The Problem

Defects in the Inherited System

The electoral system inherited from an earlier period may or may not be appropriate to advance a transition to democratic rule. In former British colonies such as Kenya, the choice of a single member district system of representation often resulted in electoral districts (i.e. constituencies) of unequal populations thus violating the democratic principle of one person one vote.

SMD systems may also be defective to the extent that they distort the results of an election by awarding some parties a greater proportion (i.e. percentage) of the seats in the legislature than their proportion of the vote, and by denying other parties the proportion of seats that equals or closely approximates their proportion of the vote.

However in countries that use PR, the electorate is unable to hold individual legislators accountable, because voters choose between alternative lists of many candidates who represent different political parties.  Voters cannot identify and contact a  legislator who is responsible for serving their particular electoral district, because there are no districts in a PR system and no legislator is assigned this task.  

This is a significant problem in agrarian societies where voters are bound to the land and seek representation for the rural communities in which they reside.  In this context, the lack of accountability of the elected to the electorate can become a major source of dissatisfaction that undermines the long-term prospects for democracy. Most new democracies holding early elections are developing countries with large rural populations.

To summarize the problem:  New democracies that use district systems of representation often violate the principle of one person one vote, but countries that use PR may violate the principle that elected officials should be accountable to the electorate.

Designing a Better System?

It is possible to design various forms of district based electoral systems that overcome the defects of inequality of representation (i.e. disproportionality) while avoiding the lack of accountability inherent in systems of proportional representation.  It is also possible to model the political impact of alternative electoral systems so that political leaders of all parties might reach agreement on which type of system is most appropriate for their country.

In this demonstration, we model alternative forms of district based electoral systems for Kenya and South Africa in a manner that addresses the defects of the present electoral system in each country. We model these alternative forms of electoral systems by using a Spatial Decision Support System or SDSS that systematically considers the political demography in each country.

To learn more about the SDSS or about the likely impact of different electoral systems in Kenya and South Africa, click the desired icon to the left.

Copyright © 2001 by Joel D. Barkan, Paul Densham and Gerard Rushton

  U of I Department of GeographyUniversity College London