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A Better Electoral System for South Africa?

Key Features of the Present System

South Africa held its first national elections on the basis of universal suffrage in 1994. The elections were held on the basis of proportional representation or PR. Under PR:

Voters cast ballots for a list of candidates nominated by the political party of their choice rather than for individual candidates.
The number of seats allocated to each party closely reflects its percentage of the total vote.
The individuals chosen to occupy the seats allocated to their party depends on their ranking on their party’s list of candidates.

There are no electoral districts in PR systems, but most countries that use PR do not allocate seats to political parties solely on the basis of each party’s share of the national vote. In the case of South Africa, and in more than 20 other countries, a “two tier” method is used:

Of the 400 seats in the National Assembly, 200 are allocated to parties on the basis of their proportions of the total national vote, and 200 are allocated on the basis of their proportions of the vote in each of South Africa’s nine provinces.
This two-tier method was used to elect the first multi-racial National Assembly in 1994 and the second in 1999. However, the South African constitution does not specify what form of electoral system should be used for the next parliamentary elections other than to state, in section 46(1) that the system “results, in general, in proportional representation.”

Strengths of the Present System

South Africa is a rare example of a new democracy where the choice of electoral system was discussed extensively before the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. In the early 1990s, long before the negotiations that that crafted the interim constitution of 1993, ANC leaders including Kader Asmal and Albie Sachs argued that South Africa’s electoral system should be based on PR. Their reasoning was straightforward:

PR would provide all parties, no matter how small, with representation in the national legislature proportional to their electoral support.
PR would provide for the representation of South Africa’s racial minorities without resorting to the creation of reserved seats and separate voters rolls for different racial groups as in Zimbabwe. In other words, PR was a non-racial mechanism to facilitate racial representation if parties would, as expected, draw the most of their support from different racial, ethnic or linguistic groups.
The use of the party list which is the basis of PR would enable all parties, especially the ANC, to insure the election of women, racial minorities, and individuals with specialized expertise by ranking them high on the party’s list.
In sum, a PR system would be a highly inclusive system, and as such the best system for guaranteeing South Africa’s transition to democratic rule.

The arguments in favor of PR were borne out by the 1994 elections:

Two parties that had threatened to boycott the elections—the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and Freedom Front (FF)—participated in the elections and accepted the results.
There was a marked decline in political violence following the elections.

And by the 1999 elections:

Continued participation in the elections by all political parties, and an acceptance of the results.
A cabinet that is arguably more diverse in terms of its racial background, gender and areas of specialization than would be the case with an electoral system that does not require parties to rank-order its candidates on a party list.

Problems with the Present System

Although the choice of PR eased South Africa’s transition to democracy, PR may not be the most appropriate electoral system to assure the consolidation of democracy. Many citizens and political leaders, including members of the governing party, believe the current system should be modified. They cite the following fundamental problems with PR:

Because members of the National Assembly are not elected from electoral districts, it is impossible for the residents of a given geographic area or community to hold individual legislators accountable for their performance on behalf of the community.
Because legislators cannot be held individually accountable for their performance, they have few incentives to learn about the particular needs of local communities, or to address these needs.
Because legislators do not represent the residents of defined geographic areas, they are not easily accessible to members of the public. This is particularly true for South Africa’s rural population, because most members of the National Assembly reside in Gauteng Province or other urban areas, and spend a large part of each year sitting in Parliament in Cape Town. Without traveling long distances to an MP’s home or to Cape Town, most citizens never see a member during the five year interval between elections.
In sum, PR weakens the vital links between government and the public that are the essence of democracy

To address these weaknesses with PR, the following reforms have occurred:

In October 1994, the ANC began to assign each of its members in the National Assembly to a specific geographic area that would be his or her unofficial “constituency.”
All members of the National Assembly, regardless of party, receive 3,000 rand per month to enable them to visit and maintain an office in the “constituency” to which they are sent by their party.

These reforms, however, have not been effective for three reasons.

Most members do not reside in the areas to which they are assigned, and must therefore travel long distances and be away from their families to implement the reform.
The funds provided to members to travel regularly to their designated “constituencies” are insufficient.
There are apparently few or no sanctions on members who do not visit their designated constituency

The use of party lists is also subject to abuse that undermines democracy.

Aspiring candidates and those seeking a high ranking on their party’s list must respond first to the leadership of their party rather than to the voices of the people.
The use of party lists enables the party leadership to remove independent and critical legislators from office by removing them from the list. Rather than guaranteeing diversity, the lists can be used to enforce intra-party discipline and insure conformity with the leadership. While there is no clear evidence of this practice in South Africa, the potential for supressing dissent is real.

Winners and Losers

Not surprisingly, the leadership of all major parties in South Africa endorse the continuation of the present system, because it places power in their hands. Yet within the ANC many backbenchers and some ministers favor an alternative to the present system that would include some form of district based representation. This is particularly true of younger MPs and former UDF leaders—politicians who remained in South Africa during the 1980s and who developed local bases of support during this period. A district based system would enable them to consolidate such support by seeking election in the areas where that support is greatest. By contrast, ANC leaders who were in exile and who now dominate the party, favor PR.