Foreword 4
I. Introduction 6
II. From Soviet Dependence to Independence: Transition Chaos 8
IV. The Conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia 13
IX. The Present Georgian Power Situation 28
Postscript: Georgia on Our Minds 44
The Fact-Finding Mission
Organized under the auspices of the Psychologist's Against Nuclear Arms for Peace and Ecological Balance in Sweden, financed by a grant from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and undertaken in cooperation with The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research (TFF), an independent peace research foundation in Lund, Sweden, our Fact-Finding Mission visited Georgia (and its claimed territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) from July 6 to the July 30, 1994. It consisted of a multidisciplinary team of four people, as follows:
Dr. Marta Cullberg Weston, clinical psychologist/psychoanalyst and member of the Board of Directors of Psychologist's Against Nuclear Arms for Peace and Ecological Balance (Sweden) and the Board of Directors of The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research (Lund, Sweden);
Dr. Burns H. Weston, Bessie Dutton Murray Professor of International Law and Associate Dean for International and Comparative Legal Studies, The University of Iowa (USA), and human rights advisor to the Board of Directors of The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research (Lund, Sweden);
Dr. Jan Öberg, Swedish and Danish sociologist/peace researcher and Director of The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research (Lund, Sweden); and
Mr. Klaus Rasmussen, doctoral candidate in political science, The University of Copenhagen (Denmark).
A Note About Method
While in Georgia, our Fact-Finding Mission extensively interviewed approximately 80 persons in government, politics, the media, intellectual communities, and representatives from the United Nations (UN), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as well as important agents in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Reality is always multifaceted, and for this reason our Report, based on these interviews and as much up-to-date literature we could obtain, [2] attempts to mirror in comprehensive fashion the many different political, socio-economic, juridical, and psychological elements that make up Georgian life at this critical time.
However, despite repeated efforts, we were unable to interview the political leadership in Abkhazia, who, unlike the political leadership in South Ossetia, never managed to find a "suitable time" to meet with us. Our understanding of events and conditions in Abkhazia are based, therefore, on interviews with regional Abkhazian officials and representatives located in Abkhazia from the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), the CIS, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Médecins sans Frontières, and local citizens representing the military, the press, and the arts, among others. Also, we relied on written source material.
The many and diverse persons interviewed, it is important to note, were not randomly selected. Rather, we chose people close to the center of the political process and often asked them the same or similar questions so as to add systematically to our knowledge and to discover simultaneously information that might be missing or misunderstood. In this organic way, in a relative short period of time, we were able to learn a great deal about the situation. While there is nothing inherent in the process to define its end, for practical reasons our time was limited to three weeks in the area.
We wish also to emphasize that it always has been our practice or rule never to quote people interviewed by name. We spell this out firmly at the outset of each interview to encourage maximum freedom of expression, without fear of retribution; also to ensure that members of our Fact-Finding Mission may return to Georgia or otherwise continue to work on specific projects related to Georgia without concern for their safety or success. Thus, precisely attributed quotations are missing from this Report.
Acknowledgments
We extend to all persons who took of their time to inform us about the situation in Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia our most sincere thanks. We are keenly aware, of course, that it is impossible to write a report that will please everyone. Thus, even while gratified by certain aspects of our report, many will be disappointed as well. Everyone interviewed, however, contributed significantly to our understanding, and for this reason we extend to all concerned our deepest gratitude, and not least to the several local English-speaking translators upon whom we relied. To them we acknowledge a special indebtedness, as we do also to Professor Stephen Jones of Mount Holyoke College who generously gave of his time to review this report.
* * *
We dedicate this Report, for which we are solely responsible,
to the young people of Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. May
they find peaceful and just ways of co-existence! War is no sign
of statesmanship. It is proof that humane problem-solving has failed.
War itself is a defeat for humanity, only seldom a necessary evil.
It is almost never a realistic means to solve problems.
Marta Cullberg Weston
Burns H. Weston
15 December 1994
The Republic of Georgia is located on the southern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains between the Black and Caspian seas in a region--Caucasia--that is rich and colorful in cultural tradition and that evokes romantic associations of fiercely independent mountain people and of free-roaming Cossacks on white horses. Though times are changing, much of that tough, independent, and adventurous spirit is still present. Intense feelings of love and hate are evident everywhere, as are also strong loyalties to clan and family, and to the land on which these intense feelings and strong loyalties have been nurtured. But not to be overlooked is a nearly religious attitude toward generous hospitality. At one point, indeed, we were held as "hospitality hostages". To be a guest at a typical Georgian, Abkhazian, or South Ossetian dinner, complete with its tradition of toasting, is a life-long experience that enriches one's outlook on life.
Bordered on the north and northeast by Russia, on the southeast by Azerbaijan, on the south by Armenia and Turkey, and on the west by the Black Sea, Georgia was once an important part of "the Great Silk Road" of earlier times, and in many ways it still is a bridge between East and West and North and South. Its geo-strategic importance is self-evident.
The people of Georgia have a long and proud cultural history. Georgia was among the first countries to convert to Christianity (in 330 A.D.), and most of their early written texts were religious. The Georgian language, with its unique alphabet (one of fourteen different alphabets in the world), existed in written form as early as 400 A.D. and is linguistically distant from Slavic as well as the Turkic or Indoeuropean languages. [3] Georgia has also a rich cultural history of dance, music, theater and literature.
Historical and statistical data concerning Georgia may be noted in the accompanying chart on page 8. Absorbed by Russia in the first half of the Nineteenth Century, it proclaimed its independence in May 1918, with Soviet recognition being extended two years later. In February 1921, after being overrun by the Red Army, it was proclaimed a Soviet republic. In 1922, it entered the USSR as a component of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (TSFSR). In 1936, it became a separate Union republic. And from 1936 until the early 1990s, it remained geopolitically as it was formed in 1922, with two autonomous republics (Abkhazia and Adzharia) and one autonomous region or oblast (South Ossetia) incorporated within its borders.
A truly multicultural society, Georgia has a large Armenian population (9%), as well as Russians (7.5%), Azerbaijani (5%), and Ossetians (3%) in addition to Georgians (69%). The 1989 census counted fourteen officially recognized national minorities within Georgia, nine of them numbering over 30,000 people. The ability to handle these minorities will seal Georgia's fate. As Georgian specialist Professor Stephen Jones has written: "The conduct [that] emerging states take towards their minorities [has] become a barometer of their democratic intentions." [4]
Source: Elizabeth Fuller, The Transcaucasus: War, Turmoil, Economic Collapse, in 3 RFE/RL Research Report 51, 56 (No. 1, January 1994).
After 200 years of almost uninterrupted Russian rule, Georgia is trying to become an independent, democratic State. In the late 1980s, glasnost and perestroika evoked strong yearnings for independence in Georgia, not surprisingly considering that Georgians have always strongly defended their language and always have managed to keep a strong sense of national identity. In fact, Georgia was the second republic after Lithuania to declare independence from the Soviet Union. But the problems in becoming independent and democratic have turned out to be gigantic.
At Georgia's Supreme Soviet balloting in October-November 1990, a pro-independence Free Georgia--Round Table coalition secured a parliamentary majority (155 of the 250 seats), and on April 9, 1991 it declared the Republic's independence. On April 14 it named its Chairman and leader of the pro-independence Free Georgia--Round Table coalition, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, to the new post of Executive President of the Republic. Approximately six weeks later, on 26 April 1991, Gamsakhurdia retained the post by winning 87% of the vote in Georgia's first direct presidential election.
In coming to power, however, Gamsakhurdia made much worse what already were very difficult problems in becoming independent of the Soviet Union. By espousing a virulent nationalism ("Georgia for the Georgians"), he antagonized most if not all of the ethnic minorities within Georgia and, in the process, provoked bloody conflict within the country--not once, but three times within three years before his apparent suicide on 31 December 1993 (after his government was overthrown in a coup d'état around New Year 1992). The pride of the Georgian people in their tradition of cultural non-discrimination did not prevent him from creating enormous trauma for the entire country based on ethnic division.
A wish for independence parallel to the one experienced by Georgia
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union thus arose in Georgia's autonomous republics
and regions, with Gamsakhurdia's untamed nationalism naturally causing
the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians to become more and more embittered.
An immature and unwise policy on Georgia's part, with covert Russian support
for the self-determinist Abkhaz and South Ossetians, [5] led to war.
The first leadership of any newly emerging democratic State, typically has no experience in democratic governance. Often elected on a nationalistic agenda, they (mis)use nationalistic conflicts to hide the fact that they have no real solutions to the economic and structural problems that face their newly independent country, and usually the problems that confront them are enormous. In the case of Georgia, the strong emotional power of the independence movement there led to an abrupt rupture of economic as well as political ties to the Soviet Union (and subsequently Russia), similar to an amputation without any alternate support system; and as all trade and investment in Georgia had been arranged by the Soviets to suit Soviet (and later Russian) convenience, the economic consequences to Georgia have been disastrous. The abrupt break from Soviet rule created much economic disarray along the way in the form of disrupted energy supplies, a shutdown of many industries, and consequent hardships and shortages of water, electricity, and gas for the general population. In such a transition, populations are affected by psychological stress, one usually sees a regression wherein anxiety is activated and more primitive emotional mechanisms rise to the surface, [6] and the people become susceptible to ethnic antagonisms and populist rhetoric of a dangerous kind.
The Georgians are attempting to build a democratic society and economy from scratch. Worse, they are trying to do so under the continuing influence of an old mentality that seriously inhibits progressive change and that, at the outset, provoked a period of wholesale chaos. Professor Stephen Jones summarizes the old inhibiting legacy in an illuminating way:
People who knew Gamsakhurdia before his political career report of paranoid trends and a somewhat deviant personality. As a politician, his omnipotent and paranoid personality traits became quite problematic as they fused with a nationalistic preoccupation. Professor Jones comments that "his writings and speeches are infused with a Messianic vision of Georgia's future" and "reminds one of the fantastic pseudo-racial concoctions of nineteenth century pamphleteers". [10] We recognize this type of thinking from several newly independent States, as in the republics of the former Yugoslavia where a nationalistic fever ousted all reason and perspective in a self-glorifying egocentric circle.
By an ostentatious "Georgia for the Georgians" program, Gamsakhurdia fanned the nationalistic flames that had started in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Calling the South Ossetians "ungrateful guests" in Georgia (as they had lived in South Ossetia for "only 300 years", according to the Georgian version), initiating rallies against the Ossetians, and abolishing the South Ossetian Autonomous Region's oblast status naturally created intense bitterness and animosity in South Ossetia. Against Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Georgian government proclaimed a new Georgian language decree and encouraged rallies against the secessionist movements, rallies which turned violent. As one knowledgeable observer has put it:
But Gamsakhurdia's authoritarian and undiplomatic ways towards his opponents, though he was initially a popular politician, created many enemies. His ambivalent reactions to the coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow further antagonized the opposition, including two important war-lords: Tengiz Kitovani and Dzaba Ioseliani. Kitovani has been appointed to lead the National Guard and Ioseliani had created his own armed force, the Mkhedrioni. A coup d'état led by Kitovani, Ioseliani, and former Prime Minister Sigua during late-December 1991 and early-January 1992 ousted Gamsakhurdia from office, and he subsequently fled to the Republic of Chechnya.
The military junta that ruled temporarily thereafter, however, could not establish any credible legitimacy despite a propagandistic campaign by Eduard Shevardnadze, calling it a change towards democracy. Thus, in March 1992, Kitovani, Ioseliani, and Sigua called upon Shevardnadze to return to Georgia as "Head of State", and a new era began. As shall be seen, however, Georgia remains in transition chaos and has yet to demonstrate any great improvement.
The Georgian economy was closely tied to the Soviet system and it broke down upon Georgia's declaration of independence in 1990-91. In 1990, according to a World Bank report [12] more than 67% of Georgia's exports went to Russia while 60% if its imports came from Russia, with energy supplies coming through other Soviet republics at reduced prices. After independence, these states wanted world market price payment for gas, oil, etc., and Georgia had no cash. In agriculture, Georgia's specialization on such products as fruit, vegetables, tea, and wine was logical from a climatic viewpoint, but it left the country non-self-sustaining in basic foodstuffs, and industrial products were directed towards the Soviet market. The cut-off of the links to the Soviet Union (Russia) left the industry without raw materials, without energy supplies, and without a market. Production fell drastically, as Georgia had to close down over 60% of the Republic's industrial capacity (in January-February 1991). [13] Additionally, war in certain regions, with its own costs, aggravated the economic collapse of tourism, which had been an important source of income. All these elements led to a progressive break-down of the economic system and a free-fall in the economy. A restructuring of the economy is under way, but has not yet resulted in any improvements for the people or for industry.
Living in Tbilisi vividly illustrates the situation. In this beautiful city, there are big holes in the streets (partly a function of prior military conflict) or manhole covers missing (being stolen and sold for scrap) so that cars must drive very carefully on what little fuel is available. Almost every house is in bad repair and seriously in need of paint or plaster. The plumbing is often not working and water is an unreliable commodity. Electricity is often shut off, so that one may have to walk many flights for lack of a working elevator. Telephones function in certain districts, but not in others, and long-distant telephone calls are altogether impossible without a trip to the central telephone exchange (for lack of a working postal system through which to pay one's bills). The entire Parliament has but two computers to serve them!
The unemployment figures in Georgia may not be alarming, but the reality is that people do not earn any money at their work! An average salary is around forty US cents per month! So, to travel to collect one's salary (as indicated, the postal service does not work) often costs more than one is paid. At the same time, most prices today are at world market-levels. Only bread is still relatively cheap. [14] People survive on bread and on home-grown vegetables and cheese (a common commodity), but most families have to sell their possessions to survive. A minister in the government has a salary of approximately 2-3 US dollars per month, and one distressed governmental minister told us that his wife had to sell her jewelry for them to manage their finances. Today, approximately 90% of the population lives near or below the "poverty line". [15]
The black market dominates the economy. Average living costs are estimated at about 15-20 US dollars per month, so the shadow economy is of course substantial. In these circumstances, one has to wonder at some of the prescriptions for economic change that the World Bank recommends to the Georgian government: "restrain the growth of wages", a "reduction in pensions and social programmes" (already as low as incomes, of course), and the development of "incentives for savings"! [16] In its efforts to move to a free-market economy, the Government set out on a privatization course first in the agricultural sector and then in public housing, although not always in a well thought-out process. Many economic reforms are still to be enacted, partly because the government has failed to appoint true reformers to power, partly because the economic process is dominated by the black market. Most incomes are part of this shadow economy, few are therefore prepared to bite the hand that feeds them, and this, in turn prevents the Government from implementing any significant tax laws to collect any significant tax revenues. The mafia appear to be among the few, albeit illegal, winners of the reforms that have been attempted.
There also are serious doubts voiced about the Head of State,
Eduard Shevardnadze, as a leader of the economic transition. His
appointment of old "apparatchnicks" to key positions do not inspire confidence.
Shevardnadze is often referred to as having foxlike-qualities, and that is probably necessary to survive in the chaotic political climate that is Georgia. His return to Georgia in March 1992 was a return to chaos following the coup d'état engineered by Tengiz Kitovani, Dzaba Ioseliani, and former Prime Minister Sigua. International correspondent Elizabeth Fuller calls it his "Via Dolorosa". [17] He was summoned by an illegitimate "Military Council", Gamsakhurdia had refused to resign as President, and there was unrest in Mingrelia, Gamsakhurdia's home province in addition to two intense ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As seen, there also was economic catastrophe.
Upon Shevardnadze's return, a "State Council" was established
with Shevardnadze as Chairman of the Council's Presidium and the three
strong men from the coup as Deputy Chairmen--war-lords Kitovani and Ioseliani
plus former Prime Minister Sigua--to whom Shevardnadze was beholden.
The task of balancing these forces, establishing national reconciliation,
and preparing for elections (scheduled for October) was of course a formidable
one, albeit one that would give legitimacy to his position.
Due largely to his international reputation, the world reacted positively to Shevardnadze as "Head of State". Within weeks, even though Tbilisi did not control all of claimed Georgian territory at the time (i.e., South Ossetia and Mingrelia) and despite the fact that Shevardnadze had ridden to power on the back of an illegal coup d'état, international recognition of Georgia was forthcoming. Indeed, the international community did not even demand special guarantees to protect Georgia's ethnic minorities or guarantees against human rights violations in general. Also, in part because Shevardnadze quickly presented an economic reform program that more or less pleased the West, he was able to escape foreign criticism when he resorted to anti-civil libertarian measures against the supporters of former President Gamsakhurdia while his illegitimate government prepared for the scheduled October elections.
Shevardnadze's leadership style was more mature than that of Gamsakhurdia. He did not use ethnic conflict as a tool of politics and, indeed, tried hard to defuse it. But he was not unqualifiedly successful in the early days. The government he set up tried to balance all forces by including the opposition, and this turned out to be quite ineffective. Additionally, he was from the beginning dependent on Kitovani and Ioseliani, the strong men after the coup, and was unable to control them, Kitovani with his National Guard and Ioseliani with his Mkhedrioni. In August 1992, for example, he dispatched Kitovani and the National Guard to Mingrelia to handle a kidnapping of several government hostages, but was unable to prevent Kitovani from marching straight on to Sukhumi (the capital of Abkhazia), firing upon the Parliament building there, and thus commencing an all-out war with Abkhazia, one that turned out to be fatal for Georgia and almost so for Shevardnadze personally. Shevardnadze claims that he did not give the orders; but the fact remains that he was unable to rein Kitovani in and thereby avoid the subsequent deleterious consequences (see Section V, below).
Similarly, while Shevardnadze managed a ceasefire within just a few months (by Summer 1992) in the earlier conflict he inherited from Gamsakhurdia in South Ossetia, he nevertheless was unable to curb severe violence there during the months after his takeover. The South Ossetians claim that more people died in the short time after Shevardnadze came to power than in the period before, and this has created a strong bitterness against his government. Also, they criticize him for keeping a war-lord and former criminal (Ioseliani) as his closest advisor. It is important to recall, however, that Shevardnadze was not in control from the minute he arrived in Georgia and that it takes time to find ways to balance competing internal pressures and personalities.
In sum, it remains to be seen whether Shevardnadze is or is not
"the savior of Georgia". It is by no means clear. Only time
will tell.
Georgians claim that the South Ossetians emigrated from the north a few centuries ago while the South Ossetians claim that they have lived in the area since the migration from Persia, that it is their homeland, and that they fought through the centuries for their freedom against Georgian Kings. They refer for example to Queen Tamara, a legendary Georgian Queen from the 10th Century, as part Ossetian and married to an Ossetian.
South Ossetia was first incorporated into Russia in 1774, followed by Georgia in 1801. After the Russian Revolution of 1918, however, Georgia announced its separation from Russia (ultimately very brief) and, in turn, South Ossetia (encouraged by the Bolsheviks) announced its independence from Georgia, an event that led to intense aggression from the Georgian authorities and ultimate defeat of this self-determinist impulse. According to the Ossetians, 20,000 Ossetians died in this "first genocide", and many people fled to North Ossetia.
In 1921, when Georgia, with South Ossetia in tow, was integrated
into the newly founded Soviet Union, the Ossetians no longer had a border
problem between North and South Ossetia. During the time of Josef
Stalin (a Georgian), however, there was forced "Georgianization" in the
form of a change of alphabet, Georgian as the State language, and the closing
of Ossetian schools, and in 1946, Stalin deported many South Ossetians
to Ingushetia. Life was grim and accordingly many people left South
Ossetia for Georgia proper and elsewhere. The Ossetians claim that
at the time of the Russian Revolution there were as many Ossetians in North
as in South Ossetia. In 1991, there were 350,000 Ossetians in the
North but only 68,000 Ossetians in South Ossetia--due, the South Ossetians
claim, to a discriminatory policy against them. Today, quite a few
Ossetians (more than 100,000) live in Georgia proper. They of course
were the target of different discriminatory actions during the war, such
as being forced to give up their jobs, being harassed, being forced from
their apartments, etc.--a form of "ethnic cleansing". On the other
hand, there were quite a few Georgians living in South Ossetia (around
30,000 before the war) and they in their turn became the target of Ossetian
violence. There still are quite a few Georgian villages in South
Ossetia, around Tskhinvali, South Ossetia's capital, especially.
South Ossetia is connected to North Ossetia via a tunnel three
to four kilometers long through the Caucasus Mountains that was completed
in 1987; also via arduous mountain passes. In wintertime, both of
these routes are often cut off, as the road to the tunnel is difficult.
The emotional ties to the North are strong (although stronger, it appears,
than emotional ties from the North to the South). Part of the program
of the independence movement in South Ossetia calls for unification
with North Ossetia.
In August 1989, the language act that made Georgian the official language in the schools fueled the independence feelings in South Ossetia, and in a letter dated November 1989 the Oblast Council of South Ossetia requested the Georgian Supreme Soviet to grant South Ossetia the status of an autonomous republic. In response, in his anti-Ossetian campaign, Gamsakhurdia called the South Ossetians "ungrateful guests" of Georgia, alluding to the (Georgian) claim that they have lived in the area for only a few centuries. Further, Georgia refused to use the name "South Ossetia" and began to refer to the region as "Samochablo" (an ancient Georgian name) or the "Tskhinvali Region" (after the regional capital city).
In November 1989, groups of Georgian nationalists planned a march on Tskhinvali, avowedly as a continuation of so-called "friendship meetings" initiated by the Georgians in the weeks and months preceding, most of which increased rather than decreased tension between the principal parties, the meetings more and more turning into rallies. The march on Tskhinvali was no different, except that this time the "friendship meeting" involved approximately 15,000 people arriving in buses and cars which, not surprisingly, the South Ossetians viewed as an invasion force which they chose to stop outside Tskhinvali's city limits. Clashes between different groups led to hundreds of injuries, and five people were killed.
Thereafter, although there developed a short period of stabilization through to Autumn 1990, the South Ossetian demand for independence intensified, in part because, during Summer 1990, the Georgian Parliament annulled all of Georgia's treaties with the Soviet Union and adopted the Georgian Constitution of 1921, a psychologically and politically important step for the South Ossetians because in 1921 South Ossetia was not part of Georgia. Georgia's adoption of the Constitution of 1921, in other words, formed the base for South Ossetia's (and Abkhazia's) declaration of independence.
In September 1990, the South Ossetians proclaimed their independence as "The Soviet Republic of South Ossetia" (a proclamation that so far has failed to gain any international recognition), and in October they boycotted post-Soviet Georgia's first free elections in favor of elections of their own. The Georgian elections, however, brought Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the Round Table Free Georgia coalition to power. The Gamsakhurdia government not only annulled the South Ossetian elections; on December 11, 1990, it annulled South Ossetia's status as an autonomous region (oblast) and a day later imposed martial law under a declared state of emergency on the stated grounds that two Georgians and one Ossetian had been murdered in Tskhinvali under mysterious circumstances. As might have been expected, however, these actions sharply aggravated the conflict. Subsequently, Soviet Interior Ministry forces were sent to the area to establish order, a move that upset the Georgians, who, conditioned to be wary of Moscow, saw it as meddling in Georgia's internal affairs.
On the night of January 5, 1991, Georgian residents (who, according to Ossetian sources, has been warned of coming events) began to flee en masse from Tskhinvali; and the day after Georgia dispatched three to four thousand militia (the South Ossetian's claim 6,000) to Tskhinvali "to maintain order". The militia were seen by the South Ossetians as an occupation force, however, and a resulting South Ossetian resistance led to three weeks of urban warfare complete with armed barricades, shooting, burning of houses, and a division of the town into Georgian- and Ossetian-controlled zones until the Georgian militia were pushed out of the city.
Forced out of Tskhinvali, the Georgians, however, were not defeated, as they still held the heights around the city and much of the surrounding rural area. Georgian paramilitaries shelled the city on a daily basis, retaliations were instituted against Ossetians in the countryside, and many South Ossetian villages were burned to the ground.
All of which led to retaliation and a spiral of reciprocal violence between the parties, with the result that South Ossetians started to flee to North Ossetia and Georgians to Georgia, not always safely. [18] As one informed observer has put: "On Gamsakhurdia's orders, electricity and water supplies to Tskhinvali were cut off, and the road by which Tskhinvali received food and other products was blocked. Ossetians also cut off Georgian-populated villages from the rest of Georgia." [19] And as if this were not enough, the military blockade imposed by Georgia upon South Ossetia severely impeded rescue operations in respect of two devastating earthquakes in South Ossetia in April and July 1991.[20] Even now, approximately three years later, people in the Ossetian village of Dzhava live in temporary housing, much of the international money for rebuilding the area being still in Georgia.
Negotiations among Georgia, the USSR, North Ossetia, and South Ossetia temporarily defused the violence. A Joint Commission working in May, June, and early July 1991 managed to diminish the looting, the arson, and the inter-ethnic violence. [21] It was not, however, re-established after the summer because of the coup in Moscow and because of a refusal by Georgia to take part. [22] As observed by Helsinki Watch: "At that time President Gamsakhurdia, who used the conflict in South Ossetia to enhance his nationalistic appeal, rejected both parliamentary proposals to renew the Joint Commission's activities and calls from the opposition to form a multi-national commission to resolve the conflict." [23]
In July 1991, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of South Ossetia, Kulumbekov, was invited to Tbilisi for talks. Upon arrival, however, he was arrested and jailed in the local KGB prison. [24] This deceptive behavior of course intensified the conflict. The South Ossetian leadership supported the putsch in Moscow and "Gamsakhurdia used the failure of the putsch to launch a new attack on the separatists" [25] while, at the same time, "a number of Ossetians were sacked from jobs in some places of Georgia." [26] Many atrocities were committed by both sides.
Respite did not come even in December 1991-January 1992 when, as previously indicated, former President Gamsakhurdia was ousted from office. While Georgia's subsequent interim government called for a cessation of the conflict and released Kulumbekov, the conflict continued more or less unabated. There is in fact much bitterness in South Ossetia directed against Shevardnadze because even more people were killed after he came to power than during the earlier phase.
Finally, in July 1992, a ceasefire was negotiated by Eduard Shevardnadze and Boris Yeltsin, and Russian peacekeepers were sent to the area to work with the Georgian and South Ossetian military to reestablish peace and order. Interestingly, even though the Russian-led tripartite peacekeeping force has so far been unable or disinclined to disarm the countryside, the ceasefire has held, and during the last two years there has been only sporadic fighting. On the other hand, no peace talks have taken place, partly due to the Abkhazian conflict which has dominated the political scene, but also because some passage of time appears to have been necessary to permit emotions settle down enough to negotiate.
Further, the economic situation in Tskhinvali has become severe due to Georgia's economic and military blockade. Tskhinvali's water supply, for example, is dependent on a pipe line from the Caucasus Mountains that runs through Georgian villages which use up the water or divert it so that the inhabitants of Tskhinvali have water only a few hours a day. And in relation to the earthquake-devastated town of Dzhava, for another, relief comes only from Russia because funds have been held up in Georgia. All of which naturally fosters sympathetic bonds to Russia rather than to Georgia. Indeed, the South Ossetians have begun to establish physical linkages to Russia that can make them structurally independent of Georgia. An electrical power line has been extended from Russia's North Ossetia and, in Autumn 1994, the South Ossetians were to regain their telecommunications with the outside world via a telephone line from North Ossetia. The North Ossetian factor is important. North Ossetia is South Ossetia's lifeline to the outside world and its strongest economic supporter, and while there are limits to what North Ossetia can and will provide (it has problems of its own and has had to absorb many refugees from South Ossetia), we regret not having had the time to travel to Vladikavkaz, its capital city, to talk with the political leadership there.
The South Ossetian leadership is quite determined to accept nothing but independence from Georgia or, alternatively, unification with Russia. The Georgians, on the other hand, cannot accept an independent South Ossetia. It is therefore important that a dialogue be started and that steps be taken that can signal a new and more tolerant political climate in Georgian-South Ossetian context. Solving the water-supply problem would be a good first beginning, and a relatively easy step to show good will. But as of this writing, to our best knowledge, no solution is in site. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) initiated a dialogue between Georgia and South Ossetia in North Ossetia in June 1994, and the joint statement emanating from that meeting outlines several practical measures to be initiated as confidence-building measures. [27] As of July-August 1994, however, little or no progress had been made.
The Abkhaz, an Orthodox Christian people with their own language, are reported to have lived in the area, along with Georgians, as early as 500 B.C., at about the same time that the ancient Greeks founded trading posts along its shores and colonized the region. Their history, however, has seldom been marked by genuine self-rule and cultural autonomy. It was not until the 8th Century A.D., after Abkhazia was conquered by the Romans in 65 B.C. and after the decline of subsequent Byzantine influence, that Leon II managed to create the first kingdom of the Abkhaz. [28] In 975, under a Georgian, Beograd III, the eastern and the western parts of the kingdom were absorbed into one Georgian kingdom. From 1555 to 1806, Abkhazia came under Ottoman control. In 1810, to escape Ottoman influence, it joined Russia, only to have thousands of its people flee to Turkey during Caucasian wars in the mid- to late-19th Century (a process of population reduction that would continue). In 1918, the revolutionary Mensheviks brought it under their control and started a much-resented process of "Georgianization". And in 1921, after Georgia was overrun by the Red Army, it became a Treaty Republic of the Soviet Union associated with Georgia, until 1931 when it became an Autonomous Republic within Georgia.
But Abkhazia's autonomy within Georgia turned out to be only paper thin. Stalin's reign of terror during the 1930s, hard on many parts of the Soviet Union, marked another period of "Georgianization". Lavrentii Beria, a Mingrelian Georgian born near Sukhumi (and later head of Stalin's secret police), is reputed to have been the mastermind behind the repressive policies against Abkhazia. As in South Ossetia, Georgian was declared the state language, Abkhaz schools were abolished, and Abkhaz radio broadcasts were forced to cease, and the region was otherwise the target of political and economical discrimination. Added to which, Georgians were induced to immigrate to Abkhazia and the relative proportions of the population changed. By 1979, the Abkhaz constituted only 17% of the total population (see Table 1) as against 44% Georgian, although it should be noted that the vast majority of the Georgian population were Mingrelians, a regional people that have long been ambivalent toward Georgian rule from Tbilisi.
During the Brezhnev era, in 1978-79, protest of the longstanding economic and cultural discrimination against the Abkhaz led to some important reforms that upgraded respect for Abkhazian economic and cultural autonomy, including, among other things, the establishment of the University of Sukhumi. However, when Perestroika unlocked Abkhazia's longing for independence from Tbilisi, the Georgians failed to appreciate that this impulse paralleled their own yearnings for independence from Moscow, with the consequence that many unwise political steps were taken by Tbilisi that seriously aggravated the tension between the Abkhaz and Georgian political authorities and people. The stage was set for the present conflict.
Two events in the respective capitals of Sukhumi and Tbilisi in 1989 increased the tensions. A crackdown by Soviet troops on a peaceful independence demonstration in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989, killing several Georgians and wounding around a hundred, not only magnified the Georgian drive towards independence but also polarized feelings towards the Abkhaz. Violent clashes between Abkhaz and Georgians then took place in Sukhumi in July 1989, when Georgia created a Georgian division in the University of Sukhumi. Fourteen people died and many hundreds were wounded.
A political war ensued. In December 1990, in response to the Georgian Parliament's annulment in Summer 1990 of all of Georgia's treaties with the Soviet Union and its adoption of the politically and psychologically important Georgian Constitution of 1921, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet elected the historian Vladislav Ardzinba, a person with close links to Moscow, [30] as its Chairman. In Sukhumi, in November 1991, a third congress of the Assembly of North Caucasian Peoples, formed in August 1989, adopted a Treaty for a Confederative Union of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. And in July 1992, the Abkhaz reinstated their 1925 Constitution, further underscoring their drive for independence. The support of the North Caucasian peoples and of different military factions from Russia turned out to be critical in the military war that was to ensure.
The Georgians, it should be noted, have never really questioned Abkhazia's right to autonomy the way they have that of South Ossetia. They acknowledge that Abkhazia is the only Abkhaz State, in contrast to their view that only North Ossetia--not South Ossetia--can be "the Mother State" for Ossetians. But they were upset about the privileges that the 17% Abkhaz population had acquired: 28 seats in the Abkhazian Parliament relative to 26 seats for the Georgians and 11 for other nationalities. A policy continued from the Soviet period, whereby the titular ethnic group enjoyed more privileges relative to other ethnicities, [31] it nevertheless was actually supported by Gamsakhurdia.
Thus, with the Gamsakhurdia regime never having been recognized internationally and therefore with Abkhazia's claimed international borders being left unsettled, the return of Shevardnadze to Georgia and Georgia's subsequent recognition within its old borders, including Abkhazia, was a serious set-back for the Abhkaz. Talks about some federalized solution had actually started with Georgian parliamentary representatives on August 13, 1992 and were supposed to have been resumed the day following, but the war of words and politics transformed quickly into a real war of guns. On August 14, Tengiz Kitovani, who is said to have been dispatched to free some Georgian politicians taken hostage by Gamsakhurdia groups, but who was himself violently opposed to any independence for Abkhazia, took it upon himself to march into Sukhumi with the National Guard, start shooting at the Parliament building there, and thus commence a serious violent conflict. [32]
Fighting continued, and on August 25 Gia Qarqarashvili, a general of the Georgian National Guard, appeared on Abkhaz television to issue an ultimatum, often referred to by people we interviewed and directed at precisely the Abkhaz's sensitive nerve, i.e., their fight for cultural and ethnic survival. If the Abkhaz would not lay down their arms "the Abkhazians would have no one left to carry on their race. One hundred thousand Georgians would be sacrificed for the 97,000 Abkhazians, but Georgia's borders would remain intact". [33] These types of threats, not unusual among different Georgian politicians and generals, of course provoked intense hatred, and in the end only reinforced the movement for independence in Abkhazia.
Thus, while a cease fire was brokered in Moscow on September 3, 1992, fighting continued, and on October 1, the formal ceasefire collapsed in an all-out Abkhazian counterattack. The Abkhaz, supported by North Caucasian and covert Russian forces, [34] drove the Georgian troops from Gagra and other cities. Along the way, both armies committed atrocities against the opposite civilian populations. And as a result a large portion of the Georgian population in Abkhazia, midst such experiences and rumors, fled.
Fighting continued. Parts of eastern Abkhazia were brought under Abkhaz control and the whole of western Abkhazia was retaken by the Abkhaz forces, with a demarcation line drawn for a long while along the Gumista River outside Sukhumi. In the meanwhile, enormous hardship was suffered by the civilian population. It has been calculated that, within a relatively short period of time, under threat of physical harm and with many of their homes being burned to the ground, the majority of the Georgian population in Abkhazia fled eastward into Georgia proper, resulting in an enormous ethnic cleansing. Sukhumi, still under Georgian control, was all this time shelled from the hills held by the Abkhaz forces with their North Caucasian and covert Russian support.
A new ceasefire was agreed upon on May 14, 1993, but it held for only two weeks, with heavy fighting continuing into July. Then, in Sochi (Russia), on July 27, a new agreement was concluded through the mediation of the Russian Federation, calling for the withdrawal of all heavy Georgian arms from Sukhumi and for a demilitarization of the conflict zone. International observers were to be deployed to monitor the process. However, this ceasefire turned out only to buy time for the Abkhaz forces to regroup and reorganize, evidently using the intelligence and the organization capacity of certain Russian forces. Also, they were joined by several battalions of north Caucasian troops.
On the August 14, 1993, one year after the first Georgian attack by Tengiz Kitovani, a major attack was launched on Sukhumi by the Abkhaz side. In swift time they managed to overthrow the poorly organized Georgian forces, which had given up their heavy artillery according to the May 14 ceasefire agreement. Shevardnadze called in vain for support from the Russians, the supposed guarantors of the ceasefire agreement; likewise from the international community. He even came to Sukhumi to take personal charge and to support the Georgian troops, but was forced to flee at the last minute before Sukhumi fell. Several of his top aides did not escape and suffered brutal and savage deaths. One large group of Georgian refugees fled hastily up through the mountain passes towards Georgia, creating a large wave of refugees, made catastrophic by the increasing snows of an approaching winter. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was called in to alleviate the worst sufferings. Later, Russia imposed energy sanctions on the Abkhaz for breaking the ceasefire agreement, a symbolic retribution.
The Georgian troops were totally paralyzed by what had happened and retreated in disorganized fashion through the eastern Gali region back to Georgia. The Abkhaz forces easily retrieved the whole of Abkhazia, including the Gali region with its 98% Georgian (Mingrelian) population before the war. In Mingrelia (Georgia), the remnants of the Georgian army ran into troops loyal to Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who proceeded to rout them and take their weapons. Within a short while, Gamsakhurdia's troops took Zugdidi and approached Tbilisi. Shevardnadze practically had the rope around his neck.
Under these dire circumstances, Shevardnadze agreed to Georgia's becoming a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which Russia had held out as a condition of its assistance. Thereafter, he received the covert Russian support for the Georgian forces that the Abkhaz had gotten previously, and within a few months the Mingrelia situation changed completely. Gamsakhurdia found his troops thoroughly defeated and, on New Years Eve 1993-94, he allegedly committed suicide (according to most sources, although there are many versions).
Having thus avoided the final catastrophe, Shevardnadze was faced with two major defeats. Each remain his most critical problems today: the loss of Abkhazia and the loss of independence from Russia through the joining of the CIS.
When we visited Abkhazia (in July 1994), the effect of the ethnic
cleansing there was most evident. The region was depopulated (especially
in eastern Abkhazia), tens of hundreds of houses had been destroyed, medical
facilities were grossly inadequate, and the economy was at a total standstill.
The Abkhaz are paying a heavy price for their separatist policies.
Furthermore, their continued hostile refusal to accept the return of displaced
Georgians is creating a human catastrophe.
Adzharia has been ruled by several family clans, which have tended to appoint their own members to the important jobs. "President Gamsakhurdia, ignoring all democratic procedures, appointed to the leadership of the Adzharian parliament Aslan Abashidze, who reportedly is a grandson of the Pasha appointed by Turkey before the Russian empire occupied this territory". [35] Abashidze, in turn, proceeded to appoint his own people to central positions.
Not surprisingly, therefore, a certain unrest was noticeable when a pro-democracy movement became influential with the new government in Tbilisi and Abashidze became insecure and started to talk about the distinct features of the Adzhars. And unrest was noticeable, too, when some political parties in Georgia called for a referendum in Adzharia on abolishing Adzharia's autonomous status because of the fact that the Adshars' ethnic identity is 100% Georgian. Strong protests then took part in Adzharia's capital, Batumi.
Time did not permit us the opportunity to travel to Adzharia. However, at present, Adzharia is reportedly calm and stable (Abashidze, it is said, "rules with an iron hand"). There is no indication of any trouble in the area in the near future, and government personnel in Tbilisi seem content to leave well enough alone.
Not surprisingly, the cultural identity of the Meskhetians has developed differently for different groups during their years in exile. Many see themselves as Turks and have developed that cultural identity, speaking only Turkish. Others identify with Georgia and seek to return there. Today, in spite of the 1958 repatriation law, some 200,000 Meskhetians have not been permanently settled. Attacks on the Meskhetians in Uzbekistan in 1989 led many of them to seek entry into Georgia, their ancestral home, [36] but Georgian officials went to great lengths to prevent their return at that time. To permit their return to Georgia in the present situation, however, with a failed or failing economy and with already over 250,000 refugees stemming from the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts, is a very complex and sensitive matter.
Also, it is not clear as to where, precisely, the Meskhetians should return if and when they do return. Meskhetia, along the Turkish border where originally they lived, is an area now populated 46% by Armenians and 48% by Georgians, and it is a poor area with high unemployment besides. Thus one commonly hears among Georgians the sentiment that the Meskhetians are welcome back to Georgia but not now and not to Meskhetia. Not coincidentally, there are rumors (with videotapes to support them) of Meskhetians killing Georgians in unspecified earlier times, which naturally has had the effect of antagonizing part of the population.
In sum, there is a long-fused Meskhetian time bomb waiting to
go off. The Georgian government, which is struggling with the problem,
and the international community as well, would be wise to devise humane
solutions before it is too late.
The policy of "divide and rule" was prominent in Soviet politics. Without doubt, it contributed, too, to the emerging ethnic conflicts in the former USSR. The Georgians, disinclined to entertain such ethnic competition for fear of a house divided, have so far disallowed ethnic representation by quotas in the Georgian Parliament, thus ironically contributing to the ethnic tension between the Georgians, on the one hand, and the Abkhaz and South Ossetians, on the other, that Georgia has wanted to avert. It has not helped that, typically, the Abkhaz and South Ossetian elites have studied in Moscow (due in part to the fact that Russian is their second language), that the Ossetians have all along been more loyal to Russia, or that Abkhazia has been a favorite holiday place for the Russian nomenklatura.
Georgian nationalism posed a real threat to the autonomies within Georgia, such that they came to view the Soviet Union (and later Russia) as a safeguard for, or guarantor of, their ethnic or minority rights. They turned, therefore, to the center (Moscow) for help; and the Soviet Union, willing to play one ethnic group against another, did not delay in responding. Representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were invited to take part in the new (Soviet) Union Treaty drafting process, which was boycotted by Georgia, and they were promised the right to become parties to the Treaty as Union republics. [37] After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, of course, these plans fell through. But before, when Georgia first threatened to break its ties with the Soviet Union, President Gorbachev is said to have warned that Georgia would then loose Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In other words, it is quite evident that Soviet/Russian involvement in these crises has been quite extensive, as noted above in connection with the conflict in Abkhazia. Of course, because of centrifugal ethnic forces in Russia itself, different forces in Moscow had to proceed carefully lest its support of secessionist movements elsewhere would encourage such movements within Russia or among border territories (e.g. in the north Caucasus region and other places). Accordingly, they acted in covert ways.
Lately, peacekeeping, with or without the umbrella of the CIS, has become one way of maintaining Moscow's influence in the "near abroad". A new doctrine similar to the Monroe doctrine in the Americas has emerged, where Russia sees it as its task to keep order in what it considers its back yard. And for fear of destabilizing Boris Yeltsin, the international community has tolerated a great deal of Russian intervention in the name of peacekeeping in Russia's "near abroad"--as in Abkhazia, Moldova, South Ossetia, and Tjadikistan. According to one observer, "Russia has set its sights on regaining predominant influence over the military, political, and economic affairs of the former Soviet Union". [39] Many are voicing similar views, and point to the fact that Russian policy towards Georgia changed noticeably when, in Autumn 1993, in retreat from Abkhazia and under fire in Mingrelia, Shevardnadze felt pressured to commit Georgia to the CIS Since then, Moscow has vowed support for Georgian territorial integrity.
In any event, one sees vividly, in different parts of Russia's
"near abroad", a continuation of the old Soviet impulse toward hegemony.
Moldova, for example, was forced to join the CIS So also, as noted,
was Georgia, and as part of that deal Russia now can keep several of its
military bases within Georgia. Georgia did not get the support from
the international community that was necessary to break away from Russia's
influence, and consequently it was forced back into Russia's arms.
Today, some Georgian officials admit privately that Russian influence on
Georgian policy is substantial, even to the point of saying that "every
important decision is made in Moscow". It is not clear the extent
to which this is understood in the West.
Liberation from an oppressor is of course wonderful and empowering. But the feelings of resentment are strong, and the danger is that political propaganda can exploit them in such a way as to lead to an exaggerated sense of national self-image, even to the extent of believing in one's own or one's nation's omnipotence. Certainly it is common that the newly independent nation will lose appreciation for its interdependence with other nations/ethnic groups, and therefore may enter into a politics of a quite egocentric variety (not unlike teenagers breaking away from the family and needing time on their own before being able to relate in a mature way to the parental structure). This is certainly true of the politics in Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, just as it is true also of the politics in the former Yugoslavia. Once being liberated, it is extremely difficult to enter into a new dependence--which is what makes the international community's predisposition to respect the territorial integrity of Georgia so difficult for the Abkhaz and South Ossetians to accept. For the Georgian population, it was of course extremely difficult emotionally to accept a joining of the CIS, a process that quite understandably has been vehemently opposed by large groups.
But such tolerance breaks down when it comes to territory.
When ethnic groups in Georgia began asserting claims to territory, Georgian
tolerance ceased. The territory of the "motherland" has intense symbolic
ties to the deep-rooted feelings of the people. As soon as any ethnic
group has aspirations on a little piece of this land, it arouses a narcissistic
rage in the population, [40] which is extremely strong and without rational
consideration. This narcissistic rage makes people ready to fight
to the last drop of blood to defend the motherland-- feelings that are
a powerful tool in a leader's hand.
Georgia's nationalistic revival instantly awakened much anxiety among Georgia's minority populations (especially in Abkhazia and South Ossetia) about personal and societal security and about the freedom to express one's cultural identity freely. The nationalistic threat is experienced in the most basic sense--as fear of extinction--and it is a powerful inner agent for radical defensive actions. For the Abkhaz people especially, being only about 97,000 strong, but also for the South Ossetians, the threat of extinction was felt very keenly indeed and most certainly contributed to their political withdrawal from Georgia.
The "chosen traumas" of the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians are, among others, the brutal behavior of Georgians during 1918-21 and, later, Stalin's severe "Georgianization" programs. Georgians, on the other hand, harbor more traumatic memories of Russian oppression, the most recent being the heavy crackdown by Soviet forces on a peaceful demonstration in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989. Despite the ethnic tensions, however, there appears to have been no intense animosity between the peoples in the area. Indeed, intermarriage was not uncommon. The wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have created deep wounds that have to be seriously addressed if they are not to become new "chosen traumas".
In the myths told to the younger generations, there also are stories of the halcyon days of the ethnic group in question. Promises to recreate these halcyon days are often prominent in the political propaganda. The "chosen glories" of the nation/ethnic group, as they may be called, are saluted and the psychological step towards the experience of belonging to a superior nation is a small one.
Thus were the omnipotent strands in Gamsakhurdia's personality played out in policy as an egocentric Georgian perspective of chosen traumas and chosen glories with nationalistically insulting features that quickly antagonized the ethnic minorities. The result: two different wars and two different territories (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) cut off from the central government, and the Georgians were forced to wake up quickly from their nationalistic day-dreams.
Today, many Georgian politicians appear to understand that the earlier nationalistic policy was catastrophic. This realization was of course eased by the fact that there was a change in government via the coup d'état and that therefore the blame could be placed on the old Gamsakhurdia regime. However, it is one of Shevardnadze's major achievements that he has played down nationalistic politics.
It is not only extreme individualism in party politics that is a problem. It is also that political loyalty exists less in relation to a party or platform than it does to a person. In olden times, Georgia was divided into different princedoms, and loyalty towards the prince and his clan was a dominant feature. Loyalty to the person remains a dominant pattern to this day and may, in fact, be at the root of Georgia's political problems, creating difficulties in establishing party platforms. A strong subservient loyalty to the strong leader (the father) is definitely noticeable, and in a way holds Georgia's political life together. But, on the other hand, this pattern of loyalty is reminiscent of the old Soviet system, which did not foster independent actions. It can be a real danger if the strong man turns out to have a destructive policy, as, for example, Gamsakhurdia did.
There is also a pervasive conspiracy mentality in Georgian society,
an attitude that derives from the personal and political intrigues that
are so much of Caucasian history. But it goes far beyond any realistic
assessment. Found among prominent political party leaders, it adds
to an unhealthy political climate. [42]
Obstructing the system by not working or not putting effort into
one's work was part of the common culture during Soviet times. Living
for a long while under oppressive conditions may thus be inferred to dull
one's capacity for creativity. But today, everyone must join together
to build up the country, even if this is an inner change that will not
take place over night.
On the other hand, even when the Georgian media have sought to provide real news, they have, according to some, exacerbated the internal conflicts that have been Georgia since independence. Direct TV coverage of the Georgian Parliament at the height of its nationalistic outbursts is reported to have been enormously instrumental in increasing the ethnic fears in the autonomous republics and regions, and it provided strong support for ethnic discrimination.
As noted, Georgia has gone through a turbulent process of disassociation from the Soviet Union/Russia and now is in the process of reintegration into the Russian sphere of influence. Probably no one but Shevardnadze could have managed Georgia's joining the CIS, but in so doing he compromised his earlier opposition and therefore is criticized, among private citizens at least, as "a pawn of Russia".
In governmental circles, there clearly exists a view that the early Georgian effort to cut off all ties with its most powerful neighbor and most important trade partner was futile. They describe it as an infant's teething problem, realizing that some type of significant relationship will always exist with Russia, if only by virtue of the common history. But they insist that any such relationship must function on a more equal basis than has been true in the past, a co-equal sovereign States.
The political opposition, on the other hand, is not so rational. The fact that Shevardnadze had no other option than to commit Georgia to the CIS at that critical time in October 1993 when Tbilisi was at near risk of being overrun by Gamsakhurdia forces is not an argument in Georgia. This is totally an emotional issue.
Thus, however necessary his decision to commit Georgia to the CIS, Shevardnadze's internal power position was considerably undermined by the move, and he acquired a bitter and loud opposition that can cause a great deal of trouble in the future. The National Democratic Party leader, Ghia Chanturia, got high marks in the public opinion polls in Summer 1994 after he called for Georgia to get out of the CIS, to rebuild the army, and to retake Abkhazia and South Ossetia by force. [46] Anti-Russian emotions run high and cloud rational judgment.
The same cannot be said of Dzaba Ioseliani, however. Of
the original three strong men from the coup, only he, a member of Parliament,
is left at the top today. Some people contend that he is the real
powerbroker in Georgia. There does seem to be, in any event, a kind
of symbiotic relationship between Shevardnadze and Ioseliani, each in need
of the other. Shevardnadze has been dependent on Ioseliani and his
private army. [47] Ioseliani, with a long criminal background before becoming
a dramatist (he earned an academic degree in drama and wrote several successful
plays before becoming a warlord), has been dependent on Shevardnadze to
give him the political and constitutional legitimacy that otherwise he
would not have, at least not with the outside world.
Ioseliani, whose Mkhedrioni troops carried out many atrocities against
the civilian population in Abkhazia, is today Georgia's top negotiator
in the talks with the Abkhaz, and it is argued that Shevardnadze has been
quite shrewd in casting this war lord and powerbroker into a constructive--and
respectable--role. But it is evident also that in many respects
Ioseliani creates problems for Shevardnadze's political image. In
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, people remark with deep anger that Shevardnadze
has a war criminal as his closest collaborator and that therefore he cannot
be trusted. Also, many are upset that, in Ioseliani, Shevardnadze
has a plain old ordinary crook in his inner circle (whose son, rumors point
out, is influential in the mafia and able to control all goods and services
that enter and leave the country).
Perhaps this arrangement is the natural consequence of Shevardnadze having been, before assuming responsibility for the Soviet Union's foreign affairs under President Gorbachev, the Communist Party boss in Georgia. Another additional explanation, however, is that Georgia's formal governmental structure, with a Cabinet of Ministers of the old unwieldy Soviet type, along with Shevardnadze's concern to balance different forces and his conservative personnel policies, led to a situation of paralysis, with agreed-upon reforms often not being carried out and with reformers often finding themselves in the minority. In other words, Georgia's Parliament of 234 seats, representing 26 different political parties and 11 factions, is inefficient, its level of discussion is low, and its procedures are with great frequency ignored. Parliamentary commissions often do not even meet. "A fractured and undisciplined parliament, an unreformed cabinet structure and Shevardnadze's own balancing act between reformers and former communist administrators", Professor Jones observes, "have led to confusion in the decision-making structures of the Georgian state". [49] It is sometimes said that the State Apparatus performs a purely analytical function, but it actually formulates and presents the policies that the different ministries have to follow. Shevardnadze, at the head of this extra-constitutional structure, has the practical power in his hands.
His ability to balance competing internal forces, however, has turned out to be as much a vice as a virtue. To quote Professor Jones once again, "Shevardnadze's lack of leadership on institutional reform and his unwillingness to abandon `balanced' policies aimed at unifying politically incompatible forces, while they permit him to stand above the fray, . . . only further contribute to Georgia's crisis of government". [50] This view, it must be added, is shared by many people we interviewed who question his capacity to lead in the realm of economic reform. It can be easily--and diplomatically--argued that no person is good at everything. Hopefully Shevardnadze can be persuaded to leave economic policy to the reformists who have, in addition to some expertise, a vision for a new future.
In sum, Shevardnadze is in control of Georgia today (thanks in part to the Russians and to Dzaba Ioseliani), but not firmly so. Many problems are waiting to be solved, among them the negotiations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Some tangible or visible improvement in the economy, too, is urgently needed to prevent a return to mayhem and disorder. International support for economic reforms is thus of great importance.
Asking people throughout Georgia who might take the place of Shevardnadze
if something were to happen to him, no one really could name anyone.
As pointed out already, he is one of the few politicians and certainly
the only major politician in Georgia with an international overview and
reputation. As such, he is widely seen as a stabilizing factor and
the only alternative to chaos. But his circumstance is precarious,
and this fact must be taken seriously.
In South Ossetia, a wholly new peacekeeping model is being attempted, wherein Russian troops cooperate with a Georgian and a South Ossetian battalion and all of them are monitored by the CSCE. All parties attested to the fact that this model, new though it is, works. Ever since the peacekeeping troops were stationed in the area in 1992, the ceasefire has held.
On the other hand, there has been much suspicion in Georgia and around the world about the forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Abkhazia (in reality Russian troops) and about the Russian Army in South Ossetia as peacekeeping forces. All of which is natural inasmuch as the Russians were involved in the conflicts behind the scenes in the first place. Also, as indicated above, there is evidence that, through peacekeeping operations, present Russian policy seeks to keep up their influence in Russia's "near abroad". Under these circumstances, therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the international community put pressure on the CIS to achieve some progress in the peace negotiations as a condition of economic and technical assistance to it and/or Russia by the Western world.
Visits with the CIS leadership in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia,
including interviews of some of the actual peacekeeping monitors themselves,
leads us to conclude that the CIS and the Russian Army are assuming their
assigned tasks with a high degree of professionalism. Also, the fact
that the troops speak the language and have a good knowledge of the culture
has been valuable and, we think, contributed to the good result.
The use of CIS/Russian troops in areas of Russian interest (their "near
abroad", now a CIS country) is an issue that the international community
must sooner or later address.
The alleged conflict was settled before our eyes. The governmental official picked up two other phones and spoke, first, with Head of State Shevardnadze and, next, with Dzaba Ioseliani. With the promise that the claimed theft would be investigated and handled by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) monitors, the mayor of Village A, still listening on the first phone, agreed not to attack.
This occurrence illustrates how easy it is for events in these war-torn regions to ignite into flames. Two hundred calves (or even the rumor of 200 stolen calves) could have started the war anew. But the occurrence illustrates also the importance of mechanisms to defuse the conflicts before they get out of hand (the CSCE monitors being an important conflict-defusing mechanism in this instance). It also is an example of an efficient handling of a conflict by the Georgian official and of the importance of lower-level conflict-resolving processes.
But there are many obstacles. Although a federal solution is a compromise solution that may make sense to the international community, it does not meet the requirements of the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians who seek greater independence from Georgia than federalism would allow. It is, thus, not an easy solution. The former Yugoslavia, for instance, was a federalized solution that did not work. There are of course different models of federalism. Germany, Switzerland, and the United States are obviously successful models. But the model that is chosen must be very well tailored and thought out.
The Abkhaz position is that "we won the war", and winning the war has meant to them the achievement of their autonomy and independence, however shaky at the present time. They effectively control their territory, they have a functioning government, and they have assumed sole responsibility for governing themselves since Autumn 1993. They do not want to return to a dependence on Georgia, from which they have wanted to separate all through this century. Time and economics may change all that, however, and so also may Russia through the CIS. The Russians probably are the only ones with the leverage to achieve a federalized solution, which the West has so far failed to take seriously.
Nor has there been any preparation of the population for a solution involving the repatriation of refugees or other dealings with Georgia. One way to get this process going might be to repatriate the refugees from the Gali region in the east first. The population there was 98% Georgian before the war, but of the Mingrelian subgroup, which have not been seen as cooperating with the Georgian government. Of course, as a precondition, the paramilitary bands in the area would have to be disarmed. Human right's observers and UN civil police could be used to oversee the security of the returning refugees.
Alternatively, although admittedly controversial, the political boundaries between Abkhazia and Georgia proper could be redrawn. Changing borders by force is not allowed under international law, but changing them by negotiations is. As noted, the Gali region before the war was populated 98% by Georgians (Mingrelians), whereas the Abkhaz were represented by only 17% of the total population in all of Abkhazia. By severing the Gali region from Abkhazia and linking it to Georgia, the Georgian refugees could reclaim their homeland and the percentage of Abkhaz in Abkhazia would increase. Such reorganization could make either a federalized or confederalized solution easier, and it would assist the refugee problem considerably, but probably it is unacceptable to both sides.
The Georgian position, as previously noted, is that North Ossetia is the "mother State" and that the South Ossetians are just an ethnic minority in the country. Therefore, Georgia is undisposed to accept a federal solution, much less a confederal one, relative to South Ossetia. Indeed, Georgians appear unwilling to return even to the status quo ante where South Ossetia was an autonomous region or oblast. Georgians talk mainly about cultural--not political--autonomy for South Ossetia. The South Ossetian position is of course very different: total independence from Georgia; alternatively, uniting with North Ossetia within Russia. However, the recognition of Georgia by the international community, which supports the principle of territorial integrity, was a serious set back for South Ossetia. Indeed, since Georgia joined the CIS, even Russia, South Ossetia's presumed ally, now proclaims its support for the territorial integrity of Georgia, and notwithstanding that the border between North and South Ossetia is and will remain, according to the President of North Ossetia, Galazov, "transparent".
In any event, it is clear that the South Ossetians are not likely to accept the status quo ante even if it were offered to them. A war has taken place, and the mistrust is even greater than before. Some kind of a federalized solution might prove helpful if it contained far reaching guarantees for self-determination. But it would be taken as a painful setback by the South Ossetians nevertheless, and thus would require much reappraisal of South Ossetia's proclaimed goals. NGOs could play an important part in this regard, preparing the ground for a negotiated solution of this sort. Also, confidence-building measures and efforts at "building peace from below" would be important. The ultimate solution might be an overall federalized solution that includes Abkhazia, Adzharia, South Ossetia, and perhaps other regions (on behalf of, say, an Armenian majority). Accepting South Ossetia as a federalized unit might for the Georgians be easier within a context of other regions becoming federalized units as well.
However, even if the South Ossetians can be persuaded, it is clear
that Georgia has a very long way to go to accept a federalized solution
with South Ossetia. Perhaps the international experts on federalized
solutions recently asked to study the Georgian situation can sell the idea
that there are advantages with an overall federalized solution. In
Georgia, work on a new constitution includes plans for extended regional
self-government, possibly a window opportunity for a federalized general
solution.
The Abkhaz and the South Ossetian position is to insist on independence or on joining Russia, but since Autumn 1993 Russia has repeatedly stated that it recognizes the integrity of Georgia's borders. Accordingly, negotiations between Georgia, on the one hand, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on the other, are stalemated. Not much has happened in recent rounds of negotiations.
However time is a critical factor, a factor that both the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians have seriously to consider: time for the Georgians to build an army; time for refugees to become increasingly demanding and hostile (especially in relation to Abkhazia); and time for the Abkhazian and South Ossetian economies to deteriorate even further than they already have, thus threatening political leadership:
a. The Georgians have started to build an army, with the help of Russian advisors this time. The Georgians do not have money for a large army. The Georgian troops that were fighting in Abkhazia were mainly paramilitaries and local people, and they lacked military discipline and effective training. But even a small, well-trained army of 5,000 persons could pose a threat to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, according to well-informed military observers. The point is not lost on the Georgian leadership. It should not be lost on the Abkhaz or South Ossetian leaders either.
b. The refugees in Georgia, from Abkhazia especially, are becoming ever more desperate and determined to return home. It is clear from driving around Abkhazia that these areas are at present very depopulated, the consequence of major "ethnic cleansing". Most of the Georgian population in Abkhazia (around 200,000 people) fled, along with some 50,000 Russians, Armenians, Greeks, and other minorities [51] -- an instance wherein the ethnic minority (the 17% Abkhaz) "cleansed" the ethnic majority (the 44% Georgians). Strangely, the world community has said precious little about this "ethnic cleansing". The argument that the Abkhaz are native to their respective regions is correct, but so are the Georgians.
In any event, the indigenous people remaining in Abkhazia (some 90,000-100,000 Abkhazians in Abkhazia along with some minorities, the number of which is uncertain after the war) will be unable to run the homeland alone, so that repatriation (or some type of immigration) is necessary. [52] True, the threat to the Abkhaz ethnic/national identity that precipitated the conflict in Abkhazia must be addressed in any settlement. But as long as the refugee problem remains unresolved and refugees are denied the opportunity to return home in peace, [53] there are some 50,000 presumptive soldiers available to Georgia who would be strongly motivated to retake what they consider their land and thus who could be enrolled in military operations. There definitely is strong support among certain political parties in Georgia for a renewed war, so the longer the refugee problem festers the more probable is a violent solution. Officially, this proposition is not yet a matter of policy, and it is not in line with Shevardnadze's thinking. But one of the popular opposition parties, The National Democratic Party, has made the retaking Abkhazia by military means a part of its official program.
c. As in Georgia proper, economic conditions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are extremely depressed and worsening, creating a situation of desperation ripe for rebellion, possibly violent, against the current political status quo. As long as political solutions in relation to Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not reached, the economy in both of these regions will remain at a standstill at best. No serious international economic investments are possible and tourism (an important source of income for Abkhazia and South Ossetia) is dead. This has been the case for two to three years now, and even if people in these territories are prepared to take hardship in return for freedom the economic collapse is extremely burdensome and stress-producing. At present, the international community is beginning to support some economic reconstruction in Georgia, but the benefits that will flow from this support will not extend to the Abkhaz or to the South Ossetians because neither Abkhazia not South Ossetia are recognized as separate juridical entities internationally. The longer this situation persists, the worse off the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will be and the more prone they will be to seek closer ties with Russia. Thus, an economic reconstruction program for Abkhazia and for South Ossetia is an important part of a negotiated solution to the Abkhaz and South Ossetian crises
Similar measures would seem appropriate in the case of Abkhazia as well. The negotiations there have so far focused on the political solution, and have included consideration of the concrete refugee problems that presently are handled/negotiated by the United Nations, including especially the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). However, basic confidence-building measures are called for also, and certainly need to be instigated as well.
Of course, to agree on principles on a paper is one thing, to have them effected in practice another. As of last July, nothing along these lines had been achieved. One searches, therefore, for ways to break the impasse. Obtaining the assistance of impartial and/or uninvolved nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for assistance would be one answer (see Subsection 4 below).