CHAPTER 2
Moral
Development[1]
American postsecondary education traditionally has had a
clearly articulated role in the development of citizens who would both think
and act morally. The religiously affiliated
liberal arts colleges of the early 1800s attempted to integrate curricular and
noncurricular experiences in such a way that students graduated into the larger
world both wiser and more sensitive to their moral and ethical
responsibilities. The rise of public
research universities and the attendant fragmentation of knowledge that
accompanied the development of academic disciplines undoubtedly functioned to
shift the focus of the curriculum and the faculty away from the development of
student character. Yet, despite this
evolutionary change in the structure of institutions, the tradition of liberal
education and its concern with developing the whole person persist as an
important theme in American postsecondary education. It is widely expected that the college
experience should contribute not only to cognitive growth, but also to the
capacity to apply reason and intellect to interpersonal, social, political, and
ethical questions (Ignelzi,
1990; Ikenberry, 1997; King, 1997; Mathiasen, 1998; Pascarella, 1997). In this chapter, we attempt to synthesize the
accumulated evidence on the impact of postsecondary education on both
principled moral reasoning and moral behavior.
Change
During College
Conclusions from How College Affects Students
The weight of evidence from a large number of studies that
used different instruments and were conducted in different cultures clearly
indicates that college is linked with statistically significant increases in
the use of principled reasoning to judge moral issues. Not only do upperclassmen tend to show higher
levels of principled reasoning than freshmen or sophomores, but students also
make statistically insignificant increases in the use of moral reasoning during
college. The relative magnitude of these
gains is difficult to determine from the evidence presented. However, the exact magnitude of the gain may
not be as important as the fact that the major movement from conventional to
postconventional or principled judgment during college is itself an important
event in moral development.
Evidence from the 1990s
As with our previous synthesis, nearly all the evidence
pertaining to change during college focuses on students' principled moral
reasoning or judgment, as conceptualized by Lawrence Kohlberg (1981;
1984). Kohlberg's theoretical framework is certainly
not the only valid model of moral or ethical development, but it appears to be,
by far, the dominant theoretical framework guiding inquiry into the impact of
postsecondary education on such development.
His theory can be briefly summarized in the following way:
(D)evelopment
is described as proceeding through six stages embedded within three
levels. The first two stages (Level I)
are considered preconventional. At this
level, moral reasoning is highly egocentric in that it is based on the person's
concerns for his or her own interests and for those of specific others the
individual might care about. At Level II
(Stages 3 and 4), conventional moral reasoning takes over. This reasoning is based on a concern with
maintaining the social order. Moral
judgments are guided by obedience to rules and meeting the expectations of
others, particularly those in positions of authority. The orientation toward maintaining the system
is replaced at Level III (Stages 5 and 6) by a post-conventional or principled
perspective. The basis of this kind of
reasoning is a view of morality as a set of universal principles for making
choices among alternative courses of action that would be held by any rational
moral individual. These are considered
first principles in that they exist independently of and prior to societal
codification. Hence, a central emphasis
in the post-conventional stage is on principles for choosing the most just
arrangement for individuals within society (Pascarella,
1997, pp. 48-49).
Kohlberg's (1981;
1984)
theoretical work has led to the development of a number of instruments designed
to estimate an individual's level of principled moral reasoning or judgment.
(Although the terms "principled moral reasoning" and "principled
moral judgment" appear to be used interchangeably by scholars in the
field, for purposes of consistency we will use "principled moral
reasoning.")[2] The two most visible instruments in the body
of research are probably the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) (Colby,
Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983) and the Defining Issues
Test (DIT) (Rest,
1979, 1986). Each instrument presents a series of moral
dilemmas and attempts to determine the extent to which an individual uses
principled reasoning or prefers principled considerations in making a judgment
or decision about each dilemma. Clearly,
there is a cognitive component to moral development as measured by both the MJI
and the DIT. For example, both Hill (1995) and McNeel and Granstrom (1995) present evidence to suggest
that moral reasoning measured by either the MJI or the DIT has significant,
positive correlations with standardized measures of critical thinking.[3]
In our previous synthesis, we concluded that the extent or
level of principled moral reasoning was positively associated with level of
formal postsecondary education, and that students generally made statistically
significant gains in principled moral reasoning during college. Unfortunately, because many studies failed to
report complete statistical data, an estimate of the actual magnitude of the
growth in principled reasoning made during college could not be made. However, McNeel (1994a) conducted a valuable
meta-analysis of 13 cross-sectional and 9 longitudinal studies of student moral
development as measured by the Defining Issues Test. The individual samples in his synthesis were
from 12 different colleges and universities (7 liberal arts colleges, 3
universities, and 2 Bible colleges). We
took McNeel's raw data and conducted a reanalysis of his results, weighting
each individual study by the size of its sample. The results of our reanalysis differed in
only trivial ways from those reported by McNeel. For both cross-sectional studies (i.e.,
comparing different samples of freshmen and seniors at the same time) and
longitudinal studies (i.e., comparing a sample of freshmen with themselves as
seniors four years later), the average advantage of seniors over freshmen in
principled moral reasoning was about .77 of a standard deviation (28 percentile
points). Moreover, the major change that
took place during college was that students shifted from using moral reasoning
that concedes to societal authority (conventional moral reasoning) to reasoning
that is based on the application of universal moral principles
(post-conventional moral reasoning). We
found little in the results of studies not included in McNeel's meta-analysis
that would conflict with his findings of a strong association between principled
moral reasoning and extent of exposure to postsecondary education (e.g.,
Cummings, Dyas, & Maddux, 2001; Duckett et al., 1992; Duckett & Ryden,
1994; Foster & La Force, 1999; Galotti et al., 1991; Gielen &
Markoulis, 1994; Good & Cartwright, 1998; Hill, 1995; Jeffrey, 1993; Lind,
1997; Paradice & Dejoie, 1991).
Net Effects
of College
Conclusions from How College Affects
Students
The weight of evidence indicates that the college experience
itself has a unique positive influence on increases in principled moral
reasoning. This influence appears to be
substantially greater in magnitude than that due merely to maturation and
cannot be attributed solely to initial differences in moral reasoning,
intelligence, or social status between those who attend and those who do not
attend college. Of course, even with
these important variables controlled statistically, one cannot be certain that
all confounding influences have been taken into account. Individual differences among students related
to their likelihood of attending or not attending college may be the true
causal influences underlying differential change in moral reasoning rather than
the college experience itself. This
particular confounding influence is a potential threat to the internal validity
of even the most carefully conducted longitudinal studies of the effect of
college on moral reasoning.
It is also important to note that the evidence suggesting a
net positive influence of college on the development of principled moral
reasoning is consistent with more broadly based findings on the effects of
college on values. These findings, from
an extensive series of national samples, suggest that college attendance is
associated with a humanizing of values and attitudes concerning the rights and
welfare of others.
Evidence from the 1990s
Principled
Moral Reasoning
As we have seen for previous outcomes, the fact that students
demonstrate substantial growth in principled moral reasoning during college
does not necessarily mean that exposure to postsecondary education causes that
growth. A number of rival hypotheses
(e.g., cohort differences between freshmen and seniors in cross-sectional studies;
maturation or growing older in longitudinal studies) could account for the
observed difference between freshmen and seniors. However, consistent with the conclusions from
our previous synthesis, there is evidence from the 1990s to suggest that exposure
to postsecondary education has a statistically significant, net positive
influence on principled moral reasoning.
For example, Wilson, Rest, Boldizar, and Deemer (1992) followed a sample of 102
high school graduates for nearly a decade to determine the effects of
educational attainment on principled moral reasoning, as measured by the
Defining Issues Test (DIT). The DIT was
administered at the beginning of the study and approximately 10 years later
when the study participants were between 26 and 27. With statistical controls for initial DIT
score and a measure of dedication to career or education (e.g., motivation to
do well in career or amount of time devoted to educational pursuits), level of
postsecondary educational attainment had a strong, positive total effect on DIT
scores 10 years later of .34. (This can
be interpreted as a one standard deviation increase in educational attainment
leading to about a third of a standard deviation increase in principled moral
reasoning, net of high school DIT score and level of dedication to career or
education.) The addition of controls for
occupational status and the extent to which the individual was in a career that
was personally meaningful and challenging reduced the net of effect of educational
attainment on young adult moral reasoning, but only to about .28. Thus, even in the presence of controls for
precollege moral reasoning, dedication to career/education, occupational
status, and sense of fulfilling work, a one standard deviation increase in
postsecondary educational attainment led directly to between a quarter and a
third of a standard deviation increase in moral reasoning at age 26-27. There was, however, also a small indirect,
positive effect of postsecondary educational attainment on young adult moral
reasoning, transmitted through the positive effect of educational attainment on
occupational status and fulfilling work.
Results quite consistent with those of Wilson, Rest,
Boldizar, and Deemer (1992) have also been reported in
cross-sectional studies by Rykiel (1995), with a single community
college sample, and by Finger, Borduin, and Baumstark (1992), with a single four-year
college sample. With statistical
controls for a standardized measure of verbal aptitude, Rykiel found that
graduating second-year students had a statistically significant advantage over
incoming first-year students of about .35 of a standard deviation (14
percentile points) in DIT principled moral reasoning scores. (Since Rykiel's results are reported in terms
of differences between statistically adjusted means and those of Wilson et al.
[1992] are reported in terms of standardized regression coefficients, the
results of the two studies are not directly comparable.) Finger, Borduin, and
Baumstark found that of all of the predictors they considered (year in college,
involvement in social activities, age, socioeconomic status, parental control,
and parental warmth), year in college was by far the strongest predictor of
principled moral reasoning--accounting for 13% of the variance in DIT
scores. Moreover, consistent with the
conclusions of our previous synthesis, they also reported that age was not as
strong a predictor of moral reasoning as level of postsecondary education
completed (See also
Cummings et al., 2001; Paradice & Dejoie, 1991).
Inconsistencies in the way in which the evidence is reported
in different investigations makes it difficult to estimate the magnitude of the
net impact of college on growth in principled moral reasoning. However, the weight of evidence suggests that
at least a substantial part of the growth in principled moral reasoning that
occurs during college is uniquely attributable to the college experience
itself. The significant positive
association between extent of exposure to postsecondary education and level of
principled moral reasoning persisted even in the presence of controls for
potentially important confounding influences such as level of precollege moral
reasoning, verbal ability, maturation, family socioeconomic status, and
occupational level. The reasons why
postsecondary education may facilitate growth in principled moral reasoning are
not completely clear. However, Rest (1994) and Rest and Narvaez (1991) suggest that part of the
explanation may be that college provides a relatively challenging and
stimulating environment that leads students to overhaul and rethink the
fundamental ways in which they form moral judgments. College may do this in large measure because
it encourages students to think about the larger social contexts of history,
institutions, and broad intellectual and cultural trends--many of which involve
moral and ethical issues. Consistent with such an explanation is evidence
reported by Mason and Gibbs (1993) that academic perspective
taking (i.e., exposure to broad perspectives concerning intellectual or social
issues) is a strong predictor of advanced levels of moral reasoning among
college students.
Despite rather consistent findings in support of a net
positive impact of postsecondary education on growth in principled moral
reasoning, it is possible that the evidence we reviewed is still confounded by
other threats to internal validity, such as the interaction of selection and
change. For example, compared to their
counterparts with less exposure to college, individuals with relatively high
levels of postsecondary educational attainment might simply be more open to the
influence of the college experience to begin with. This difference in receptiveness to the
impact of education on moral reasoning, more so than the college experience
itself, might underlie the positive link between postsecondary educational
attainment and level of principled moral reasoning. Thus, as we cautioned in our previous
synthesis, differences among individuals related to their likelihood of
attending college persist as a threat to the internal validity of studies
estimating the net impact of postsecondary education on principled moral reasoning.
The primary instruments used to measure growth during college
in principled moral reasoning, as well as the net impact of college on that
growth (i.e., the Defining Issues Test and the Moral Judgment Interview) estimate
the extent to which a person uses principled reasoning in making a judgment or
decision about a moral dilemma. These
instruments are not, in and of themselves, assessments of an individual's
actual moral action or behavior.
Nevertheless, although some inconsistencies exist between reasoning and
behavior (e.g.,
Crow, Fok, Hartman, & Payne, 1991), we found clear evidence in
our previous synthesis of a statistically significant and positive association
between principled moral reasoning (as measured by the DIT and MJI) and
principled moral behavior such as resistance to cheating, peer pressure, and
unlawful or oppressive authority; "whistle blowing" on corruption;
the keeping of contractual promises; political and social activism;
nonaggression; and helping behavior (see
Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991, pp. 363-364, for a review of these studies). In research published during the 1990s, level
of principled moral reasoning has been found to be positively linked to
community involvement and a sense of civic responsibility (Rest,
Thoma, & Edwards, 1997); ethical behavior in
professions such as accounting (Arnold
& Ponemon, 1991; Bernardi, 1991; Ponemon, 1992; Ponemon & Gabhart,
1990, 1993), dentistry
(Bebeau,
1994), and
medicine (Baldwin,
Adamson, Sheehan, Self, & Oppenberg, 1996; Self & Baldwin, 1994); and the independent
clinical performance of undergraduate nursing students (Duckett
& Ryden, 1994). There is also evidence suggesting level of
principled reasoning is negatively associated with student self-reported
academic misconduct (Cummings
et al., 2001), and that
college students involved in disciplinary matters exhibit lower levels of
principled moral reasoning on the DIT than typical college students in
normative research samples (Mullane,
1999).
Thus, it would appear that principled moral reasoning does
not simply measure an individual's ability to make sophisticated responses to
hypothetical moral dilemmas; it is also systematically associated with, and
perhaps even a precursor to, principled moral action. Growth in principled moral reasoning during
college, therefore, should, at least indirectly, enhance the possibility of
principled moral action. As Rest and
Narvaez (1991) caution, however, while
principled moral reasoning may positively influence moral behavior, principled
reasoning alone is not sufficient to determine moral behavior. Rest (1994) further suggests that using
principled reasoning to judge moral issues is only one of four components
leading to moral action. The other three
components are moral sensitivity (being aware that a situation has a moral
dimension to it and how one's action could affect others involved), moral
motivation (prioritizing moral considerations relative to other situations),
and moral character (the capacity to implement and persist in one's moral
course of action). Unfortunately,
compared to principled moral reasoning, we uncovered little or no systematic
evidence concerning the influence of postsecondary education on these other
three enabling precursors of moral behavior.
Between-College
Effects
Conclusions from How College Affects Students
Evidence concerning between-college effects on moral
reasoning is nearly nonexistent. Our own
reanalysis of available data suggests that such differences may indeed
exist. However, differences in student
recruitment and selection standards among institutions make any causal
conclusion drawn from such analysis highly tentative. Findings from one study are consistent with
the notion that the student peer context may function to accentuate initial
differences among colleges in terms of gains in principled moral
reasoning. However, this finding awaits
replication.
Evidence from the 1990s
Principled
Moral Reasoning
Credible evidence concerning the impact of different kinds of
colleges on the development of principled moral reasoning in students was
virtually nonexistent until the early 1990s, when McNeel (1994a) constructed an informative
12-institution data set that provides some tantalizing hints about
between-college effects. This data set
is essentially the same as that we reanalyzed in the previous section on change
during college. However, McNeel also
took the results from the 21 individual samples in his original meta-analysis
and aggregated them according to institutional type (liberal arts colleges,
Bible colleges, or universities) and study design (longitudinal or
cross-sectional). Once again we weighted
the studies according to sample size and reanalyzed McNeel's raw data. The results with the weighted samples differ
only slightly from those originally reported by McNeel and suggest interesting
differences between institutional types.
The largest freshman-to-senior gains or differences in principled moral
reasoning were made at the private liberal arts colleges (average weighted
senior advantage over freshmen across longitudinal and cross-sectional studies
= .87 of a standard deviation, 31 percentile points). Somewhat smaller, but still substantial gains
were made at large, public universities (average weighted senior advantage over
freshmen across studies = .62 of a standard deviation, 23 percentile points);
and the smallest gains were made at the Bible colleges (average weighted senior
advantage over freshmen across studies = .13 of a standard deviation, 6
percentile points). Strikingly similar
results are reported by Good and Cartwright (1998) with a smaller sample of
three institutions--one of each type.
Such findings are, of course, limited by very small sample
institutions and by potential rival explanations for the differences found
between institutional types. For
example, liberal arts and Bible colleges might simply enroll populations of
students characterized by major differences in their receptivity to those
collegiate experiences that facilitate a shift from a conventional to
postconventional perspective about moral issues. At the same time, however, it is important to
note that in the longitudinal investigations, the liberal arts colleges in
McNeel's (1994a) sample started out with the
highest entering freshman scores in principled moral reasoning and made the
largest freshman-to-senior gains.
Conversely, students at the Bible colleges started out with the lowest
entering principled reasoning scores and exhibited the smallest
freshman-to-senior gains. These two trends
are just the opposite of what one would expect from regression artifacts (i.e.,
the artificial tendency for samples that have lower initial scores on a test to
show greater gains on that test than samples that start out with initially
higher scores on the same test). As
such, it argues for the possibility that the between-college differences found
in principled moral reasoning gains represent actual institutional
effects. Traditional liberal arts
education, combined with the unique social-psychological environments of small
liberal arts colleges, may, in fact, be particularly conducive to the fostering
of growth in principled moral reasoning.
Findings consistent with this conclusion are also reported by Ponemon
and Glazer (1990).
It is also worth noting that, while McNeel's (1994a) data suggest that a
conservative religious ideology may sometimes inhibit growth in principled moral
reasoning (e.g., the Bible colleges), this is by no means an
inevitability. As McNeel points out,
most of the liberal arts colleges in his sample were also religiously
affiliated, with a strong commitment to developing students' personal Christian
faith. This was also the case with the
single liberal arts college in the Good and Cartwright (1998) study. Yet, what apparently counts in terms of their
strong impact on students' growth in principled moral reasoning is the fact
that the religious orientation of the liberal arts colleges was integrated
within a genuine focus on liberal arts education.
A modest body of research has focused on the institutional
characteristics that appear to inhibit academic dishonesty or academic
cheating. Nearly all of this research
has been conducted by McCabe and his colleagues (McCabe
& Trevino, 1993, 1996, 1997; McCabe, Trevino, & Butterfield, 1996,
1999). Of particular relevance has been their
concern with the contextual factors that influence student cheating
behavior. Analyzing a number of
multi-institutional samples, they found that peer behavior formed a normative
context for cheating. A student was
significantly more likely to admit (anonymously) to academic dishonesty if he
or she observed another student cheating on an exam, and significantly less
likely to admit to academic dishonesty if he or she perceived that close
student acquaintances would disapprove of cheating behavior. These associations remained statistically
significant even in the presence of controls for such factors as age, sex,
college grades, parental education, extracurricular involvement, involvement in
intercollegiate athletics, and fraternity or sorority membership (McCabe
& Trevino, 1993, 1996, 1997). Consistent with these findings, McCabe and
his colleagues also found that, irrespective of size and academic selectivity,
institutions with honor codes or honor systems that are enforced by students
also had significantly less student self-reported academic dishonesty than
institutions without such honor codes or systems (McCabe
& Trevino, 1993, 1997; McCabe et al., 1996). They suggest three possibilities to account
for this difference: 1) students at honor code schools are responsible for
reporting academic dishonesty, not the faculty or administration; 2) academic
integrity expectations are clearly defined to students at the start of their
careers at honor code schools; and 3) students at honor code schools typically
receive the privilege of unproctored examinations, which they wish to preserve.
While the above findings suggest that the implementation of
academic honor codes can foster a culture of academic integrity that functions
to reduce cheating behavior, a degree of caution is appropriate in accepting
the causal influences that underlie their results. An equally plausible competing hypothesis is
that schools with publicly proclaimed academic honor codes simply attract and
enroll students for whom academic integrity is a higher personal priority when
they enter college.
Within-College
Effects
Conclusions from How College Affects Students
The evidence pertaining to the influence of different college
experiences on principled moral reasoning is somewhat equivocal in terms of
offering consistent, replicable findings.
This may not be too surprising in that developmental theory in no way
guarantees that one particular type of life experience is the preeminent cause
of development in principled moral reasoning.
A certain specific experience, then, might foster development if it
happens to a receptive and reflective individual and if it is accompanied by
other experiences in a cumulative and mutually reinforcing pattern. The key role of college in fostering
principled moral reasoning may therefore lie in providing a range of
intellectual, cultural, and social experiences from which a range of different
students might potentially benefit.
From this perspective there is modest support for what,
according to Kohlberg's theories, are salient experiences in the fostering of
growth in moral development. College
experiences in which an individual is exposed to divergent perspectives (e.g.,
living away from home, intellectual interactions with roommates) or is
confronted with cognitive moral conflict (e.g., courses presenting issues from
different perspectives) were reported by students as having a salient influence
on their moral development. Also
consistent with Kohlberg's expectations are students' specification of the
importance of interactions with upperclassmen in residential facilities (i.e.,
exposure to more advanced stages of moral reasoning) and assuming new personal
responsibilities, such as social role taking.
These experiences form a major part of the intellectual and
interpersonal opportunities that characterize residential colleges and
universities. However, it would appear
to be the extent to which an individual takes advantage of these opportunities,
particularly those having an intellectual or academic content, that is the key
determinant of growth in moral reasoning during college.
Little consistent evidence exists to suggest that academic
major or broad curricular categorizations are systematically associated with
differences in the development of moral judgment. Certain specific curricular or course
interventions with college students, however, do appear to foster the increased
use of principled reasoning in judging moral issues. The most consistently effective interventions
are those that emphasize moral dilemma discussion or personality development. This conclusion seems to hold regardless of
the methodological rigor of the study.
While these academic interventions would appear to enhance moral
development, it is clear from the evidence reviewed that their effect, as well
as the effect of any specific college experience, is smaller than the effect
that can be reasonably attributed to four years of college. One possible explanation for this finding is
that, similar to its impact on cognitive development, the influence of college
on principled moral reasoning is the result not so much of any single
experience but rather of the cumulative impact of a set of mutually reinforcing
experiences. Another possibility is that
the influence of different course interventions or specific college experiences
on moral reasoning is conditional rather than general (i.e., the magnitude of
the influence varies for different kinds of students).
Evidence from the 1990s
The decade of the 1990s saw a continuation of rigorous
attempts to isolate and identify the within-college academic and nonacademic
experiences that influenced growth in principled moral reasoning. In addition, researchers also sought to
estimate the within-college experiences linked to several forms of moral
behavior. We have organized our
synthesis of this body of evidence within the following general categories:
moral development interventions, service-learning, major field of study,
extracurricular/peer involvement, intercollegiate athletic involvement,
off-campus learning, off-campus employment, and interaction with faculty.
Moral
Development Interventions
As indicated from the conclusions of our previous synthesis,
two types of moral development interventions, those focusing on dilemma
discussion and those emphasizing personality development, appeared to be
particularly effective in fostering the use of principled moral reasoning. As pointed out by Rest and Narvaez (1991), the role of the instructor
in both of these types of interventions is more as a facilitator than as an
information provider. However, a
subsequent quasi-experiment by Penn (1990) suggests that growth in the
use of principled moral reasoning is enhanced even more when students are
exposed to direct instruction in philosophical methods of ethical analysis as
well as to dilemma discussion and personality development. Classes that had all three elements, or all
three elements plus instruction in formal logic, demonstrated one-semester
growth in principled moral reasoning (as measured by the DIT) that averaged
about .92 of a standard deviation (32 percentile points). This average effect size was more than twice
as large as those for dilemma discussion and personality development
interventions (.41 and .36, respectively) noted in our previous synthesis. A replication of Penn's didactic approach in
a general education course by McNeel (1994b) yielded one-semester growth
in principled moral reasoning of .65 of a standard deviation, still
substantially larger than the typical effect sizes for dilemma discussion and
personality development. Such evidence
suggests that growth in principled moral reasoning is not always achieved most
efficiently through the process of self-discovering the appropriateness and
power of such reasoning from discussion of controversial moral dilemmas with
one's peers. Rather, the impact of moral
problem-solving with one's peers may be an even more powerful inducement to
growth in principled thinking if one is first taught the basic component skills
of moral reasoning (e.g., formal logic, role taking, justice operations) (McNeel,
1994b).
Ethics Courses
Another purposeful intervention designed to facilitate growth
in principled moral reasoning is a course focusing on ethics. This approach has been particularly visible
in undergraduate business curricula (e.g.,
Armstrong, 1993; Ponemon, 1993; Shaub, 1994; St. Pierre, Nelson, & Gabbin,
1990). The weight of evidence from these studies is
somewhat equivocal. Armstrong (1993) and Shaub (1994) report findings suggesting
that business students exposed to courses or interventions having a purposeful
focus on professional ethics and ethical issues show significantly greater growth
in the use of principled moral reasoning (as measured by the DIT) than similar
students not exposed to such courses or interventions. However, both Ponemon (1993) and St. Pierre, Nelson, and
Gabbin (1990) found that the inclusion of
ethical content in courses, or exposure to a specific course in ethics during
college, had a trivial impact on growth in the use of principled moral
reasoning. Similarly, Smith and Oakley (1996) reported that completion of
a course in business ethics had no significant effect on students' attitudes
toward ethical business behavior. We
suspect that the mixed findings for this body of evidence reflect to some
extent the fact that the ethics interventions in the various studies differed
substantially in their content, emphasis, and implementation. On balance, across all studies the effect on
principled moral reasoning of exposure to either ethics courses or
interventions is probably positive, though quite modest in magnitude. Beyond this rather tentative speculation,
however, we hesitate to offer a firm conclusion.
Ethics in the Curriculum
There is also evidence from two independent, longitudinal
studies to suggest that purposefully integrating ethical content into an
undergraduate professional curriculum (i.e., nursing) may foster increased
growth in principled moral reasoning (Duckett
& Ryden, 1994; McNeel et al., 1997). Duckett and Ryden estimated the impact of a
nursing curriculum at a public university that built ethics content vertically
into the curriculum and provided ethically focused learning experiences in
existing courses across all levels.
Across four cohorts of students exposed to the curriculum, they found
growth in principled moral reasoning during what appeared to be the last half
of college to average about .41 of a standard deviation (16 percentile
points). The absence of a control group,
however, made it difficult to determine just what part of that growth was
attributable to the purposefully enhanced ethics curriculum.
A somewhat less ambiguous estimate of the unique impact of an
ethics-oriented curriculum on principled reasoning is presented by McNeel,
Schaffer, and Juarez (1997) in a study of undergraduate
nursing students at a small liberal arts college. The intervention purposefully integrated
ethical content and ethical growth experiences in both the general education
and nursing program curricula. For
example, the general education curriculum included several required courses
with a major ethics component. The
nursing curriculum implemented such things as an ethics seminar, specific
ethics content in senior courses, and small group meetings with a faculty
member focusing on ethical issues and relationships. Employing a variation on a time-series
design, McNeel and colleagues compared the freshman-to-senior growth in
principled moral reasoning of three cohorts of students prior to, and three
cohorts of students after, the implementation of the ethics-oriented
curriculum. Both the preceding and
subsequent cohorts entered college with about the same levels of principled
reasoning on the DIT. However, the three
cohorts entering after the ethics-oriented curriculum was implemented
demonstrated average freshman-to-senior growth in principled reasoning that was
significantly larger in magnitude (1.54 of a standard deviation, 44 percentile
points) than the average corresponding growth in principled reasoning shown by
the three cohorts entering prior to the implementation of the curriculum (1.34
of a standard deviation, 41 percentile points).
Thus, principled reasoning growth was more pronounced among the cohorts
who experienced the ethics enriched curriculum.[4]
Although it is not experimental in design, and awaits
replication, Mentkowski and Associates' (2000) assessment of the impact of
Alverno College's Ability-Based Curriculum suggests that student progress
through that curriculum may enhance the development of principled moral
reasoning. The Ability-Based Curriculum
is an integrated set of general education and disciplinary courses constructed
according to a common developmental framework.
It attempts to provide connected liberal arts learning experiences in
courses that increase student competencies in eight broad areas (e.g.,
communication, analysis, problem solving, valuing and decision making, and the
like), and at six increasingly complex developmental levels within each
competency or ability category. For
example, within the valuing and decision making competency, developmental
growth proceeds from identifying one's own values, to engaging in valuing in
decision making in multiple contexts, to applying one's own values in an area
of knowledge in a professional context.
Progress through the curriculum appeared to be measured by a cumulative
record of ability evaluations that students complete. As students completed courses, they were
evaluated in terms of their developmental level within the eight ability or
competency dimensions. Mentkowski and
her associates found that, even in the presence of statistical controls for
age, entering intellectual development and critical thinking levels, and
entering levels of principled moral reasoning (as measured by the DIT), the
measure of progress through the developmentally-sequenced curriculum had a
modest, but statistically significant and positive direct effect on women's
levels of principled reasoning after two years of college.
One reasonable conclusion from this finding is that Alverno's
Ability-Based and developmentally oriented curriculum is particularly effective
in promoting students' use of principled reasoning. However, because of the absence of a control
condition (e.g., a traditional and less integrated and developmentally-based
liberal arts curriculum), such a conclusion involves a degree of risk. As Mentkowski and Associates (2000) point out, while there are
some clear logical links between the experiences fostered by the Ability-Based
Curriculum and growth in principled moral reasoning, the design of their
investigation makes it difficult to determine the magnitude of the unique
advantage of an Ability-Based Curriculum over other less purposefully
structured and integrated approaches to liberal arts education.
Other Interventions
To be sure, other studies have estimated the impact of
purposeful interventions designed to foster growth in moral reasoning or moral
development during college. It is
difficult, however, to fit these studies into a larger body of evidence. As a group, they differ substantially from
each other in terms of the focus and content of their intervention, and, as far
as we could tell, are single studies that await replication. Nevertheless, they are of some interest and
deserve at least brief mention. For
example, Beller and Stoll (1992) report the results of a
rigorously conducted true experiment that estimated the impact of a moral
reasoning intervention designed for undergraduate student athletes. Student athletes at a single institution were
randomly assigned to two conditions: a "moral reasoning for sport"
course and a control group that did not take the course. The moral reasoning course focused on
analyzing four values (honesty, responsibility, justice, and beneficence) and
was integrated with readings on moral and ethical issues in sports (e.g., drug
testing, gambling, rule violations, winning, and the like). Compared to their counterparts in the control
condition, student athletes exposed to the semester-long intervention demonstrated
significantly larger gains on the Hahm-Beller Values Choice Inventory (a
measure of principled moral judgment correlating .82 with the DIT), and larger,
though only marginally significant, gains in principled reasoning as measured
by the DIT.
Similarly, Mustapha and Seybert (1990) sought to determine if two
different approaches to general education led to differences in students'
principled moral reasoning. The
traditional (control) curriculum provided liberal arts studies through separate
departmental courses. The experimental
curriculum consisted of an integrated six-course, six-semester sequence. Each course combined the study of two or
three subjects, was multidisciplinary, and was organized around the central
idea of decision making. Instructional
methods sought to implement Kohlberg's theory that moral decision making is a
cognitive developmental process learned through open socratic inquiry and
active learning participation. Students
were confronted with situations requiring moral decision making throughout the
curriculum. With statistical controls
for a standardized measure of intelligence, students in the experimental
general education curriculum had a statistically significant advantage in
principled moral reasoning over their counterparts in the traditional general
education curriculum of about .50 of a standard deviation (19 percentile
points). Though potentially confounded
by the fact that individuals could self-select themselves into the experimental
curriculum, the results are nevertheless consistent with the conclusions of our
previous synthesis that learning to make decisions about moral dilemmas
(dilemma discussion) positively influences growth in principled moral
reasoning. Indeed, the Mustapha and
Seybert findings suggest that this conclusion holds at the curricular as well
as the course intervention level.[5]
A modest body of research has attempted to estimate the net
impact of service-learning on various dimensions of moral development. The results of this research suggest that
involvement in service-learning has a somewhat inconsistent impact on growth in
principled moral reasoning. We uncovered
two independent and rigorously conducted quasi-experiments that address this
issue. Both Boss (1994) and Cram (1998) randomly assigned two
intact classes to different sections of one-semester undergraduate ethics
courses, each of which included extensive discussion of moral dilemmas and
ethical issues. The experimental section
in each study also included an active community service component that was
integrated into the course content, whereas the control section had no
service-learning component. Boss found
that the section with the service-learning component demonstrated significantly
greater growth in principled moral reasoning (as measured by the DIT) than did
the section without the service-learning component. However, Cram reported that growth in DIT
principled reasoning scores was almost identical between the experimental
(service-learning) and control sections.
Since the two studies are quite similar in both methodological rigor and
treatment implementation, it is difficult to choose one set of results as more
valid than the other.[6]
Evidence pertaining to the impact of service-learning on
aspects of moral/ethical development other than principled moral reasoning
tends to be consistent with the findings of Boss (1994). For example, in their comprehensive,
multi-institutional evaluation of students in service-learning courses, Eyler
and Giles (1999) found that, even with
controls for age, gender, race, socioeconomic status, other service
involvement, and dependent variable scores at the start of the semester,
exposure to service-learning courses had a modest, but statistically
significant, positive effect on the end-of-semester importance students placed
on social justice. Similar results are
reported by Astin and Sax (1998) and Gray, Geschwind,
Ondaatje, Robyn, Klein, Sax, Astin, and Astin (1996) for the net impact of
service-learning or service involvement on sense of civic responsibility and
the importance of service to the community.
Consistent with the cognitive impacts of service-learning, Eyler and
Giles also report evidence suggesting that the net, positive effect of
service-learning experiences on growth in the importance students place on
social justice is even further enhanced when the service experience is
integrated into the course content and provides opportunities for reflection
through discussion and writing. Evidence
consistent with this aspect of Eyler and Giles' investigation is also reported
by Myers-Lipton (1994). Students in a program that closely integrated
service and reflective learning showed greater two-year increases in civic responsibility
and decreases in social prejudice than their counterparts involved in service
without the reflective learning component.[7]
The small body of evidence pertaining to the net impact of
major field of study on principled moral reasoning is inconsistent and provides
little basis for an unambiguous conclusion.
McNeel and colleagues (1994a;
1996) summarize
a series of longitudinal analyses from a single-college sample suggesting that
major field of study is significantly linked to differences in
freshman-to-senior growth in principled reasoning (as measured by the
DIT). Specifically, somewhat smaller
principled reasoning growth appeared to accrue to students in certain
vocational majors (e.g., education and business) than in other disciplines or
fields of study (e.g., psychology, English, nursing, social work,
humanities). In contrast, however,
Jeffrey's (1993) single-institution, cross-sectional investigation reported
that differences between lower-division and senior students in principled moral
reasoning were essentially the same for business and accounting majors as they
were for liberal arts majors. Similar
inconsistent results have been reported by St. Pierre, Nelson, and Gabbin (1990) and Snodgrass and Behling (1996). Given the small body of
evidence and the generally inconsistent findings, we believe any conclusion
about the impact of major field of study on principled moral reasoning is
premature.
Extracurricular/Peer
Involvement
In their cogent discussion of the factors that influence
growth in principled moral reasoning during college, Rest and Narvaez (1991) argue that the
extracurricular milieu of college may play a potentially significant role in
moral and ethical development. There is
a modicum of evidence to support their argument. For example, Finger, Borduin, and Baumstark (1992) employed a regression
approach to determine which among a range of factors was significantly linked
to students' level of principled moral reasoning. The factors included: year in college, age,
socioeconomic status, relationships with parents, and frequency of informal
social/extracurricular activities during college. After year in college, level of social/extracurricular
involvement during college was the next best predictor of principled reasoning,
accounting for five percent of the variance in students' DIT scores. Consistent results are reported by Lind (1997), who suggests that the
role-taking opportunities that often accompany extracurricular involvement are
an important catalyst in the development of principled moral reasoning.
In contrast with the evidence pertaining to the development
of principled moral reasoning, the effects of extracurricular involvement on
what might be considered ethical behavior are contradictory. For example, Berger's (1998) analysis of eight
religiously-affiliated colleges from the 1992-96 iteration of the Cooperative
Institutional Research Program Data sought to determine the factors explaining
students' community service involvement during college. With statistical controls for such factors as
previous community service, demographic characteristics, academic major,
socioeconomic background, residence on campus, and high school grades, level of
involvement in clubs and organizations had generally significant and positive
effects on students' community service involvement. Conversely, McCabe and Trevino (1997) found that level of
extracurricular involvement during college was significantly and positively
linked with self-reported academic dishonesty.
This positive relationship between extracurricular activities and
cheating behavior persisted in the presence of statistical controls for such
potentially confounding influences as age, gender, college grades, severity of
institutional penalties for cheating, faculty support for academic integrity,
perceived peer academic dishonesty, and perceived peer disapproval of cheating.
Although the Berger (1998) and McCabe and Trevino (1997) investigations consider
different kinds of "moral behavior," with different regression specifications,
it is still difficult to account for their diametrically opposed findings. One possible explanation is that different
kinds of extracurricular or social involvement can have different impacts on
moral reasoning and moral behavior.
Consistent with this notion is recent evidence reported by Derryberry
and Thoma (2000). They found that students' principled moral
reasoning levels were inversely related to the density of their friendship
networks in college. Highly dense
networks are those in which each person is known by each other. An example might be a fraternity or
sorority. Low-density friendship
networks are those characterized by multiple independent friendships with a
diversity of different kinds of individuals who don't typically interact with
one another (e.g., friends from a residence facility, friends from one's major,
friends from on-campus work, and the like).
Low-density friendship networks provide a more diverse social
environment during college than high-density networks; and, therefore, greater
exposure to different ideas, values, and experiences.
Derryberry and Thoma (2000) point out that their
findings could reflect the fact that individuals with high levels of principled
reasoning may simply be more open to diverse (low-density) friendship networks
and tend to enter into them more frequently.
However, other investigations with more extensive controls for
confounding influences tend to suggest a causal link between diverse friendship
networks during college and both principled moral reasoning and principled
behavior. For example, Kilgannon and
Erwin (1992) sought to determine the
impact of fraternity or sorority membership (compared to not being
Greek-affiliated) on growth in principled moral reasoning (as measured by the
DIT) during the first two years of college.
According to Derryberry and Thoma, Greek-affiliated students would be
more likely than those not joining fraternities and sororities to have
high-density friendship networks that tend to insulate individuals from
exposure to the kinds of divergent sociopolitical and cultural perspectives
that have been shown to foster growth in principled moral reasoning. One might therefore expect Greek-affiliated
students to demonstrate less growth in principled reasoning than their
counterparts who do not join fraternities or sororities. This is generally what Kilgannon and Erwin
found. In the presence of statistical
controls for precollege level of principled moral reasoning, women who joined
sororities demonstrated significantly lower principled reasoning after two
years than did women who were not sorority members. The corresponding comparison for men was in
the same direction, though not statistically significant.
Evidence suggesting that fraternity or sorority membership
inhibits growth in principled moral reasoning is not an isolated finding. There is also evidence indicating a negative
relationship between Greek affiliation and moral or ethical behavior. For example, it appears that fraternity and
sorority members are more likely to admit to academic dishonesty during college
than their counterparts who are not Greek-affiliated (Kirkvliet,
1994; McCabe & Bowers, 1996). Of course this could, to some extent, reflect
the possibility that individuals who choose to join fraternities and sororities
have a stronger disposition toward academic dishonesty when they enter
college. Nevertheless, when McCabe and
Trevino (1997) controlled for important
individual and contextual influences such as age, sex, college grades, parental
education, extracurricular and athletic involvement, and the peer environment
with regard to cheating at the institution attended, fraternity and sorority
members still reported being involved in a significantly higher level of
academic dishonesty than their non-Greek-affiliated counterparts.
From a different perspective, there is also evidence
suggesting that low-density, diverse friendship networks may have a positive
impact on what might be considered other ethically-oriented behaviors. In Berger's (1998) eight-institution analysis
of the factors influencing community service involvement, both interaction with
different racial/ethnic groups and involvement in multicultural activities
tended to significantly enhance the likelihood of participating in community
service during college. These positive
effects remained statistically significant even in the presence of statistical
controls for salient confounding influences, such as prior community service
involvement, campus residence, academic major, extracurricular involvement,
race, sex, socioeconomic status, humanistic values at entry to college, and
high school academic achievement. With
the same set of controls in effect, being a member of a fraternity or sorority
had a significant negative impact on community service involvement in one of
the three analyses conducted. However,
there is evidence that conflicts with Berger’s latter finding. Pierson (2002) found that Greek
affiliation actually increased the likelihood of volunteer work in college,
even with controls for secondary school volunteerism, individual background
traits, and other academic and non-academic experiences during college.
A small body of research has focused, either directly or
indirectly, on the relationship between intercollegiate athletic participation
during college and moral development.
This literature provides little convincing evidence that involvement in
intercollegiate athletics has a causal influence on either principled moral
reasoning or moral behavior. Baldizan
and Frey (1995) found only small, chance
differences between male and female intercollegiate athletes and male and
female nonathletes in DIT principled reasoning scores. Similarly, Beller, Stoll, Burwell, and Cole (1996) found no significant
difference in the use of principled reasoning between intercollegiate athletes
participating in individual sports and nonathletes. Intercollegiate athletes participating in
team sports had significantly lower principled reasoning scores than either
individual sport athletes or nonathletes.
However, this may simply reflect a recruitment rather than a
socialization effect, in that athletes participating in team sports might have
started college with lower levels of principled moral reasoning to begin
with. The design of the Beller et al.
study makes it difficult to determine which of the two effects is more
probable.
The same inconclusiveness holds for the relationship between
intercollegiate athletic participation and moral/ethical behavior. Nixon (1997) found that, irrespective of
sex, intercollegiate athletes are no more likely to demonstrate aggressive
behavior (injuring another person) outside of their sport than
nonathletes. Similarly, the results of
McCabe and Trevino's (1997) multi-institutional study
of academic dishonesty indicate that participation in intercollegiate athletics
has only a small and nonsignificant effect on cheating behavior when important
confounding influences are taken into account.
Off-Campus
Learning Experiences
Consistent with Derryberry and Thoma's (2000) contention that interaction
with diverse peers and divergent intellectual and social perspectives tends to
enhance students’ growth in principled moral reasoning, there is single-study
evidence to suggest that participation in off-campus learning experiences
positively influences such growth.
McNeel (1994a) compared the
freshman-to-senior growth in principled moral reasoning of students who
participated in off-campus learning (e.g., study in foreign countries, study in
Washington, D.C., or other unspecified off-campus experiences) with students
not participating in such programs.
Those students participating in off-campus learning experiences
demonstrated gains in the use of principled moral reasoning during college that
were, on average, about 1.7 times as large as the corresponding gains shown by
their counterparts who did not participate in off-campus experiences. As McNeel points out, the causal inferences
from such a finding are tenuous at best.
For example, those who choose to participate in off-campus learning
experiences may simply be on a particularly strong growth trajectory during
college because they are especially receptive to the developmental impacts of
liberal arts education. At the same
time, it is worth noting that those participating and those not participating
in off-campus learning experiences started college with only trivial and chance
differences in their levels of principled moral reasoning. Consequently, it is unlikely that the results
reported by McNeel are simply a reflection of regression artifacts.
Off-Campus
Employment
The small body of evidence we uncovered suggests that
off-campus employment during college has a negative influence on both
principled moral reasoning and moral/ethical behavior. Rykiel's (1995) study of community college
students found that, net of verbal ability, individuals working off-campus 25
hours or more per week had significantly lower DIT principled reasoning scores
than did their counterparts employed off-campus for less than 20 hours per
week. Similarly, Berger (1998) reported that hours of
off-campus work per week tended to negatively influence community service
involvement during college, even when confounding influences such as student
demographic characteristics, prior community service involvement, place of
residence, and academic major were taken into account. It may well be that extensive involvement in
off-campus work simply diminishes the time one has available to either commit
oneself to community service, or to be involved in the social and academic
experiences of college that contribute to growth in principled reasoning. At the same time, however, both the Rykiel
and Berger studies tell us only that the more hours one works off-campus per
week the lower his or her level of moral reasoning or probability of
participating in what might be regarded as moral/ethical behavior. The studies do not inform us with regard to
differences between students who work off-campus during college and those who
do not, the impact of off-campus work related to one's academic major or
intended career, or how on-campus work might influence dimensions of moral or
ethical development.
Interaction
With Faculty
One of the conclusions from our previous synthesis was that
principled moral reasoning was enhanced by exposure to and interaction with
individuals at more advanced stages of principled reasoning. While this interaction might be most likely
with upper-class peers, it could also occur through interactions with
faculty. Although based on a
single-sample finding that awaits replication, there is evidence to support the
contention that out-of-class contact with faculty members in a small, liberal
arts college is linked to growth in principled moral reasoning. McNeel (1994a) found that students who
reported at least some out-of-class contact with faculty during college had
freshman-to-senior gains in DIT principled reasoning scores that were about
three times as large as their counterparts who reported no such contact during
college. Furthermore, the two groups
differed in only trivial, chance ways in level of principled reasoning when
they entered college; so it is unlikely that the finding simply reflects
regression artifacts. McNeel speculates
that informal, out-of-class interactions with faculty may have a strong impact
on students' principled reasoning because such interactions provide a setting
in which faculty maturity in reasoning about moral issues with which students
may be struggling can be modeled for students in a personal and nonthreatening
way. Because of the nonexperimental
design of McNeel's study, however, the causal direction of his results is
somewhat ambiguous. A reasonable
alternative explanation for his finding is that students who are the most
receptive to the impacts of liberal arts education, and who are experiencing
the largest changes in how they reason about moral issues during college, may
simply be the most strongly oriented toward interaction with faculty outside of
class.
A related investigation by Nevins and McNeel (1992) at the same small liberal
arts college suggests that it may be possible to develop faculty teaching
workshops that enhance a professor's influence on students' growth in
principled reasoning. In each of three
separate years, a year-long faculty development program was implemented that
sought to introduce faculty to concepts of developmentally-based instruction
that could be used in their classes. The
faculty who chose to participate studied a range of different models of how students
develop during college (e.g., Erikson, Gilligan, King and Kitchener, Kolb,
Perry). In addition, general concepts
such as maturational levels, developmental transformations, individual
differences (including learning style) and a balance between challenge and
support were presented and discussed.
Each faculty participant chose a target course to revise in light of
what he or she had learned, and was given release time to carry out the
revision. In order to determine the
impact of the faculty-development program, Nevins and McNeel divided students
into groups according to the amount of contact they had with the
workshop-trained faculty, and then compared their growth in DIT principled
reasoning during the first two years of college. Students with moderate or high levels of
exposure to the workshop-trained faculty in the professors' target courses
demonstrated growth in principled moral reasoning during the first two years of
college that, on average, was about 2.9 times as large as the corresponding growth
shown by students with little or no such exposure. A similar trend in DIT scores was shown for
students with different levels of exposure to the workshop faculty in their
nontarget courses. As Nevins and McNeel
candidly admit, there are plausible alternative explanations for their
findings, not the least of which is that the faculty-development program may
have attracted the most effective teachers.
Despite this limitation, however, the faculty-development workshop they
describe and assess represents a potentially significant, if yet unreplicated,
intervention for enhancing the impact of faculty and their courses on student
moral development.
Conditional
Effects of College
Conclusions from How College Affects Students
Almost no research has systematically looked for conditional
effects. The little evidence that does
exist suggests that an instructional intervention that stresses exposure to
intensive moral arguments and discussion has more positive effects on principled
moral judgment for subjects at higher levels of cognitive development (formal
reasoners) than for subjects at lower levels (concrete reasoners). This conditional effect underscores the
notion that moral development does not occur in isolation from other areas of
student development during college but rather is a part of a network of
mutually supporting changes.
Evidence from the 1990s
Once again we uncovered relatively little in the way of
research that systematically investigated the conditional effects of
postsecondary education on moral development.
However, consistent with the conclusions of our previous synthesis, we
found evidence indicating that a certain level of formal reasoning may be
required for students to realize maximum benefits from instructional
interventions designed to increase principled reasoning. In an eight-week interpersonal skills
training class, Santilli and Hudson (1992) found that only those
students with relatively high (consolidated) formal reasoning scores showed
gains in DIT principled moral reasoning.
Students with relatively low (early basic) formal reasoning levels
demonstrated only chance gains in principled reasoning.
There is also evidence to suggest that the impact on
principled moral reasoning of hours per week employed off-campus varied in
magnitude for different aged students.
Recall from Rykiel's (1995) longitudinal study of
community college students that, net of tested verbal ability, students working
less than 20 hours per week had higher DIT principled reasoning scores than
their counterparts employed off-campus for 25 or more hours per week. The positive effect on principled reasoning
of working less than 20 hours per week was larger for older (nontraditional
aged) students than it was for younger (traditional aged) students. However, we uncovered no independent study
replicating this finding, so it is difficult to interpret its meaning within
the context of other evidence.
Long-Term
Effects of College
Conclusions from How College Affects Students
Evidence from ten- and twenty-year longitudinal studies is clear
in identifying the positive, long-term influence of college on principled moral
reasoning. The estimated advantages that
accrue to those who attend college (versus those who do not) do not diminish
over time but tend to increase. In large
measure, this may be due to the tendency for college to channel individuals
into posteducation occupations and lifestyles characterized by a level of
continuing intellectual stimulation and challenge that either maintains or
further enhances principled moral judgment.
Conversely, having only a high school diploma may tend to channel one
into occupational or lifestyle environments characterized by a relatively low
level of intellectual stimulation. Thus,
level of principled moral judgment may actually regress over time.
We did not find the kind of longitudinal evidence in the
research of the 1990s that permitted long-term comparison of trends in
principled moral reasoning growth among individuals completing different
amounts of postsecondary education.
However, the scant evidence we did uncover is generally consistent with
the conclusions of our previous synthesis in suggesting that level of
principled reasoning tends to persist or modestly increase for college
graduates over the years immediately following graduation.
The most useful investigation in this regard is Mentkowski
and Associates' (2000) longitudinal assessment of
a sample of women attending Alverno College, a small single-sex liberal arts
college. Mentkowski and her colleagues
assessed the sample with the Defining Issues Test (DIT) at four different
times: when they entered college; after the first two years of college; at
graduation from college; and about five years subsequent to graduation. [The results of the first three assessments
were incorporated in the results of our earlier synthesis (Pascarella
& Terenzini, 1991) or our reanalysis of McNeel's (1994a) meta-analysis.] They found that during the five years after
graduating from college, women's growth in principled moral reasoning on the
DIT tended to plateau (although it showed a very small growth trend). The DIT mean score of the alumna was only
slightly higher than it was when they were graduating seniors; suggesting that
the rather dramatic principled reasoning growth that occurred during college
(about .80 of a standard deviation in the Alverno sample) was maintained during
the five years subsequent to graduation.
A smaller sample of women completed the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI)
during the same four assessments, and actually showed a modest increase in
principled reasoning between graduation and the five-year follow-up (about .18
of a standard deviation). Such evidence
reinforces the conclusion that the developmental trends in principled moral
reasoning that occur during college do not retrogress after college. As suggested in our previous synthesis, this
is probably attributable in no small way to the particular occupations and
life-style choices that are characteristic of, or available to, college
graduates.
Results generally consistent with those of Mentkowski and
Associates (2000) are reported by Astin, Sax,
and Avalos (1999) in their longitudinal study
of factors influencing community service involvement among alumni nine years
after enrolling in college. With
controls for service involvement in high school, as well as other relevant
confounding influences, engagement in volunteer community service during
college had a significant positive effect on hours spent in voluntary community
service activities as alumni. Thus, as
with increases in the use of principled reasoning that occur during college and
persist into the early post-graduation years, engaging in what might be
considered ethically-oriented behavior during college tends to continue when
one leaves college.
Summary
Change During College
As with our previous synthesis, nearly all the evidence
pertaining to change during college concerns students' use of principled
reasoning in judging moral issues. Also
consistent with our previous synthesis, the evidence is consistent in suggesting
that level of principled moral reasoning is positively associated with level of
postsecondary educational attainment, and that students generally make
statistically significant gains in principled reasoning during college. The
major contribution of the research of the 1990s was that it permitted us to
compute an effect size. We estimate that
the average advantage of seniors over freshmen in principled moral reasoning is
about .77 of a standard deviation (28 percentile points). It is also the case that the major change
that takes place during college is a shift from using moral reasoning that
concedes to societal authority (conventional moral reasoning) to reasoning that
is based on the application of universal moral principles (post-conventional moral
reasoning).
Net Effects of College
Inconsistencies in the way in which the evidence is reported
in different studies makes it difficult to estimate the magnitude of the net
impact of college on growth in principled moral reasoning. The weight of evidence, however, suggests
that at least a substantial part of the growth in principled reasoning that
occurs during college is uniquely attributable to the college experience
itself. The reasons why postsecondary education
may be particularly effective in facilitating growth in principled moral
reasoning are not completely clear.
However, at least part of the explanation may be that college provides a
relatively challenging and stimulating environment that leads students to
overhaul and reconsider the ways in which they formulate moral judgments. Despite generally consistent findings in
support of a net positive impact of postsecondary education on growth in
principled reasoning, it is still possible that the body of evidence is
confounded by threats to internal validity such as the interaction of selection
and change (i.e., differences among individuals related to their likelihood of
attending college which also predict growth in principled reasoning).
Consistent with our previous synthesis, we found extensive
evidence of a positive relationship between level of principled moral reasoning
and the likelihood of principled behavior.
Thus, growth in principled reasoning during college should, at least
indirectly, increase the probability of principled action. However, principled reasoning, in and of
itself, is probably insufficient to determine principled behavior because it is
only one of several individual influences on moral action. Others are such things as moral sensitivity,
moral motivation, and moral character.
Compared to principled moral reasoning, we know relatively little about
the impact of college on these other precursors of moral behavior.
Between-College Effects
Despite being based on a small sample of institutions, and
the presence of some competing explanations for the results, we uncovered
evidence suggesting discernible between-college effects on student growth in
principled moral reasoning.
Specifically, the largest growth appeared to occur at small, private
liberal arts colleges, somewhat more modest growth occurred at public
universities, and the least growth happened at Bible colleges. The findings suggest that traditional liberal
arts education, combined with the unique social psychological environments of
small liberal arts colleges, may be particularly conducive to fostering growth
in principled moral reasoning.
In addition to principled reasoning, we uncovered evidence
suggesting between-college effects on principled moral behavior. Irrespective of size and academic
selectivity, institutions with honor codes or honor systems that are enforced
by students tend to have lower levels of student self-reported academic
dishonesty than institutions without such honor codes or systems. One interpretation of this finding is that
the presence of such honor codes or systems helps foster a culture of academic
integrity that functions to reduce cheating behavior. However, it is also possible that schools
with visible academic honor codes tend to attract and enroll students for whom
academic integrity is a higher personal priority when they enter college.
Within-College Effects
The relatively extensive literature on within-college effects
on moral development suggests the following general conclusions:
1. In our previous synthesis, we found meta-analytic evidence indicating that moral development interventions focusing on moral dilemma discussion and personality development were particularly effective in fostering the use of principled moral reasoning. The role of the instructor in these types of interventions is more as a facilitator than information provider. However, quasi-experimental evidence from the 1990s suggests that growth in principled moral reasoning is even further enhanced when students are exposed to direct instruction in philosophical methods of ethical analysis, as well as to dilemma discussion and personality development.
2. Evidence regarding the effect of exposure to ethics courses or ethics interventions on principled moral reasoning is somewhat mixed. On balance, we conclude that there is probably a very modest positive effect.
3. Evidence from two independently conducted longitudinal studies suggests that purposefully integrating ethical content into an undergraduate professional curriculum in nursing may foster increased growth in principled moral reasoning.
4. While not experimental in design, and based on a single sample, there is evidence suggesting that progress through Alverno College's liberal arts Ability-Based Curriculum may enhance the development of principled moral reasoning. However, the absence of a comparison or control curriculum makes it difficult to determine the net advantage of the Ability-Based Curriculum over other less purposefully structured and integrated approaches to liberal arts education.
5. Single-sample, quasi-experimental evidence suggests that principled moral reasoning may also be significantly enhanced by a general education curriculum that integrates moral and ethical decision-making throughout a multidisciplinary six-course sequence. Though potentially limited by student self-selection into the experimental curriculum, the results are consistent with our 1991 conclusion that learning to make decisions about moral dilemmas (dilemma discussion) positively influences growth in principled reasoning.
6. Quasi-experimental evidence pertaining to the impact of service-learning on principled moral reasoning is mixed. However, additional evidence suggests that service-learning or service involvement positively influences such outcomes of college as: the importance students place on social justice, sense of civic responsibility, and importance of service to the community. It would also appear that the impact of service experiences on these and similar outcomes is enhanced when the service experience is integrated into course content and provides opportunities for reflection through discussion and writing.
7. We found little evidence across studies to indicate that major field of study has a consistent impact on growth in principled moral reasoning.
8. Although we found some evidence to support the contention that the role-taking opportunities that accompany extracurricular/peer involvement in college have positive impacts on growth in principled reasoning, evidence with regard to their impact on actual moral behavior is mixed. Different kinds of social or extracurricular involvement may well have different impacts on moral development. In this regard, there is clear evidence supporting the hypothesis that involvement in low-density peer networks, which expose one to a diverse intellectual and social environment during college, fosters greater growth in moral development than involvement in high-density, relatively homogeneous peer networks, such as fraternities or sororities. Indeed, the evidence we uncovered suggests that Greek affiliation may in fact inhibit growth in principled reasoning and increase the likelihood of academic dishonesty during college.
9. We found little convincing evidence to suggest that intercollegiate athletic participation had more than a trivial, chance impact on either principled moral reasoning or academic dishonesty.
10. Consistent with the contention that interaction with diverse peers and divergent intellectual and social perspectives tends to enhance growth in principled moral reasoning, we found single-study evidence that students participating in off-campus learning programs (e.g., study in foreign countries) showed greater growth in principled reasoning during college than their counterparts who did not participate in off-campus learning experiences.
11. A small body of evidence suggests that off-campus employment during college has a negative influence on both principled moral reasoning and involvement in community service. This may be because extensive off-campus work simply diminishes the time one has available to either commit oneself to community service or to be involved in the social and academic experiences in college that contribute to growth in principled reasoning.
12. Although based on a single-sample, there is evidence to support the contention that out-of-class contact with faculty members has a positive influence on growth in principled moral reasoning. A related finding suggests that it is possible to develop year-long faculty teaching workshops founded on introducing the concepts of developmentally-based instruction that enhance a professor's influence on students' growth in principled reasoning.
Conditional
Effects of College
Consistent with the conclusions of our previous synthesis,
we found evidence supporting the contention that a certain level of formal
reasoning may be required for students to realize significant benefits from
instructional interventions designed to increase principled moral reasoning.
Long-Term
Effects of College
Consistent with the conclusions of our previous
synthesis, we found evidence suggesting that increases in the use of principled
moral reasoning that occur during college tend to persist into the years
immediately following graduation.
Similarly, involvement in voluntary community service during college
tends to continue when one leaves college.
Adams, M., & Zhou-McGovern, Y. (1994). The sociomoral development of undergraduates in a "social diversity" course: Developmental theory, research, and instructional applications. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New Orleans.
Armstrong, M. (1993). Ethics and professionalism in accounting education. Journal of Accounting Education, 11, 77-92.
Arnold, D., & Ponemon, L. (1991). Internal auditors' perceptions of whistle-blowing and the influence of moral reasoning: An experiment. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 10(2), 1-15.
Astin, A., & Sax, L. (1998). How undergraduates are affected by service participation. Journal of College Student Development, 39, 251-263.
Astin, A., Sax, L., & Avalos, J. (1999). Long-term effects of volunteerism during the undergraduate years. Review of Higher Education, 22, 187-202.
Baldizan, L., & Frey, J. (1995). Athletics and moral development: Regulatory and ethical issues. College Student Affairs Journal, 15, 33-43.
Baldwin, D., Adamson, T., Sheehan, J., Self, D., & Oppenberg, A. (1996). Moral reasoning and malpractice: A pilot study of orthopedic surgeons. American Journal of Orthopedics, 25, 481-484.
Batchelder, T., & Root, S. (1994). Effects of an undergraduate program to integrate academic learning and service: Cognitive, prosocial cognitive, and identity outcomes. Journal of Adolescence, 17, 341-355.
Bebeau, M. (1994). Influencing the moral dimensions of dental practice. In J. Rest & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development in the professions: Psychology and applied ethics (pp. 113-139). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Beller, J., & Stoll, S. (1992). A moral reasoning intervention program for student athletes. Athletic Academic Journal(Spring), 43-57.
Beller, J., Stoll, S., Burwell, B., & Cole, J. (1996). The relationship of competition and a Christian liberal arts education on moral reasoning of college student athletes. Research on Christian Higher Education, 3, 99-114.
Berger, J. (1998). Organizational behavior and student outcomes: A new perspective on college impact. Unpublished manuscript, University of New Orleans, New Orleans.
Bernardi, R. (1991). Fraud detection: An experiment testing differences in perceived client integrity and competence, individual auditor cognitive style and experience, and accounting firms. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Union College, Schenectady, NY.
Boss, J. (1994). The effect of community service work on the moral development of college ethics students. Journal of Moral Education, 23, 183-198.
Colby, A., Kohlberg, L., Gibbs, J., & Lieberman, M. (1983). A longitudinal study of moral judgment. Society for Research on Child Development Monograph, 48(1-2, Serial No. 200).
Cram, S. (1998). The impact of service-learning on moral development and self-esteem of community college ethics students. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, Iowa City.
Crandall, C., Tsang, J., Goldman, S., & Pennington, J. (1999). Newsworthy moral dilmmas: Justice, caring, and gender. Sex Roles, 40, 187-209.
Crow, S., Fok, L., Hartman, S., & Payne, D. (1991). Gender and values: What is the impact on decision making? Sex Roles, 25, 255-268.
Cummings, R., Dyas, L., & Maddux, C. (2001). Principled moral reasoning and behavior of preservice teacher education students. American Educational Research Journal, 38, 143-158.
Derryberry, W., & Thoma, S. (2000). The friendship effect: Its role in the development of moral thinking in students. About Campus, 5(2), 13-18.
Duckett, L., Rowan-Boyer, M., Ryden, M., Crisham, P., Savik, K., & Rest, J. (1992). Challenging misperceptions about nurses' moral reasoning. Nursing Research, 41, 324-331.
Duckett, L., & Ryden, M. (1994). Education for ethical nursing practice. In J. Rest & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development in the professions: Psychology and applied ethics (pp. 48-66). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Eyler, J., & Giles, D. (1999). Where's the learning in service learning? San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Finger, W., Borduin, C., & Baumstark, K. (1992). Correlates of moral judgment development in college students. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 153, 221-223.
Flanagan, O.
(1982). Virtue, sex, and gender. Ethics, 92, 499-512.
Foster, J., & La Force, B. (1999). A longitudinal study of moral, religious, and identity development in a Christian liberal arts environment. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 27, 52-68.
Galotti, K., Kozberg, S., & Farmer, M. (1991). Gender and developmental differences in adolescents' conceptions of moral reasoning. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 20, 13-30.
Gielen, U., & Markoulis, D. (1994). Preference for principled moral reasoning: A developmental and cross-cultural perspective. In L. Adler & U. Gielen (Eds.), Cross-cultural topics in psychology (pp. 73-87). Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gilligan, C., & Attanucci, J. (1988). Two moral orientations: Gender differences and similarities. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 43, 223-237.
Good, J., & Cartwright, C. (1998). Development of moral judgement among undergraduate university students. College Student Journal, 32, 270-276.
Gorman, M., Duffy, J., & Heffernan, M. (1994). Service experience and the moral development of college students. Religious Education, 89, 422-431.
Gray, M., Geschwind, S., Ondaatje, E., Robyn, A., Klein, S., Sax, L., et al. (1996). Evaluation of learn and serve America, higher education: First year report (Vol. I). Washington, D.C.: RAND Institute on Education and Training.
Hill, K. (1995). Critical thinking and its relation to academic, personal, and moral development in the college years. Dissertation Abstracts International, 56, 4603B.
Ignelzi, M. (1990). Ethical education in a college environment: The just community approach. NASPA Journal, 27, 191-198.
Ikenberry, S. (1997). Values, character, leadership: Reexamining our mission. Educational Record, 78(3,4), 7-9.
Jeffrey, C. (1993). Ethical development of accounting students, business students, and liberal arts students. Issues in Accounting Education, 8, 26-40.
Kilgannon, S., & Erwin, T. (1992). Longitudinal study about the identity and moral development of Greek students. Journal of College Student Development, 33, 253-259.
King, P. (1997). Character and civic education: What does it take? Educational Record, 78(3,4), 87-93.
King, P., & Mayhew, M. (2002). Moral judgment development in higher education: Insights from the Defining Issues Test. Unpublished unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
Kirkvliet, J. (1994). Cheating by economics' students: A comparison of survey results. Journal of Economic Education, 25, 121-133.
Knox, P., Fagley, N., & Miller, P. (1998). Moral orientation in a sample of African American college student. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Diego, CA.
Kohlberg, L. (1981). The meaning and measurement of moral development. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press.
Kohlberg, L. (1984). Essays on moral development. The psychology of moral development (Vol. 2). San Francisco: Harper and Row.
Lind, G. (1997). Educational environments which promote self-sustaining moral development. Konstanz, Germany: University of Konstanz.
Mason, M., & Gibbs, J. (1993). Social perspective taking and moral judgment among college students. Journal of Adolescent Research, 8, 109-123.
Mathiasen, R. (1998). Moral education of college students: Faculty and staff perspectives. College Student Journal, 32, 374-377.
McCabe, D., & Bowers, W. (1996). The relationship between student cheating and college fraternity or sorority membership. NASPA Journal, 33, 280-291.
McCabe, D., & Trevino, L. (1993). Academic dishonesty: Honor codes and other contextual influences. Journal of Higher Education, 64, 522-538.
McCabe, D., & Trevino, L. (1996). What we know about cheating in college. Change, 28, 29-33.
McCabe, D., & Trevino, L. (1997). Individual and contextual influences on academic dishonesty: A multicampus investigation. Research in Higher Education, 38, 379-396.
McCabe, D., Trevino, L., & Butterfield, K. (1996). The influence of collegiate and corporate codes of conduct on ethics-related behavior in the workplace. Business Ethics Quarterly, 4, 461-476.
McCabe, D., Trevino, L., & Butterfield, K. (1999). Academic integrity in honor code and non-honor code environments: A qualitative investigation. Journal of Higher Education, 70, 211-234.
McNeel, S. (1994a). College teaching and student moral development. In J. Rest & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development in the professions: Psychology and applied ethics (pp. 26-47). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
McNeel, S. (1994b). Integrating psychology and philosophy in the teaching of ethics: A replication of Penn's direct approach. Unpublished manuscript, Bethel College, St. Paul, MN.
McNeel, S., Abou-Zeid, B., Essenburg, T., Smith, R., Danforth, D., & Weaver, R. (1996). Business students: Are they really different? Research on Christian Higher Education, 3, 33-56.
McNeel, S., & Granstrom, S. (1995). Principled reasoning, critical thinking, and spirituality. Unpublished manuscript, Bethel College, St. Paul, MN.
McNeel, S., Schaffer, M., & Juarez, M. (1997). Growth in moral judgment among baccalaureate nursing students. Research on Christian Higher Education, 4, 29-45.
Mentkowski, M., & Associates. (2000). Learning that lasts: Interpreting learning, development, and performance in college and beyond. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Mullane, S. (1999). Fairness, educational value, and moral development in the student disciplinary process. NASPA Journal, 36, 86-95.
Mustapha, S., & Seybert, J. (1990). Moral reasoning in college students: Effects of two general education curricula. Educational Research Quarterly, 14(4), 32-40.
Myers-Lipton, S. (1994). The effects of service-learning on college students' attitudes toward civic responsibility, international understanding, and racial prejudice. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Colorado, Boulder.
Nevins, K., & McNeel, S. (1992). Facilitating student moral development through faculty development. Moral Education Forum, 17(4), 12-18.
Nixon, H., II. (1997). Gender, sport, and aggressive behavior outside sport. Journal of Sport & Social Issues, 21, 379-391.
Paradice, D., & Dejoie, R. (1991). The ethical decision-making process of information systems workers. Journal of Business Ethics, 10, 1-21.
Pascarella, E. (1997). College's influence on principled moral reasoning. Educational Record, 78(3,4), 47-55.
Pascarella, E., & Terenzini, P. (1991). How college affects students: Findings and insights from twenty years of research. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Penn, W. (1990). Teaching ethics -- A direct approach. Journal of Moral Education, 19, 124-138.
Pierson, C. (2002). Volunteerism in college: Impacts on cognitive outcomes, learning orientations, and educational aspirations. Unpublished unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA.
Ponemon, L. (1992). Auditor underreporting of time and moral reasoning: An experimental-lab study. Contemporary Accounting Research, 9, 171-189.
Ponemon, L. (1993a). Can ethics be taught in accounting? Journal of Accounting Education, 11, 185-209.
Ponemon, L., & Gabhart, D. (1990). Auditor independence judgments: A cognitive development model and experimental evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research, 7, 227-251.
Ponemon, L., & Gabhart, D. (1993). Ethical reasoning in accounting and auditing. Vancouver, Canada: Canadian General Accountants' Research Foundation.
Ponemon, L., & Glazer, A. (1990). Accounting education and ethical development: The influence of liberal learning on students and alumni in accounting practice. Issues in Accounting Education, 5, 195-208.
Rest, J. (1979). Development in juding moral issues. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Rest, J. (1986c). Moral development: Advances in research and theory. New York: Praeger.
Rest, J. (1994). Background: Theory and research. In J. Rest & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development in the professions: Psychology and applied ethics (pp. 1-25). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Rest, J., & Narvaez, D. (1991). The college experience and moral development. In W. Kurtines & J. Gewirtz (Eds.), Handbook of moral behavior and development (pp. 229-245). Hillsdale, New Jersey.
Rest, J., Narvaez, D., Bebeau, M., & Thoma, S. (1999). Postconventional moral thinking: A neo-Kohlbergian approach. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Rest, J., Thoma, S., & Edwards, L. (1997). Devising and validating a measure of moral judgment: Stage preference and stage consisting approaches. Journal of Educational Psychology, 89, 5-28.
Rykiel, J. (1995). The community college experience: Is there an effect on critical thinking and moral reasoning? Dissertation Abstracts International, 56, 3824A.
Santilli, N., & Hudson, L. (1992). Enhancing moral growth: Is communication the key? Adolescence, 27, 145-160.
Self, D., & Baldwin, D. (1994). Moral reasoning in medicine. In J. Rest & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development in the professions: Psychology and applied ethics (pp. 140-153). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Shaub, M. (1994). An analysis of the association of traditional demographic variables with the moral reasoning of auditing students and auditors. Journal of Accounting Education, 12, 1-26.
Smith, P., & Oakley, E. (1996). The value of ethics education in business school curriculum. College Student Journal, 30, 274-283.
Snodgrass, J., & Behling, R. (1996). Differences in moral reasoning between college and university business majors and non-business majors. Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 15, 79-84.
St. Pierre, K., Nelson, E., & Gabbin, A. (1990). A study of the ethical development of accounting majors in relation to other business and nonbusiness disciplines. Accounting Educator's Journal, 3, 23-35.
Tennant, S. (1991). Personal and moral development: A developmental curriculum intervention for liberal arts freshmen. Dissertation Abstracts International, 51, 2657A.
Walker, L. (1984). Sex differences in the development of moral reasoning: A critical review. Child Development, 57, 522-527.
Walker, L. (1991). Sex differences in moral reasoning. In W. Kurtines & J. Gewirtz (Eds.), Handbook of moral behavior and development: Volume 2: Research (pp. 333-364). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Wilson, K., Rest, J., Boldizar, J., & Deemer, D. (1992). Moral judgment development: The effects of education and occupation. Social Justice Research, 5, 31-48.
[1] Parts of this chapter draw heavily on an earlier article: Pascarella, E. (1997). College’s influence on principled moral reasoning. Educational Record, 78 (Summer/Fall), 47-55, and on an excellent review by King and Mayhew (2002).
[2] Recently the “principled” part of principled moral reasoning has come under criticism by moral philosophers who object to Principalism (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). In response to this, some scholars have replaced principled moral reasoning with postconventional moral reasoning (Rest et al., 1999). While we recognize this concern, most of the research literature we reviewed still uses the term principled moral reasoning or judgment. Because of this, and for purposes of continuity with our previous synthesis, we continue to employ the term principled moral reasoning in this chapter.
[3] However, despite some theoretical arguments to the contrary (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988), there is little empirical support for the notion that principled moral reasoning is significantly related to gender (Baldizan & Frey, 1995; Crandall, Tsang, Goldman, & Pennington, 1999; Flanagan, 1982; Galotti, Kozberg, & Farmer, 1991; Knox, Fagley, & Miller, 1998; McNeel, Schaffer, & Juarez, 1997; Walker, 1984, 1991).
[4] There was also a tendency for students who transferred into the program their junior year to show significantly greater growth in DIT principled reasoning test scores during the last two years of college than students already in the program. However, because the former group started out with nearly a one standard deviation deficit in principled reasoning at the start of their junior year, relative to the latter group, it is likely that this comparison may be confounded by regression artifacts.
[5] Other quasi-experimental research has been less successful in finding significant effects of moral development interventions on principled moral reasoning. See, for example, studies estimating the impact of a social diversity course (Adams & Zhou-McGovern, 1994), an interpersonal communications course (Santilli & Hudson, 1992), and a psychosocial/developmental course for freshmen (Tennant, 1991).
[6] Results reported by Gorman, Duffy, and Heffernan (1994) tend to support those of Boss (1994). However, the study design is not as rigorous as that of either Boss (1994) or Cram (1998).
[7] Batchelder and Root (1994) also found that students in highly integrated service-learning courses made statistically significant increases in prosocial reasoning (reasoning reflecting empathy, concern for societal justice, importance of contractual obligations) during a semester. However, their analysis did not provide for a control group; so it is unclear how much of the growth is attributable to service-learning.