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

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Reading Livy against Livy: The dream and nightmare of (American) empire

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Reading Livy against Livy: The Dream and Nightmare of (American) Empire[1]

MICHAEL E. HOENICKE MOORE

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ABSTRACT *Recent debates over the rise of an American Empire have relied on analogies to past empires, from ancient Athens to modern Britain. Such historical analogies, while inexact and debatable, are a basic mode of understanding our relation to the past. This article explores the analogy of the United States to the Roman Empire. The figure of Rome is a contested legacy, as can be seen in the long-ago writings of Livy and Tacitus, in the developing ideal of Rome during the Middle Ages, and in the works of modern scholars and poets living under Soviet domination in Poland. Tacitus tells us that the most profound symptoms of empire may be seen in the homeland. The debate over analogies for the American Empire is thus a debate over the "state of America's soul."*

I. AMERICA: TO BE OR NOT TO BE?

Is the United States, as Raymond Aron once observed, "doomed to play the leading role?" Aron believed that, like the ancient Romans, Americans would only slowly come to recognize their imperial destiny, asking: "When did the Romans become aware of their vocation to *regere populos*?"[2] There is an apparent reluctance to accept the incipient fact of empire in American political culture. In a recent press conference, President George Bush declared that "America is not an imperial power, it is a liberating power," echoing Thomas Jefferson's dream of an "empire of liberty."[3] Nevertheless, it is clear that the United States is at a cross-road, and the once taboo theme of empire has become common in political discussions.

In recent debates over the role of the United States in the world, some scholars explain that American power and global influence already amount to an expanding empire, exercising power world-wide through regional military proconsuls.[4] Meanwhile neo-Conservatives (William Kristol), nationalists (Philip Bobbitt) and neo-Liberals (Niall Ferguson) alike argue that America should openly and deliberately accept its stature as an imperial power in the post-Cold War era. The proponents of empire resolutely keep in view only the positive aspects of imperial power, especially so as to see things from the vantage point of victorious and expanding powers of the past. Traditionally empire has

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served to control regions, resources and trade routes. Late-modern imperialists are more interested in empire as a system for the control of people, and the establishment of global order.[5]

In the course of this debate, comparisons have been made between the United States and the ancient empire of Athens (the Delian League), or the British Empire of the nineteenth-century. Such comparisons can seem far-fetched or unhistorical. I would argue instead that drawing such historical comparisons is no idle game, but rather a basic means of understanding our own times in relation to the past. Such analogies with the past have always provided historical and political orientation. A debate over historical analogies for America's current and future role is serious, and amounts to a debate over the state of our soul. It is well to remember, with the ancient historian Thucydides, that the past does not offer simple knitting-patterns. Such debates can do no more than help us become more aware and wakeful as we endure history, and try to shape our actions.

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II. Historical Analogies

Historians are usually troubled by analogies made between past events and those of the present. Such analogies are inexact, slanted, misleading, and amount to nothing, since in any case, true historical scholarship studies the past itself, in its distance and distinctiveness. Historians know that history never repeats itself. When humanists of the Renaissance sought to restore the beauties of the ancient world, they succeeded only in creating new beauties, and new horrors, for their own time. Carried too far, however, this argument might render void the most urgent reason to study history.

A different perspective was offered, however, by Eduard Meyer, the great nineteenth-century historian of classical antiquity. Meyer argued that only the "historically effective" aspects of the past were worthy of our consideration. By this he meant, every age gives its measure to the past: what still affects current reality is what counts. Meyer's understanding of historical *effectivity* is close to the earlier historical philosophy of Friedrich von Schiller.[6] The moral value and meaning of what our armies and leaders do can only be given a context by reference to the past. From this perspective, comparison of the present to the past is a tight knot binding us to historical reality. And yet the "lessons of the past" are rarely simple. The search for lessons is a form of reflection and argument about our own time in its continuity or difference to the past.

The Bush Administration's policy of preemptively striking at potential enemies "to forestall or prevent . . . hostile acts by our adversaries," has set this imperial debate in motion, and has led to the search for appropriate analogies.[7] US military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have inspired positive and negative parallels to British efforts to dominate the same regions. The United States can even be seen as the unrivalled leader of an expanding circle of democratic powers, like the Athenian Empire. Vice President Dick Cheney is an admirer of the historian Victor Davis Hanson, who supports this analogy for current American ambitions.[8] If Mr Cheney were to inquire of more historians, he would learn that, when asked to consider the meaning of the Athenian Empire, many think first of the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War*, where we hear a defense of the "law of the stronger" by Athens, and learn how casually they could plan and carry out the extermination of a city.[9] The inhabitants of the island of Melos did not wish to

submit to Athenian control, and Athens sent ambassadors to reason with them. The Melians argued that submission to Athens would be a kind of slavery, while the Athenians maintained that it would be to the advantage of both sides if Melos would submit:

> *Melians*: And just how would it be as much to our advantage to be enslaved, as for you to rule over us?
>
> *Athenians*: You would benefit by surrendering before you experience the worst of consequences, and we would benefit by not having you dead.[10]

The people of Melos chose to defend their independence, but after a siege, Athens conquered the city, and "killed all the males of fighting age they could capture and sold the women and children into slavery."[11] The point of Thucydides' account seems to be that extremely powerful states, like the gods themselves, are endowed with great freedom of action and can unleash arbitrary acts of power with impunity. Unrivaled power is godlike.

By the end of the Melian episode, the reader is left to brood by his lamplight, full of hopeless admiration for the men of Melos, and recoiling at the victory of raw power.[12] It is important to recall this, since the proponents of American empire indulge in a fantasy of virile strength and a cult of will power, despising their opponents as effeminate and weak. This is the approach taken by Robert Kagan, with his weird joke that "Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus."[13] Neo-Conservative historians endorsing the model of a "tough Athens," do not shy away from the military stridency of that empire, but fail to see how Athens came to resemble her rival Sparta.[14] Of course, neither Athens nor Sparta won the Peloponnesian War. Both cities were debilitated and exhausted by the end, inviting the dominance of Macedonia, a force from outside. Alexander the Great was the whirlwind reaped by Athens. Historical analogies are contentious, and can swing two ways.

Events of the past have the awful odor of inevitability. From our standpoint in present time, they cannot be otherwise, and this is the agony of reading Thucydides. As analogy, and a source of reflection for current or future action, however, the story may yet turn out differently. The search for "historical lessons" is an ambiguous enterprise, although it is so often carried out with little sense of balance or historical tact.

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III. History and Myths of Rome

Ancient Rome is often left out of the current debate over American Empire. Athens and the British Empire seem fresher, and more suitably democratic for comparison with the United States. Over successive ages, however, the Roman Empire served as the archetype of imperial grandeur and for reflection on the fate of empires. The massive history of Rome written by Livy (Titus Livius, 64/59 BC–17 AD) commenced with the founding of the city, and the stories of Romulus and Remus, and Aeneus the Trojan exile.[15] He wished to include these tales because, while unreliable, they contained a "kind of truth"—the truth of how the Romans viewed themselves and how others viewed them.[16] The attempt to write historical narratives reaching back to the mythic origins of a city or a culture was a habit inherited by the Romans from ancient Greek historians. According to Oswyn Murray, this often enticed ancient historians to make a

"fatal elision between myth and history."[17] Livy was aware of the problem, but brushed it aside:

> if any people should be permitted to sanctify its inception and reckon the gods as its founders, surely the glory of the Roman people in war is such that, when it boasts Mars in particular as its parent and the parent of its founder, the nations of the world would as easily acquiesce in this claim as they do in our rule.[18]

Indeed, you could say that "Romans were from Mars." Livy here drew a connection between political power and myth, implying that the myth of Roman origins was noteworthy even if false, and was accepted by foreigners and Romans alike, because the myth was a further projection of power. From Livy's perspective, Roman war-power rightly compelled belief in its founding myths, as a mental form of obedience.

Livy's history reflects how a new understanding of the Roman polity was looked for, as Rome extended its dominion in Gaul and the Mediterranean and was transformed into an empire. Livy was teased by the rhetorician Quintilian for his rustic style, and by the emperor Augustus for harboring old-fashioned republican leanings.[19] Wary of the transformations endured by the old Republic, Livy was nonetheless captivated by the drama of Roman military power and wished to demonstrate the justice of the Roman cause. He sought to vindicate Roman expansion, but attribute it to the heroic republican era. According to Livy, the wars of Rome established a greater polity, having cohesion and a meaningful identity. Livy was at pains to establish the legitimacy and necessity of Roman imperialism, which "rendered better the condition of those who had become its subjects."[20] His portraits of the great heroes of Rome's wars: Cincinnatus, Camillus, Fabius Maximus Cunctator, Scipio Africanus, were intended to awaken admiration for their incorruptible virtue and patriotism. And they did inspire generations of schoolchildren, made to read Livy in European and American grammar schools. The myths of early Rome, although unreliable, were vital to the greater canvas of Livy's history: they provided current Roman expansion with a permanent and inarguable validity.

Livy should be compared with the later historian Tacitus (56–117 AD), who cautiously and in cowled language expounded a darker view of the empire. When Tacitus wrote, Rome had captured much of the known world. Tacitus declared at the outset of his *Annals* that the rise of the Roman Empire had been well chronicled, but that in the late Empire, the "rise of flattery" and fear of imperial displeasure caused history-writing to atrophy, becoming mendacious or frivolous.[21] He pined for the good old days of Livy, when Roman history was all sunny and pleasant. With barely-concealed contempt he set out to chronicle, in his *Annals*, the collapse of republican virtue in a world under the total sway of despotism. The senators crouched in fear of the emperors, but hoped to catch any scraps that might fall from the table of imperial power. The emperors were depraved by lust and soaked to the eyeballs in the bliss of power. The true motives of historical actors could no longer be discerned; the real reason for events could only be surmised. With Tacitus we view a world completely transformed by the impact of imperial power, and the scene is bleak. Tacitus has often provided a model—teaching other historians, writing under other tyrannies, "not merely to register facts but to penetrate the recesses," an historical style of tremendous reserve and tension.[22] As the "exegete and the critic of political absolutism" Tacitus had many admirers in the sixteenth and

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seventeenth-centuries: a follower of Tacitus would keep his counsel (and his head) by adopting a veiled manner of speaking.[23]

IV. Visions of Rome

Christian Views

For early Christians, Rome was a wicked, demonic power. New Testament writers compared Rome to Babylon, and implied that when the prophets of Israel announced the downfall of Babylon, they were really speaking of Rome.[24] "Babylon" became a code-word for Rome. In rabbinical thought, likewise, Babylon and Rome were equated as the fierce powers that had destroyed the First and Second Temple. The authors of the Gospels proclaimed that Jesus had come to liberate humanity from the oppression of the Roman Empire.[25] Even after the conversion of Constantine in 312, suspicion still clung to the Roman Empire and its pagan backdrop. St. Augustine believed that the conquests of Rome were the result only of a lust for domination (*libido dominandi*). In his great work *The City of God*, Augustine argued that the achievement of Rome in conquering this mortal world was of little importance: "I entirely fail to see what difference it makes, aside from the most empty pride of human glory, that some men should be conquerors and others conquered."[26] Ransacking Livy, Augustine subjected Roman history and its founding myths to devastating criticism and mockery. He concluded that the empire only came to exist because of injustice and human frailty: "if men were always peaceful and just, human affairs would be happier and all kingdoms would be small, rejoicing in concord with their neighbors."[27]

After the fall of Rome, however, the Christian kingdoms that arose in the former European lands of the empire did not share Augustine's complex view of the Roman Empire. Instead, they longed to revive its heroic glory and inherit the power that went with it.

The Ostrogoths

The Goths who sacked Rome in 410 did not really mean to destroy the Empire. Having developed their identity in a long period of contact and conflict with Rome, they were keen on continuing the empire, but under Ostrogothic rule. The Ostrogoths had long assimilated Roman customs and ideas. Indeed, they were granted Roman citizenship by Theodosius, and thought of themselves as Roman.[28] When they suddenly found themselves in a position of command, they did not wish to see the fall of Rome. In the late fifth century, as they established an enormous kingdom stretching from the Balkans to Spain, the Goths accomplished what might be called the "Germanization" of the Empire, continuing and heightening a trend that can be observed long before the formal end of the empire.[29] The Gothic king Theodoric, with his bare legs and long hair, thought of himself as the "Restorer of the Republic" (*Restitutor reipublicae*), much to the dismay of the old, highly cultured senatorial class, who could never forgive the calamity that befell their City.[30] A new Gothic empire was built around this theme of continuity. It was here that the continued power of Rome over the European imagination was first established, as a mythic entity that could be restored, rebuilt, and perhaps endlessly renewed.

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The Carolingian Empire

North of the Goths another Germanic people would also lay claim to the legacy of Rome. The Franks (who gave their name to modern-day France), established a kingdom of their own, and gradually built a large kingdom under their own long-haired kings, conquering the Goths, whom they drove out of Gaul early in the sixth century. The Franks were far less assimilated to Rome, and boasted that they had helped destroy the old pagan Roman Empire. But gradually, the Roman Empire took on for them a dreamlike quality, as an ideal civilization of law and righteous power. Beginning in about 768, under their King Charlemagne, they built a substantial empire that would include most of western Europe, from Italy to Denmark, and from the Pyrenees to Germany. Genuine continuity with Rome was lacking in this case. When Charlemagne came to the throne, there had not been a Roman emperor in the west for about 300 years.

Nevertheless, in the most famous event of his reign, Charlemagne was crowned as "Emperor of the Romans" on Christmas Day in 800. On this remarkable occasion, Pope Hadrian relied on the ideology of a document forged in the papal curia, the *Donation of Constantine*, which "proved" that the popes had been granted imperial rights in western Europe by the Emperor Constantine, when he packed off to Constantinople. According to the dubious document, Constantine granted to the bishops of Rome an imperial regalia, complete with crown, scepter, and robes of purple.[31] The regalia and prestige of the Roman Empire could thus be "transferred" to the Franks in a single grand ceremony. The opportunity to lay claim to all the grandeur of Rome and the mantle of Empire was impossible to resist for Charlemagne.

Here was another triumph of nostalgia. Rome was adopted as a political theme, in a program that emphasized only the positive aspects of Rome: its great power, lofty culture (although pagan), and rational law. Some historians have endeavored to illustrate the geopolitical benefits to the Frankish state of this short-lived empire, although such an interpretation requires the historian to ignore the stridently expressed religious motivations of Carolingian kings, and the impulse of sheer competitive aggression involved in the Carolingian expansion.

Thereafter, the idea of a "revived Roman Empire" became a constant theme in western politics. The Ottonians used this theme when they built the Holy Roman Empire, an entity, and an idea, which would remain in existence until the fall of the Habsburgs in 1806. To the very end, the Habsburg emperors indulged in "historical play-acting," flourishing the robes, crowns and ceremonial of medieval/Roman grandeur.[32] Throughout the Middle Ages, and into the Early Modern period, European regimes often claimed either continuity with the Roman Empire, or to be the true heirs of the Roman spirit. The Roman Empire, which had founded itself on the violent myth of Romulus and Remus, itself provided a grandiose political myth for European polities, deployed in contradictory forms, from the French Republic to the Third Reich of Hitler. Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) unseated the last Holy Roman Emperor. For his own coronation, Napoleon and his advisors crafted a ceremony that would evoke the Roman coronation of Charlemagne, but include enough classical Republican themes to achieve the right tone. At the culmination of his ritual, rather than deigning to be crowned by clerical hands, Napoleon placed the crown of empire on his own head.[33]

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V. Reading Livy against Livy

Now to return to the modern world and the debate over American Empire. The Cold War shapes the thinking of many current political thinkers and politicians in the United States. American politicians are keen to take credit for having "won the Cold War," which is said to have been achieved by pressing the arms race. Such a view leaves no room for cultural factors, and some, such as Niall Ferguson, laugh at the very idea of "soft power."[34] We should pause to consider where that contest was really waged, by those with everything to lose, within the Soviet Empire, by philosophers, poets and labor leaders: the Solidarity trade union, the Czech rock band The Plastic People of the Universe, and groups of intellectuals such as Charter 77, all played their role. Dissident literature from behind the Iron Curtain is today a formidable body of political thought that will long remain important, given the proposition that tyranny has not passed away from the world. Here I wish to focus on Poland, and the way in which Polish thinkers, writing in dangerous conditions, sometimes from prison, viewed the whole concept of empire. The Poles had been crushed and their country partitioned so often by empires (Prussia, Sweden, Germany, Russia) that they grew skeptical of the empire-concept.

Taking the Roman Empire as a negative model is an old tradition in Poland. Henryk Sienkiewicz's novel of 1896, *Quo Vadis*, one of the most widely translated and popular of all novels, portrayed Nero's Rome as a culture spiraling into perverse decline because of its vast power: the delightful character Petronius comes to realize that "the garlanded, trophy-bedecked chariot in which Rome was riding at the head of a train of fettered nations was making straight for the abyss."[35]

A century later, in the east Europe of Brezhnev, intellectuals again reconsidered the old dream of empire. In a pair of sharply pointed books, Ryszard Kapuscinski examined two bizarre, decrepit empires of the contemporary world: the Ethiopia of Haile Selassi, and Iran under Shah Pahlavi, leaving unspoken the strong implication that his essays were intended to serve as a critical reflection on Poland under the martial law regime of Wojciech Jaruzelski.[36] Kapuscinski thus proved to be a true heir of Tacitus, writing a covert history of martial-law Poland through his shrouded, ironic studies of other tyrannical empires.

Zbigniew Herbert, born in 1924, came to maturity during World War II and under Nazi occupation. During the war, he participated in clandestine educational efforts, and took part in the resistance, fighting in a guerilla unit. Herbert began writing poetry during the war, and became one of the postwar wave of Polish poets, gaining attention with his first published volume of poetry in 1956.[37] During Soviet occupation and later during the martial law regime of Jaruzelski, Herbert remained in Poland, and continued to write, becoming a leading cultural figure for the Polish dissident movement. Herbert himself did not like to belong to any group or organization. He recorded the effect of remaining in Poland in his poem "The Abandoned": "I did not catch/the last transport/I stayed behind in a town/which is not a town."[38] Herbert's work revolves around the contrast between the historical world and its cruelties, and the bewildered or tragic perspective of a lonely thoughtful mind. He often reflected on the problem of empire, and drew a contrast between the ambitions of Great Powers and the City that stands against them. For Herbert, as for St. Augustine, the City was the central image of human community,

fragile daily life confronting the ruinous sprawl of empires. In one of his greatest poems, "Report from the Besieged City," he reflected on the history of Poland this way:

> truly it is inconceivable that the City is still defending itself
> the siege has lasted a long time the enemies must take turns
> nothing unites them except the desire for our extermination
> Goths the Tartars Swedes troops of the Emperor...
> the colors of their banners change like the forest on the horizon
> from delicate bird's yellow in spring through green through red to winter's black.[39]

Regarding Rome, the preeminent model of empire, Zbigniew Herbert again echoed Augustine in his disdain for the devotees of power and imperial rule, in his poem "Transformations of Livy." He asks: "How did they understand Livy my grandfather my great-grandfather?"[40] Given his own experience, he found it hard to support the traditional admiration for Roman glory and virtue.

> Only my father and myself after him
> read Livy against Livy
> carefully examining what is underneath the fresco
> ...we were willing to be moved by the defeat of the Samnites Gauls or Etruscans
> we counted many of the names of peoples turned to dust by the Romans
> buried without glory who for Livy
> were not worth even a wrinkle of style
> those Hirpins Apuleans Lucanians Osunans
> also the inhabitants of Tarentum Metapontis Locri.[41]

Like St. Augustine, Herbert suggests that a true portrait of an Empire should include the conquered.

VI. "HOMELAND" AND PROVINCE

According to Hannah Arendt, "Expansion as a permanent and supreme aim of politics is the central political idea of imperialism."[42] This is true, whether the expansion is proclaimed as the spread of law and order (as in the case of Rome) or as a gift of political liberty (as in the case of Athens, or Napoleon's France). Imperial institutions also bring about ineluctable and permanent changes in the homeland. For a long time, Romans tried not to see that the Empire had brought the Republic to a squalid end. Imperial government was long viewed optimistically, as a direct continuation of republican institutions and values.[43] Gradually the emperors claimed ever more lofty titles, highlighting their singular power and quasi-divine stature.[44] The mob in Paris cheered the victories of Napoleon, even after he turned his "whiff of grape-shot" against them. Such transformations are why, according to the anthropologist Marcel Mauss, the rise of an imperial regime announces a *coupure* between the political and the moral. Writing sometime between 1925 and 1927, Mauss argued that empire brings to an end Aristotle's ideal of the city as a stage for the fullest development of the citizen and his virtue.[45] With empire, the state turns all its attention to dominion abroad and control at home. As Tacitus might remark, conquerors often find themselves enslaved alongside the conquered. Still, we can hope that our judgments about the past might offer guidance

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for our life in the contemporary world, as we address ourselves to an unknown future. Arendt held open this window of hope:

> If judgement is our faculty for dealing with the past, the historian is the inquiring man who by relating it sits in judgement over it. If that is so, we may reclaim our human dignity, win it back, as it were, from the pseudo-divinity named History of the modern age . . .[46]

Perhaps we should look for signs of an emerging American Empire less in foreign wars than in gradual, persistent changes in the homeland. Historical reflection, meanwhile, can only clarify the mind, and guide the comportment of individuals who confront the twilight of an epoch or the rise of a new system.

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Notes

1. I wish to thank Sang-Ki Kim and Carl P. Springer for their comments during the colloquium "Thinking About Empire," at Southern Illinois University—Edwardsville; also Michaela Hoenicke Moore (York University) and Robert Zaretsky (University of Houston) for their help and suggestions.
2. Raymond Aron, "The Imperial Republic," in *The Dawn of Universal History: Selected Essays from a Witness of the Twentieth Century*, trans. Barbara Bray (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 265 and 245. Original edition: *Une histoire du XXe siècle* (Paris: Éditions Plon, 1996).
3. George Bush, Address preceding a White House press conference, 13 April 2004; on Jefferson and the history of American empire, see: Richard White, "The Geography of American Empire," *Raritan* 23 (2004): 2.
4. Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 167–97.
5. Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 7–13.
6. See the classic article of Walter Grossmann, "Schiller's Philosophy of History in his Jena Lectures of 1789–90," *Publications of the Modern Language Association* 69 (1954): 156–72. The concept of effective history (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) was central for the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd edition (New York: Continuum, 1998), 300–1. The History of Concepts (*Begriffsgeschichte*), a historical school inspired by Gadamer, has pursued the notion of effective history systematically. See most notably: Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck, eds, *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, 8 vols.-in-9 (Stuttgart: E. Klett, 1972–97).
7. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (The White House: September 2002), 15.
8. Cheney referred to Hanson's work in a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 9 April 2003. Hanson is proud of Cheney's interest. See Victor Davis Hanson, "History or Hysteria?" posted in *The National Review Online*, 28 March 2003; and his recent book, *Ripples of Battle: How Wars of the Past Still Determine How we Fight, How we Live, and How we Think* (New York: Doubleday, 2003).
9. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Walter Blanco (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), V. 86–114, 227–31.
10. *Ibid*., V. 92–3, 228.
11. *Ibid*., V. 116, 231.
12. See the useful commentary of W. Robert Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 147–57.

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13. Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power, America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2003). See also Richard Figuier, "Le méridien de partition. La civilization européenne contre la société américaine," *Revue des deux mondes* (April 2004): 55–62.
14. Donald Kagan, *The Peloponnesian War* (New York: Viking, 2003).
15. R. M. Ogilvie, ed., *Titi Livi Ab Urbe Condita*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, rpt. 1979), pref. 6–7, trans. T. J. Luce, *Livy: The Rise of Rome, Books 1–5* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3.
16. Gary B. Miles, *Livy: Reconstructing Early Rome* (Ithaca: Columbia University Press, 1995), 18.
17. Oswyn Murray, "History," in *The Greek Pursuit of Knowledge*, ed. Jacques Brunschwig and Geoffrey E. R. Lloyd, trans. Catherine Porter *et al.* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 181.
18. Livy, *Rise of Rome*, 3.
19. Gian Biagio Conte, *Latin Literature, A History*, trans. Joseph B. Solodow (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 367–70.
20. Eugen Cizek, *Histoire et historiens à Rome dans l'antiquité* (Lyon: Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1995), 161–4.
21. C. D. Fisher, ed., *Cornelii Tacitii Annalium ab excessu Divi Augusti libri* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1906), I.1.
22. Ronald Syme, *Tacitus*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), vol. 2, 520.
23. Arnaldo Momigliano, "Tacitus and the Tacitist Tradition," in *The Classical Foundations of Modern Historiography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 123.
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