikovsky received similar attentions, the composer of the 1812 Overture
being particularly honored by having a motorcycle garage installed in his
former dwelling» 29*.
After liberation of the occupied territory, the Soviet Army, as a rule,
could find «nothing of value left in the museums of its recaptured
cities. They found instead burned and defaced buildings, ruined laboratories,
books reduced to pulp» 30*. Whereabouts of most art objects
that were looted and taken away by Nazi aggressors (like an invaluable
historical Smolensk archive or the Amber Room) are still not known. An
American prosecutor at the Nuremberg trial called Nazi policy on the occupied
Soviet territory a «deliberate destruction of Russian culture».
Ultimately, 26,5 million of Soviet people (or 11,5 percent of the USSR
population in 1941), most of them civilians, were killed by Nazis, exterminated
in German concentration camps, or died as a result of wounds. A combined
number of Soviet citizens who were killed or crippled during the Great
Patriotic War was equal to over forty million 31*.
As a form of reparations for the damage which had been done by Nazi Germany
to the Soviet Union, if one can speak about any possible reparation that
could compensate loss of millions of lives, the USSR, among other things,
evacuated from Germany approximately 2,2 million artworks, and about 3
million archival files.
Between 1955 and 1969, as a manifestation of its goodwill, the Soviet Union
handed back to the German Democratic Republic the lion’s share of art objects,
which had been taken away after the Second World War: more than 1,922,000
pieces of art (or 87,4 percent of what had been originally evacuated) and
almost all three million archival files. Among the art treasures returned
were Dresden Art Gallery with its Raphael’s Sistine Madonna, a collection
of art works from the Berlin National Gallery, the famous Pergam Altar,
masterpieces by Titian and Botticelli, a collection of antique sculpture
from the Albertinium Museum, etc. Naturally, after 1990, all those artifacts
belong to the unified Germany.
In 1994, Doris Hertramf, counsellor for cultural affairs of the German
Embassy in Russia, estimated that between 30,000 and 100,000 artifacts
were still in Russian museums 32*. By 1997, the German side had risen the
question of a return of some 200,000 to 300,000 pieces of art from German
state-run and private-owned collections. Most of them are the monuments
of numismatics (175,000 coins and medals) and archaeology, as well as about
55,000 paintings including works of French Impressionists and Postimpressionists
(Monet, Matisse, Van Gogh), masterpieces of Goya, Rembrandt, Rubens and
Delacroix, a 15th Century Gutenberg Bible and the 5,000-year-old Trojan
gold collection discovered by German archaeologist Heinrich Schliemann
33*.
Insisting that the law does not rule out the possibility of «cooperation»
with third countries (looted by Nazis) on a bilateral basis, the State
Duma disagreed with Yeltsin and already in three weeks, on April 7, 1997
with 308 against 15 votes effectively overrode the presidential veto.
The April 16-17 session of the Federation Council coincided with President’s
Yeltsin visit to Germany during which Russian President was to hold talks
with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and receive an award from a German media organization.
Although, prior to the visit President’s aide enlisted at list seven major
matters on the agenda (the draft Accord on Russia-NATO relations, problems
of European security and cooperation, Russia’s «full membership»
in the Group of Seven, World Trade Organization and the Paris Club of Creditors,
economic cooperation with Germany and the restitution of World War II «trophy
art») (ITAR-TASS, April 16, 1997), in reality about 80 percent of
the summit time was given to just two questions: Russia-NATO relations
and the issue of art objects moved to the USSR at the close of World War
II. When meeting with his German counterpart, Yeltsin in a «gesture
of friendship and openness» handed him microfilmed archives of the
Central Committee of the former GDR ruling party (Socialist United Party
of Germany), 11 files from the Rathenau Archive 34*, an inventory of art
works and other materials taken to the USSR at the end of the war as well
as a letter from Patriarch Aleksy II of Moscow and All Russia with a list
of property the Russian Orthodox Church wants Germany to return (ITAR-TASS,
April 17, 1997).
Quite illustrative is the detail that although in an interview with Stern
(published a day before the beginning of Yeltsin’s visit to Germany) Yeltsin
said he would bring «some pieces» of the cultural treasures
seized during World War II (ITAR-TASS, April 15, 1997), a Russian Foreign
Ministry spokesman told ITAR-TASS that the «ministry knows nothing
about Yeltsin’s plans to take cultural valuables to Germany.» 35*
Hardly by coincidence, in the midst of the argument over «trophy
art» in Russia, and that very day (April 16, 1997) when the Federation
Council overrode the President’s veto, two items apparently belonging to
the Amber Room (a fragment of mosaic and a lacquered wooden cabinet) were
«unexpectedly» found in Germany 36*. German Government used
those «discoveries» as a chance to reciprocate President Yeltsin’s
veto by pressing the search for the Amber Room remains.
Composition of the Federation Council is different from the U.S. Senate
or Rajya Sabha in India: it is composed of the heads of Administration
and Legislature of each of the eighty-nine constituent subjects of the
Russian Federation, convenes not more than twice a month for 2-3 days each
time, and, unlike the State Duma, can hardly be considered a permanently
working legislative body. Long Russian distances and urgent regional matters
often prevent «Senators» from attending sessions of the Federation
Council. In an attempt to provide even missing deputies with an opportunity
to cast their vote (negative or positive) regarding the President’s veto,
the Federation Council decided to follow a rare voting procedure and to
use written ballots («questionnaires») which were mailed to
deputies who couldn’t attend the current session.
By May 14, the Federation Council received ballots back and announced that
it obtained votes of more than two thirds of the total number of its members
necessary to override the veto.
On May 22, Yeltsin again returned the trophy art law to the parliament
without signature claiming in his statement that the Law had been adopted
«with violations of the constitutional procedure.» Russian
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin was also critical of the Federation Council’s
voting, called it «an emotional approach» and reminded that
«Russia owes but is also owed seized art objects, and more at that»
(ITAR-TASS, May 16, 1997).
On June 10, the Federation Council de facto for the second time overrode
President’s veto and by 121 votes to nine with four abstentions voted to
return the trophy art law to President Yeltsin for signing. In its resolution
sent to the president, Council deputies correctly argued that only the
Constitutional Court can determine whether parliamentary voting procedures
violate the constitution and stated that «the President of the Russian
Federation has evaded the fulfillment of responsibilities within his competence
to sign and publish the law» (ITAR-TASS, June 10, 1997.) Three
days later the State Duma by 351 votes to one with one abstention approved
a similar appeal to Yeltsin stating that he was exceeding his constitutional
authority by not signing a properly adopted by the Federal Assembly act.
Indeed, superpresidential Constitution of Russia of 1993 gives the president
great powers but does allot to parliament certain countervailing prerogatives.
Article 107 of the Russian Constitution (Chapter 5. The Federal Assembly)
unambiguously and in explicit terms determines the veto procedure of the
President. According to the Constitution, an adopted law shall be sent
to the President for signing and publication within five days (1). The
President has two options: within fourteen days, to sign a law and publish
it (2) or veto it and send back to the Federal Assembly. In that case,
the State Duma and the Federation Council may either take into account
the President’s comments and criticism and work out a new draft or, with
two thirds of the total number of deputies of both chambers, to override
the veto and approve the law in its original version. After that the law
shall be signed by the President within seven days and published (3).
The Constitution is silent, however, as to whether the legislation becomes
law in the event the President refuses to sign the previously vetoed bill.
In this respect, the Russian Constitutional Law does not contain any provision
similar to the principle of the U.S. Constitutional Law saying that the
President may not use executive powers to thwart the expressed will of
Congress (see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
Although back in March Yeltsin’s representative in the Duma Kotenkov warned
the Federation Council that if the President’s veto is overriden by the
upper chamber, Yeltsin would have to appeal to the Constitutional Court
to block the law, it didn’t happen. On June 30, 1997, President Yeltsin,
in violation of his own Constitution - but «courageously»,
in the eyes of The New York Times, 37* - imposed his second veto on the
same law, arguing that both houses of the parliament used unconstitutional
procedures to override his first veto: proxy voting in the State Duma and
mailed ballots in the Federation Council. The argument was particularly
disingenuous since Yeltsin had signed numerous other laws passed with exactly
the same voting procedure in the Duma. It was the Federation Council which
on July 4 in an unanimous voting filed with the Constitutional Court an
inquiry against Yeltsin’s actions arguing that the president lacks the
authority to declare parliamentary voting procedures unconstitutional.
The legal collision was particularly unusual, because, proxy voting is
a common procedure in the Duma and because it was not the first time as
the chambers of the Federal Assembly were overriding President’s veto.
That had happened at least three times before. On October 25, 1994, eleven
months after the adoption of the new Constitution, the Federation Council
(following a similar procedure in the Duma) overrode Yeltsin’s veto of
the Russian budget bill. On November 15, 1995, the upper chamber of the
Russian Federal Assembly overrode President’s veto of the Law on the Subsistence
Minimum. And on August 7, 1996, the Federation Council overrode Yeltsin’s
veto of a law defining budgetary classifications.
After several postponements
for procedural reasons caused by an illness of co-reporter Judge Vladimir
Strekozov, the problem was finally decided in the Constitutional Court.
The Court did not address the issue of trophy art itself, but considered
legal processes and the question of President’s «obligation»
to sign into effect a law after his veto had been overriden by both chambers
of the Federal Assembly. On April 6, 1998 the Court supported the Parliament’s
claim that Yeltsin had failed to meet his constitutional responsibilities
by refusing to sign the law. In its decision the Constitutional Court ruled
that President could not simply ignore a parliamentary vote to override
his veto of a bill and ordered him to sign the Trophy Art Bill into law
immediately.
The decision was assessed by observers as «unusually independent»
38*. Indeed, it was a rare case in which the Court, suspended by
Yeltsin in October 1993 and restored in March 1995 with limited powers,
disagreed with the President and «put their rubber stamps away.»
In a characteristic manner, Yeltsin considered such disagreement reflected
in the Court’s decision «a good slap in the face» and in a
subsequent meeting with the Constitutional Court Chairman Marat Baglai
scolded him for the fact that «something is not quite right with
our Constitutional Court» (Interfax, June 2, 1998.)
President signed the bill, and appealed to the Constitutional Court to
consider constitutionality of the Law itself.
More than a year later, on July 20, 1999, the Constitutional Court struck
down as unconstitutional several provisions of the Trophy Art Law, but
not the act in its entirety. The Court upheld Russia’s right to keep cultural
valuables seized from Nazi Germany which are not to be returned to former
«aggressor-countries» (like Germany, Italy, Hungary, etc.)
These artworks are rightly regarded as the federal property of Russia,
the court said.
Significantly, even in that case, some artwork can be transferred to Germany
- within the framework of cultural exchange programs between the two countries
as a goodwill gesture on behalf of Russia.
At the same time, according
to the Court, the Law improperly lumped all trophy art into one category
and didn’t allow for claims by individuals whose art had been stolen from
them by the Nazis, or by the Soviet Union’s wartime Allies such as France
- from which the Nazis looted many objects and brought them to Germany
where they were in turn taken by Soviet troops. Thus, the Constitutional
Court confirmed the right of the Nazis’ victims and citizens of the countries
of anti-Hitler coalition to get their property back.
Another provision saying
that trophy art of an unknown origin cannot be reclaimed was pronounced
as violating the Constitution. The court ruled treasures of unknown origin
can be reclaimed within 18 months if an owner comes forward.
The court also considered Yeltsin’s objection about the voting procedure
in which some lawmakers in the Duma voted for absent colleagues. Proxy
voting is allowed by the State Duma regulations; it has been used when
adopting most Russian laws, and the President has never had a problem to
sign those laws into effect.
The court agreed the procedure was improper, but decided to refrain from
voiding the vote and said that incorrect vote procedure may become a reason
to reject laws in the future.
The law was sent back to parliament for a revision, and on April 26, 2000,
the Duma passed the law in its third reading. A new consideration of the
Trophy Art Law in the Duma became just another corroboration that the statute
is supported by the whole spectrum of political forces represented in the
parliament. The vote was truly unanimous: with 355 deputies in favor with
zero opposed.
As expected, adoption of
the law does not preclude the Russian authorities from holding consultations
with the German government regarding exchanges of cultural values. On April
28-29, 2000, Russian Minister of Culture, Mikhail Shvidkoi, returned to
Germany 101 paintings from the Bremen Art Museum. His German counterpart,
Michael Naumann, handed over to Shvidkoi a fragment of the Amber Room (an
amber chest) 39*.
Apart from the particular provisions of the Trophy Art Law itself, the
whole legislative process in which the Law was drafted, rejected by the
Federation Council, redrafted, adopted, vetoed by the President, readopted,
etc., and especially two Constitutional Court decisions regarding the Law,
can be considered a test case for the whole constitutional mechanism of
checks and balances and separation of powers in the Russian Federation.
Trophy Art Law as an illustration of the current legislative process in
the country indicates that the process has acquired features of legal and
civilized character. The Constitutional Court has revealed a hidden democratic
potential of the Russian legal system, even within the limits of the «superpresidential»
Constitution, which is definitely a sign of hope for Russia standing on
the edge of post-Yeltsin era.
For Further Reading:
The Spoils of War: World War II and Its Aftermath: The Loss, Reappearance,
and Recovery of Cultural Property (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., Publishers
in Association with The Bard Graduate Center for
Studies in the Decorative Arts, 1997. Elizabeth Simpson, ed.).
Robert V. Daniels, Russia’s Transformation. Snapshot of a Crumbling System
(Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).
Nicolai N. Petro, The Rebirth of Russian Democracy. An Interpretation of
Political Culture (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1995).
William Butler, Russian Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
Molly Warner Lien, «Red Star Trek: Seeking a Role for Constitutional
Law in Soviet Disunion», 30 Stanford Journal of International Law
(1994).
Robert Sharlet, «Transitional Constitutionalism: Politics and Law
in the Second Russian Republic», 14 Wisconsin International Law Journal
3 (1996).
NOTES
1* James H. Billington, The Icon and the Axe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1966). George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston-Toronto: Little, Brown,
and Co., 1967), p. 528-9. And if contradictions are not just an isolated
phenomenon, but «essence of Russia», attempts to eradicate
them (to «civilize» Russia) are not possible without fundamental
changes of Russia and, as a rule, doomed to fail from the start. The problem,
therefore, is not how to «cure» Russia of her contradictions
but how to use them for Russia’s development.
2* See The Russian Civilization and Sobornost (Moscow: The Russian Sobornost
Fund, 1994), p. 30. Cited in: Nikolay Zlobin, «Will Russia Be Crushed
by Its History?», 159 World Affairs 2 (Fall 1996). Richard Pipes,
Russia under the Old Regime (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974. Series:
History of Civilization).
3* Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR (2d ed. 1963), p.5.
4* «Russia does not differ essentially from Europe but Russia is
not yet essentially one with Europe», wrote Thomas Garrigue Masaryk,
Czech historian and first president of Czecho-Slovak republic, in his remarkable
study of Russian history (Thomas G. Masaryk, The Spirit of Russia (London:
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., New York: The Macmillan Co., 1919. Volume
1), p. 6.)
5* «Anyone imagining the course of Russian pre-modern history to
have been particularly barbarous or bloodstained should remember the near-absence,
in comparison with Western lands, of witch-hunting, crusading, institutionalized
capital punishment (abolished under Elizabeth in the mid-eighteenth century).
The brutal episodes in the reigns of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great
were traumatic because uncharacteristic» (Robin Milner-Gulland, The
Russians (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), p.228.)
6* The First Russian Republic ended with the violent dissolution of the
first democratically elected Russian parliament and suspension of the Constitutional
Court of Russia in September-October 1993; the Second Republic was initiated
by an adoption of the new Constitution in December 1993.
7* The only other law that can probably belong to the same category is
the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.
8* Mark Boguslavsky, «Legal Aspects of the Russian Position in Regards
to the Return of Cultural Property», The Spoils of War: World War
II and Its Aftermath: The Loss, Reappearance, and Recovery of Cultural
Property (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., Publishers in Association with
The Bard Graduate Center for Studies in the Decorative Arts, 1997. Elizabeth
Simpson, ed.), p.186-190.
9* See, for instance: Elissa S. Myerowitz, «Protecting Cultural Property
During a Time of War: Why Russia Should Return Nazi-Looted Art»,
20 Fordham International Law Journal (June 1997); S. Shawn Stephens, «The
Hermitage and Pushkin Exhibits: An Analysis of the Ownership Rights to
Cultural Properties Removed from Occupied Germany», 18 Houston Journal
of International Law (Fall 1995); Steven Costello, «Must Russia Return
the Artwork Stolen from Germany during World War II?», 4 ILSA Journal
of International & Comparative Law (Fall 1997); Sylvia L. Depta, «Twice
Saved or Twice Stolen? The Trophy Art Tug-of-War Between Russia and Germany»,
10 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal (Fall 1996); Amy L.
Click, «German Pillage and Russian Revenge, Stolen Degas, Fifty Years
Later – Who’s Art Is It Anyway?», 5 Tulsa Journal of Comparative
& International Law (Fall 1997); Alexander Blankenagel, «Eyes
Wide Shut: Displaced Cultural Objects in Russian Law and Adjudication»,
8 East European Constitutional Review 4 (Fall 1999).
10* See, e.g., Central and East European Law Initiative, American
Bar Association (ABA CEELI), Analysis of the Constitution of the Russian
Federation (New York, 1995), p.38. An American scholar correctly concludes
that the presidential provisions of the Russian Constitution contain «all
the brittleness of the U.S. Constitution but lack its balanced division
of powers» (Edward W. Walker, «Politics of Blame and Presidential
Powers in Russia’s New Constitution», East European Constitutional
Review, Fall 1993/Winter 1994, at 116.) Another observer argues that the
Russian Constitution is «plagued by contradictions that undermine
the separation of powers in the new Russian government, and the aggrandized
position of the president in the Constitution is all but frankly anti-democratic»
(Jeffrey Waggoner, «Valor at the Russian Constitutional Court: Adjudicating
the Russian Constitutions in the Civil-Law Tradition», 8 Indiana
International & Comparative Law Review 1997, at 193.)
11* ABA CEELI, Analysis of the Constitution of the Russian Federation at
40.
12* In September 1993, «with a stroke of the pen, Yeltsin had wiped
out Russia’s embryonic and uneasy separation of powers. Mao had bested
Montesquieu», concluded an unbiased American scholar (Robert Sharlet,
«Russian Constitutional Crisis: Law and Politics Under Yeltsin»,
9 Post-Soviet Politics, no. 4, October-December 1993, p. 327). «It
was a highly risky decision, since it was plainly illegal», wrote
The Guardian (Jonathan Steele, «Inside Story: Chaos Theory»,
The Guardian, November 13, 1993). «Rarely in history there has been
a coup prepared so ineptly and so openly. Yeltsin violated the constitution
so flagrantly that there could be no talk of his having ‘made a mistake’
or ‘exceeding his powers’», commented a deputy of the Moscow City
Council (Boris Kagarlitsky, Square Wheels: How Russian Democracy Got Derailed
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994), p.197).
13* In May 1991, the main provisions of the Law were included into the
text of the Russian Constitution.
14* Justice Delayed. The Russian Constitutional Court and Human Rights
(New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1995), p. 6.
15* Although the original Decree «On the Gradual Constitutional Reform
in the Russian Federation» contained a provision saying that representative
bodies in the Russian regions continued functioning (art.8), it was a deceptive
maneuver aimed at guaranteeing neutrality of the regional legislatures
in President Yeltsin’s conflict with the Russian Supreme Soviet. As a result
of issuance of Decree No. 1723 of October 22, and Decree No. 1760 of October
26, the regional legislatures were dissolved too.
16* Yeltsin’s attempt to block any public discussion of the draft was characterized
by British scholars as «hardly a sound precedent of democratic practice»
(see Stephen White and Ronald J. Hill, «Russia, Former Soviet Union,
and Eastern Europe», in The Referendum Experience in Europe (London:
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996. Michael Gallagher and Pie Vincenzo Uleri, eds.),
p. 163. More on the interregnum period of September-December 1993 in Russia
see, e.g., Tanya Smith, «The Violation of Basic Rights in the Russian
Federation», East European Constitutional Review (Summer / Fall 1994).
17* See, e.g., A Modern Day Czar? Presidential Power and Human Rights in
the Russian Federation (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1995),
p. iii; Stephen Holmes, «Superpresidentialism and its Problems»,
East European Constitutional Review, Fall 1993 / Winter 1994, p.123; John
Kohan, «What Would Lenin Say?», Time, December 20, 1993, p.44.
«Superpresidentialism» of the new Russian constitution was
quite a logical step in the Russian «reforms»: «If you
are determined to impose capitalism by any means, to pour the medicine
down people’s throats against their will, you can’t achieve your objective
with genuine consent. So you opt for some kind of iron fist, for a czar,
even if you choose to call him - as did Izvestia’s Washington correspondent,
unaware of the contradiction - a ‘democratic dictator’» (Daniel Singer,
«Putsch in Moscow», The Nation, October 25, 1993, p.449).
18* Robert Sharlet, «Citizen and State under Gorbachev and
Yeltsin», in Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics (White,
Pravda & Gitelman, eds. 1994), p. 109, 128.
19* In an alarming conclusion of another objective American scholar, Yeltsin
«demonstrates how attempts to copy the American system are likely
to end up in dictatorship, as they have so often in Latin America»
(Robert V. Daniels, «Yeltsin’s No Jefferson. More Like Pinochet»,
The New York Times, October 2, 1993, p.23).
20* See Amy J. Weisman, «Separation of Powers in Post Communist Government:
A Constitutional Case Study of the Russian Federation», 10 The American
University Journal of International Law & Policy (Summer, 1995), p.1397.
21* The process of lawmaking in the Federal Assembly is determined by Article
105 of the Russian Constitution. Federal laws are adopted by a majority
votes of the total number of State Duma deputies (art. 105.1.) These laws
are submitted to the Federation Council within five days of their passage
in the Duma (art. 105.3.) If a majority of the total number of deputies
of the Federation Council vote for the law, or if the Council fails to
consider the legislation within 14 days, it will be deemed adopted (art.
105.4.) If the Federation Council rejects the legislation, both houses
may convene a reconciliatory commission to settle their differences, and
then resubmit the legislation for consideration by the Duma (art. 105.4.)
If the Federation Council again rejects the bill, the Duma may still enact
the legislation if two-thirds of its membership vote in favor of it (art.
105.5.)
22* Elections of the last appointed Governor, in Karachaevo-Cherkessia,
happened only in 1999.
23* By 1998, Germany has reportedly provided the USSR and Russia
with over 100 billion mark credits (ITAR-TASS, July 20, 1998.). Since disintegration
of the USSR, over 50 billion Deutschmarks in aid have been given to Russia
only.
24* Jan Cleave, «Russia: Parliament Rejects Yeltsin’s Veto
Of Trophy Art Law», Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, May 16, 1997).
25* The poll involved 1,500 urban and rural residents. Backers of
the law included both people with a scarce educational background and with
higher education. (ITAR-TASS, June 16, 1997.)
26* See, for instance: «Nationalists and Communists contend
that the art is merely compensation for the enormous losses of Russian
cultural treasures» («An Amber Light on Wartime Loot»
(Editorial), The New York Times, July 19, 1997); «The negotiations
between Russia and Germany have stalled with Russian nationalists seizing
upon the issue with particular fervor /.../ As early as 1993, however,
the Russian position began to harden and nationalist voices became louder»
(Stephan Wilske, «International Law and Spoils of War: To the Victor
the Right of Spoils? The Claims for Repatriation of Art Removed from Germany
by the Soviet Army During or as a Result of World War II», 3 UCLA
Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs (Spring/Summer 1998),
at 226, 280); «The 308-15 vote could help Russia to hang on to priceless
cultural treasures /.../. The ballot reflected an upsurge of nationalist
feeling throughout Russia» (Chrystina Freeland, «Looted German
art: Duma snubs Yeltsin», The Financial Times, April 5, 1997); «The
trophy art has become a key part of a power struggle between Russia’s nationalist
Parliament, which has attempted to nationalize the art treasures, and President
Boris Yeltsin» (Victoria A. Birov, «Prize or Plunder?: The
Pillage of Works of Art and the International Law of War», 30 New
York University School of Law Journal of International Law and Politics
(Fall 1997 / Winter 1998) at 213).
27* Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945. A General Outline
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), p.434.
28* See Mikhail Shvidkoi, «Russian Cultural Losses During World War
II», The Spoils of War: World War II and Its Aftermath: The Loss,
Reappearance, and Recovery of Cultural Property, p.67-71.
29* Lynn H. Nicholas, The Rape of Europa: The Fate of Europe’s Treasures
in the Third Reich and the Second World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1994), p.193-4. Indeed, what else could be expected from Nazi invaders
whose attitude to the Soviet people was expressed by Heinrich Himmler (in
his speech of July 13, 1941, just three weeks after the beginning of German
aggression against the USSR) in the following terms: «A population
of 180 million, a mixture of races, whose very names are unpronounceable,
and whose physique is such that one can shoot them down without pity and
compassion... welded by the Jews into one religion, one ideology...»
(R. Breitman, Architect of Genocide: Himmler and the Final Solution (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), p.177.)
30* Lynn H. Nicholas, op.cite, p.200. That’s how an American military correspondent
Marcus Hindus described destruction by Nazis of Peterhof, Peter the Great’s
lavish palace on the Gulf of Finland: «I had neither seen nor heard
anything like it in France after the World War. Only windblown tall reeds
rising out of deep snow give one a feeling of some life within nature itself...
all Peterhof is gone. It isn’t even a ghost town like Kiev, Kharkov, Poltava,
Orel or Kursk... it is a desert strewn with wreckages from which, perhaps,
has been blown away some of the most exquisite and most joyful art man
has created» (New York Herald Tribune, February 17, 1944. Cited in
Lynn H. Nicholas, op.cite, p.200-201.) Overall, 34,000 precious objects
were taken from Peterhof to Germany (Michail Shvidkoi, op.cite, p.69.)
31* For comparison, in Great Britain loss of its citizens during World
War Two was equal to 375,000 (or 0,9 % of the British population), in the
U.S. - 405,000 (or 0,3 % of the U.S. population), even in Japan human toll,
including victims of atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was equal
to 2,6 million (or 3,4 % of its population) (Great Patriotic War of the
Soviet Union. 1941-1945. A General Outline, p.434.)
32* Ellen Barry, «Total War to Trophy War: Berlin’s Lost Art»,
The Moscow Times, November 16, 1994.
33* In the 1990s, the most significant of those cultural objects were exposed
in a series of «stunning exhibitions», as they were called
by Western press (Richard Beeston, «Yeltsin Shrugs off Duma to Give
Kohl Looted Work of Art», The Times, April 16, 1997), at Moscow’s
Pushkin Museum of Fine Arts and the Hermitage in St. Petersburg.
34* The archive of the Weimar Republic Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau,
who in April 1922 signed the treaty establishing diplomatic relations with
the USSR.
35* RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 1, No. 12, Part I, April 16, 1997.
36* In the first case, a lawyer from Bremen tried to sell a fragment of
the Amber Room mosaic for $2.5 million. A second object turned up when
a reader in Berlin recognized in a news picture a cabinet she had bought
in the 1970’s in East Germany. Both of those «discoveries»
indicate that the Amber Room could survive and is still located somewhere
in Germany.
37* «An Amber Light on Wartime Loot» (Editorial), The New York
Times, July 19, 1997.
38* See, for instance, Dmitry Zaks, «President Hits Back At Court»,
The Moscow Times, April 8, 1998.
39* In an apparent attempt to stress his special relations with Germany,
President-elect Putin welcomed the return to St. Petersburg of the remains
of the Amber Room and thanked «our German friends» for the
return home of «one of our national sacred objects». According
to Putin, that exchange is an indication that «people in Russia understand,
value and treasure Russian-German relations» (Interfax, April 29,
2000.)