From Culturalism to Transculturalism
The Cultural Dynamic
Cultural studies has a complex and dynamic genealogy.
We can trace various lineages through social theory, sociology, anthropology,
and various modes of aesthetics. However, the constellation of these
somewhat indefinite elements is frequently attributed to Raymond Williams
and the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (see Hall, “Cultural
Studies”; Turner; Grossberg; Bennett; Storey; Lewis). Williams’s
concept of “cultural studies,” along with Richard Johnson’s
broader notion of “culturalism,” distinguished a mode of
analysis which could integrate an anthropological interest in the popular
arts and artifacts with a reformist social and political agenda. Through
various refinements, most particularly the more sophisticated application
of Stuart Hall’s interpretation of Althusserian ideology and Gramscian
hegemony (“Rediscovery of Ideology”), Birmingham cultural
studies exerted an astonishing influence over the evolving (mis)fortunes
of the humanities and social sciences in the English-speaking world.
Even in the United States, with its own quite distinct understandings
of the problematic of “culture,” Birmingham style cultural
studies was able to attach itself to local permutations of poststructural
and postmodern theory, providing, among other things, a reinvigorated
vocabulary of heuristic dispute—one which productively engaged
with America’s ongoing consternations over race, the politics of
pluralism and notions of national culture.
More broadly, however, this constellation of the various lineages which
led to a distinctive cultural studies illuminated new pathways and new
for a cross- or transdisciplinary approach to the specific field of knowledge.
In his review of the Birmingham legacy, Stuart Hall has argued that cultural
studies has always had at its core a political agenda (“Cultural Studies”).
The post-Birmingham period has presented new challenges to the notion of ideology,
structure, and hegemony, with many cultural theorists preferring to centralize
a more generic definition of power and power relationships. Foucault substantiates
this idea when he refers to the pervasiveness of power through the stratum
and sub-stratum of social and personal relationships (see Discipline and Punish
and History of Sexuality). The precise nature of this power, however, remains
decidedly problematic, as Foucault’s pronouncements have been deployed
in the interests of two quite divergent modes of post-hegemony, post-ideology
cultural movements. In the first instance, it has been taken up by a broad
field of analysts interested in defining, even welcoming, a new historical
epoch which would facilitate the radical expansion of human identity and expressive
subjectivities. The second area in which Foucault’s ideas have been adapted
is in the area of cultural policy or “cultural civics.”
My aim in this paper is to examine critically these recent developments in
cultural studies in terms of a post-Gramscian cultural dynamic. This is not
to suggest that the Gramscian paradigm is exhausted and I acknowledge that
there are many very notable writers in the field who advocate the restoration
(continuation) of a Gramscian theoretic (see Storey, McRobbie, Grossberg).
My argument here is simply that the most recent incarnations of the self-defining
cultural studies movement have centered on two quite specific readings of Foucault.
In order to advance our understanding of culture it seems necessary to examine
these readings, most especially as cultural studies seeks to establish itself
as the evolutionary descendant of the traditional disciplines. The current
essay, in fact, suggests an alternative to the Foucaultian cultural dichotomy,
one which seeks to maximize the heuristic efficacy of hegemony theory and poststructuralism.
To this extent, I suggest that the concept of “transculturalism” takes
us beyond Johnson’s original notion of “culturalism” through
the integration of a political aesthetics with a cultural civics.
From Postmodern to Posthuman
The poststructural and postmodern critiques of Gramscian
theory have been well canvassed. However, it is worth recalling some
of the more
prominent objections to structuralist notions of power, ideology, and
hegemony. Thus, for the poststructural/postmodern cultural theorist—
• Power is basically unstable and interchangeable.
It is never fixed in structure but is experienced at the level of the
body. Power is inevitably challenged at the moment of its appearance;
it is always changing, mutating, being transformed.
• Power is shaped through language which is
itself incomplete and always in transition.
• Notions of hegemony and ideology, even as they are construed
as “negotiable,” falsify the dispersed and incomplete nature
• If truth exists at all it is only a locally
constituted phenomenon that operates temporarily and can never be universal.
• Without an origin, center, or ultimate cause,
language is predisposed toward the margins.
• Culture is formed in language so it too is
transitory, unstable, and dynamic.
• Culture thus becomes a resource for identity
liberation, diversity, free imagining, and expressiveness. The goal
of the cultural critic should
be to enhance the liberational space of the individual subject.
• Systems and structures of any kind are to be abhorred. Marxism,
for example, merely substitutes one dominant or normative institution
for another. The postmodern cultural critic, therefore, seeks “alternatives” through
the margins, the personal, the sensual or pleasurable, the (individuated)
popular, the body, the fragmented self, the other, the diasporic, and
Identity politics are centralized in a celebrational
postmodernism. Even Gramsci’s notion of organic intellectuals,
which certainly widened the liberational ambit of Marx and Althusser,
limiting to the postmodernists. The subject is liberated in postmodern
culture through the complete extinguishment of social or collective imperatives.
The subject is free-flowing, selecting, unhindered. S/he cannot be defined
except through self-reflexivities and self-determinations. There is no
fixed center, no ultimate reference by which the subject might be measured
or estimated. The institutional ascriptions of race, class, sexuality,
gender, age, and geography are deconstructed and hence neutralized by
a cultural studies which privileges the margins and the particulate over
the formative and determinant. Individual identity and personal pleasure
overwhelm the austerities and expectations of modernism, advocating a
new morality and a new way of aestheticizing relationships which are
no longer territorialized by certainty (see Deleuze and Guattari, Giddens).
This mode of analytical advocacy has clearly distinguished itself from
the humanist precepts which underpin modernist politics. According to
postmodern theoretic, humanism is another form of institutional or normative
containment, one which generally disguises political elitism within a collectivist
discourse. That is, humanism, most particularly as it attaches itself to the
state, democracy and capitalism, expresses the interests of plutocratic, white
heterosexual males under the guise of a general “social benefit.” As
with Benthamite and Millsian utilitarianism, humanism seeks to mediate the
social good as an assembly of individual gratifications, pleasures, and prosperities.
Zolo, along with other recent analysts of modern liberalism and democracy,
point out that this mediation simply manifests itself as a highly differentiated
and hierarchical social order.
The theoretics of posthumanism breaks entirely with this ideological nexus,
seeking to establish a politics which is constituted around the radicalization
of self, reality, and knowledge. Writers like Jean Baudrillard have, of course,
identified these radical disjunctures through a new kind of critical pessimism
which is associated with contemporary televisual culture. Baudrillard’s
pessimism is not shared by many advocates of posthumanism who herald the epoch
in terms of its liberational potential. For these theorists there can be no
restoration of a generalized human experience since all experiences are unique
and highly individualized. Any attempts to produce a generalized ethic or political
principle, indeed any attempts to produce a generalized community, necessarily
transgress the interests of individuals (see Nancy). For these radical theorists
the past must be ruptured and the future must be seized in a language war that
can have no completion and no consummation. For posthumanists, history and
culture are characterized by agonism and by the exertion of dominant groups;
only through a form of radical separationism can subjects be truly liberated
from the homogenizing and normativizing excesses of these dominant groups.
Posthumanism is constructed out of a sense of dismay and disquiet. Like other
postmodernists, though without the critical pessimism of Baudrillard or the
sentimentalism of Charles Jencks, posthumanism abandons the possibility of
a meaningful or fixed communicative form. Rather, communication is perpetually
self-shattering, constituted through ephemera, transience, and the radical
fragmentation of subjectivity. For authors like Donna Haraway posthumanism
offers the possibility of an evolutionary leap, a move toward a new cyborgian
identity that is not ossified by the precepts of gender, age, ethnicity, or
sexuality. Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston celebrate the disillusion that
is inherent in posthumanism since it provides the conduit for a new and more
radical social conceit:
The gridlock of signifiers and signifieds at the juncture of gender,
class, ethnicity and sexuality in the night world of voguing is a traffic
jam of posthuman proportions, where the drivers may as well abandon their
vehicles. The Human wanders, lost, into a maze of sex changes, wardrobe
changes, make-overs, and cover versions that imbricate human reality
into posthuman realness. (7)
The obliteration of origin in a postmodern poetica
is unmistakable. Such apocalyptic hedonism resonates in much of the
science fiction futurism
from which posthuman theoretics draw their inspiration. However, a vision
of radical separationism and its prescient “realness” critically
under acknowledges the processes of meaning-making which continue to
drive and motivate contemporary culture(s). Separationism, displeasure,
and non-meaning are certainly present in current discourses and media
experiences, but so too are the communalizing and communicative experiences
which continue to congregate around discourses like love, freedom, nation,
democracy, pleasure, family, television, and music. We continue, that
is, to congregate around our various formations of culture and meaning.
Thus, just as hegemony theory and structuralism more broadly might overstate
the possibilities of systematic communication, so the separationists
overstate its implausibility. The corollary of this sort of separationism
is the ultimate individuation of all human experience and the abandonment
of any communicative or systematizing semiotic flow.
The New Civics
The Foucaultian path to separationism is marked by
the French philosopher’s
somewhat suppressed but recurring devotion to personal politics and an
aestheticized anarchicism. Even so, a number of theorists have adapted
Foucault’s broader interest in the operations of the state and “governmentality” in
order to take cultural studies in a quite different direction from the
separationists: that is, toward a new form of cultural civics. For these
critics Foucault’s work is clearly dissociated from the lineage
of Bakhtin and the radical pschoanalysts like de Certeau, Deleuze, and
Guattari on the one hand, and the aesthetic postmodernists on the other.
Remarkably, in fact, these theorists frequently couple an interest in
Habermas’s re-vitalized public sphere (see The Philosophical Discourse
of Modernity and The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere)
with Foucault’s governmentality thesis. I say remarkable because
Habermas himself distinguishes his own concerns and intellectual heritage
from Foucault’s, which he sees as fundamentally embedded in the
project of postmodernism (see “Taking Aim”).
Specifically, however, Foucault’s notion of governmentality may
be regarded as a form of material management which defines itself historically
as a mode
of social organization. Governmentality refers to a modernist deployment of
Government is defined as a right manner of disposing
things so as to lead not to the form of the common good, as the jurists’ texts
would have said, but to an end which is “convenient” for
each of the things that are to be governed. This implies a plurality
of specific aims: for instance, government will have to ensure that the
greatest possible quantity of wealth is produced, that the people are
provided with sufficient means of subsistence, that the population is
enabled to multiply . . . . [W]ith government it is not a matter of imposing
laws on men, but of disposing things: that is to say, of employing tactics
rather than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics—to
arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means,
such and such ends may be achieved. (“Governmentality” 95)
Foucault reviews the notion in various lectures,
seminars, and interviews, suggesting at one point that the “contact between technologies
of domination of others and those of the self I call governmentality” (“Technologies
of the Self” 19). In this discussion, however, Foucault concedes
that his study of governmentality has overemphasized tactics of domination
over those of self-management. In his essay “Technologies of the
Self” Foucault makes clear that subjects employ various “tactics” (technologies,
techniques) in order to govern themselves. To this extent, governmentality
is not merely about institutionally elected governments, but rather about
the ubiquity of governance, management, and control. It should also be
emphasized that Foucault’s application of the concept of governmentality
is historically focused, designed to distinguish the political practices
and “technologies” of the Enlightenment (and modernity) from
Tony Bennett, nevertheless, is undeterred in his adaptation of Foucault’s
concept for a polemical account of contemporary cultural studies. Bennett expresses
his deep dissatisfaction with the Gramscian approach to culture and cultural
analysis, arguing that studies based around ideology and hegemony tend to reproduce
simplistic notions of a center of power. Foucault’s arguments, by contrast,
treat power as decentralized and pervasive in all human relations. Bennett
makes several claims against a cultural studies which is preoccupied with theoretical
and representational issues. A policy driven cultural studies would redress
a number of the problems that continue to limit the practical efficacy of cultural
studies and cultural politics. To this extent, a policy-based cultural studies
1. Focus on institutions and institutional practices.
2. Recognize that cultural studies is practised within educational institutions
which are in turn instruments of government and governmentality.
3. Acknowledge that cultural studies is not a renegade activity but
exists within the framework of governmentality and so engages in specific
regulatory practices (e.g. what is to be studied, what is not to be studied).
4. Interrogate various technologies of power as they are exercised through
Bennett’s essay, produced out of the Australian Key Centre for
Cultural and Media Policy, polemicizes the issue of cultural policy analysis
in contemporary cultural studies. Along with other scholars associated
with the Centre—Ian Hunter, Colin Mercer, and Stuart Cunningham—Bennett
maintains that questions of policy and governmentality need to be central
to the cultural studies project if it is to reach beyond the limited
borders of textual analysis.
Similarly, Jim McGuigan argues that cultural studies’ infatuation with
language and discourse theory has led to an overemphasis on textual shaping
and consumption (Cultural Populism). According to McGuigan, the deviation of
cultural inquiry into various forms of cultural populism has limited its critical
efficacy, as it surrenders to the reactionary interests of global capitalism.
McGuigan, in fact, questions not only the populism of cultural analysts like
John Fiske (see Media Matters and Understanding Popular Culture), but also
a policy focus which is not grounded in normative critical values. To this
extent, McGuigan distinguishes his own work from that of authors like Bennett.
McGuigan presents his own analysis in terms of critical values of “democratic
egalitarianism” which are applied to a number of concrete and substantive
issues of cultural policy, including questions of evaluative judgment and public
administration, culture, economy, geography and history, cultural identity,
citizenship, censorship, and morality (Culture and the Public Sphere 177; see
also Kellner). For McGuigan, Habermas’s notion of a consensual communicative
action within the public sphere provides the basis for understanding the actual
conditions of ordinary people’s everyday struggles. The ultimate question
for cultural studies, McGuigan argues, is how to construct an expressive citizenship.
The Policy Debate
Borrowing from Simon During, we can identify three levels within the
cultural policy debate:
1. Policy should be studied in cultural analysis.
2. Culture is characterized by governmentality and regulatory processes.
3. Policy should be the central focus of cultural studies. (480)
There can be little argument with the first level
of this debate—that
policy issues should be part of the cultural studies ambit. It is certainly
true that some areas of cultural studies restrict their analysis to problems
of aesthetics and representation, and are less interested in issues of
power and injustice. It is equally true, however, that many cultural
analysts enter public and policy debates quite directly, applying modes
of Gramscian or Foucaultian discourse-based cultural analysis. Stuart
Hall and Edward Said, for example, have often engaged in matters of governmental
policy formulation as well as direct political action. Hall makes it
clear that his theoretical work is always and necessarily focused toward
practical political outcomes (see “Cultural Studies,” “The
Local and the Global,” and “Old and New Identities”).
Hall’s explicit criticism of Thatcherism in England and Said’s
opposition to U.S. foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East demonstrate
clear continuities between various forms of textual analysis and participation
in public policy debates. Of course, Bennett objects to the putative
oppositionalism of Gramscian-style cultural studies, but it is nevertheless
clear that cultural studies critique reaches well beyond a simple opposition
for opposition’s sake. Through its Gramscian and Foucaultian incarnations
cultural studies continues to make major contributions to the ways in
which culture and politics can be considered; in this sense, cultural
studies can be critical (or “negative”) as well as offering
positive suggestions for policy formulation.
The problem for Bennett’s approach—and here we encounter the second
level of the policy debate—is that the whole notion of governmentality
is so complete that it appears inescapable. In other words, there seems to
be nothing an individual subject can achieve through a critical or ideological
distance from the processes of being governed or regulated. In this sense,
opposition, resistance, and even rejection seem merely to be cultural articulations
that are comfortably accommodated within the general context of citizenship
and cultural civics. While at one level this may seem reassuring, at another
level the risk of serious political dilution emerges since radical resistance
becomes fatuous, meaningless, or absurd in Bennett’s schema. There seems
little value in a scholar (or any other subject) resisting or rejecting the
threat of injustice or oppression except through the available mechanisms of
democratic participation and regulation. Protest must be contained within a
general discourse of participation since “to be a citizen” is the
complete lexicon of rights and political determinations. In Bennett’s
cultural civics, there appears to be no legitimate subjectivity that is not
contained within the borders of the citizenry.
At the third level of this debate, then, it seems clear that the situating
of policy at the center of cultural studies seriously limits the possibilities
of thinking new thoughts and exploring new horizons of culture and cultural
politics. Specifically, the centralization of policy, governmentality, and
citizenship privileges the state and its right to govern, control, and regulate.
It tends to reinscribe the problems associated with representative democracy
and the excesses of statehood and nation. That is, cultural policy studies
tend to fix their liberation in the constituency of the nation-state; the nation
is restored against the flow of diversity and multitudinous cultural forms
associated with globalization, identity, and cultural difference; the policy
approach tends to override the great diversity of social and spatial scales
in which power operates. More particularly, cultural policy studies are predisposed
toward regulation and protection which inevitably compromises or diminishes
the potentialities of new modes of cultural expression, subjectivity, and identity.
In repudiating postmodernist interests in difference and customized forms of
pleasure and emancipation, the national policy approach frequently threatens
to confirm as it restores the authority and homogenizing tendencies of the
state. The pragmatism which is often celebrated by cultural policy studies
may be viewed more broadly as an unmitigating faith in governance and the humanist
ideal, a faith which inevitably reconstitutes the limiting effects of rationalized
order and the universalization of individual and community desires—a
faith, that is, in the social collective over the personal.
Along these lines, Fredric Jameson claims that the policy-primacy approach
is highly localized, emerging in a context of high levels of state intervention
(“On ‘Cultural Studies’”). While such policy studies
may be pertinent to a country like Australia, Jameson argues, they have far
less relevance in the United States where there is little ideological or historical
support for state engagement in cultural activities. Adding to this, we might
suggest that this highly localized conception of the state and state regulation
seriously limits the policy scholars’ view of broader, global, cultural
issues. Simon During suggests something similar in his discussion of the policy
debate, claiming that Australian policy scholars have been well positioned
to contribute to government policy formulation designed to support local culture
and cultural industries: “But this means that the hot issues on the American
culture/government interface—censorship, and the withholding of public
funding for so-called obscene or blasphemous works, the attack on multiculturalism,
the questioning of the public funding of culture at all—do not really
appear in Bennett’s work” (480). In other words, the policy primacy
argument is very much fixed within the national borders of its source.
What is Culture?
It is not, therefore, a matter of the inclusion or
exclusion of policy issues that is in dispute in cultural studies.
Neo-Gramscians like Angela
McRobbie and Graeme Turner move comfortably from various modes of textual
analysis into direct political and policy commentary, arguing consistently
that the study of culture and the media must always return to the industrial
and regulatory contexts in which media is formed, operates, and is consumed.
Ien Ang concludes similarly that the move into a postmodern cultural
epoch necessitates, rather than precludes, the full engagement of cultural
studies in the industrial, professional, and ideological contexts within
which media consumption takes place. According to Ang, media scholars
are dutibound to investigate the broad gamut of textual production and
consumption practices in order to elucidate fully the “living room
wars” which are so powerfully implicated in the shaping of postmodern
Ang’s point here is that the divide between theorists of a postmodern
cultural studies and those advocating some form of cultural civics is overstated.
Ang’s pragmatism reflects an increasing trend in cultural studies, one
which comfortably engages with empirical, textual, and policy-based methodologies
(see Storey, Grossberg, Grossberg et al.). However, this trans- or post-disciplinary
perspective is tending to parenthesize substantive definitional and theoretical
matters in order to “get on with the task of doing cultural studies.” The
danger is, of course, that these questions may be perpetually deferred, thus
limiting the cogency, relevance, and efficacy of findings. To this extent,
the question of “what is culture?” seems a necessary precursor
to the more dramatic question of “what is cultural studies?”
While I have offered a more detailed answer to this question in my book Cultural
Studies, I want to suggest here that culture is fundamentally formed through
modes of meaning-making and that while a definition of culture necessarily
draws on anthropological and structural linguistic roots, current understandings
must also account for the poststructural and postmodern lexica. In this sense,
culture needs to be understood in the following terms:
1. Culture is an “assemblage” of imaginings and meanings.
Culture is constructed by humans in order to communicate and create community.
While society and community are assemblages of people, culture is an
assemblage of imaginings and meanings. Authors like Castells have objected
to the notion of cultural imagining because it lacks a certain empirical
solidity. However, empirical and social theory have never comfortably
addressed the notion of imagining and its role in aesthetics, identity
formation, and the broader shaping of human realities. Culture begins
with an imagining of the world about us; these imaginings are represented
in some way. That is, they are formed in discourse, language, symbols,
signs, and texts—all concepts applied to meaning systems. These
imaginings and meanings, however, can never be fixed or solidified, but
remain assemblages that can be dismantled through time, space, and human
action. That is, the “system” into which meanings are formed
is far from absolute and immutable. The meanings are put together for
a purpose within a particular historical and spatial (material) context.
Meaning systems are always subject to the return of imagining and vice
versa. Imaginings and meanings operate to form one another, but they
can never be relied on as stable and sustaining formations. Meaning and
imagining can at any time confirm or destabilize one another.
2. Culture is an assemblage of imaginings and meanings
that may be consonant, disjunctive, overlapping, contentious, continuous,
In other words, culture is always transitional, transformative, open,
and unstable. While the sociological lineage has tended to treat language
as fixed and orderly, meaning systems like language are capable of producing
misunderstandings and non-meaning as well as meanings. At any one time,
a culture can be subject to an infinite array of meaning disputes and
gaps. There may be a “dominant” meaning or “dominant” ideology
which attempts to amplify and direct meanings in particular ways, but
a culture can never be closed since it is made up of competing interests
and many different individuals and groups.
3. Culture is an assemblage of imaginings and meanings
that may be consonant, disjunctive, overlapping, contentious, continuous,
These assemblages may operate through a wide variety of human social
groupings and social practices. This means that we can speak of a family
culture, a national culture, an ethnic culture, a global culture, a work
culture, a religious culture, a university culture, a football culture,
a technological culture, a gay culture, and so on. Certain cultures form
around institutions which may be more or less extensive and durable.
These institutions exhibit more or less consonant ideological, semiotic,
ethical, aesthetic, and organizational characteristics. To this extent,
individuals may be subject to the cultural meanings that are produced
and imposed by large and historically enduring institutions such as governmental
institutions, the “family,” or media corporations.
An individual human subject may participate in many different cultures simultaneously.
Each of these cultures may have its own system of meanings which articulates
itself through norms and values, beliefs, political ideals, rituals, clothing
styles, vocabulary, status positions, and so on. A meaning system, that is,
has many different dimensions which are formed through various levels of dominant
values. In fact, each culture may be more or less rigid in the structure of
its associations or assemblages. Rigid rules, for example, may apply to the
culture of the biker gang; these rules may define power relationships, economy,
the position of the rider in the road line, sexual practices, and clothing
styles. Individuals may experience severe dissonance through their participation
in different cultures. A Muslim living in the United States, for example, may
wish to practice polygamy, even though this transgresses the rules and dominant
ideologies of the national culture. Equally, a heroin user may experience significant
dissonance in a professional workplace.
4. Culture is an assemblage of imaginings and meanings that may be consonant,
disjunctive, overlapping, contentious, continuous, or discontinuous.
These assemblages may operate through a wide variety of human social
groupings and social practices. In contemporary culture these experiences
of imagining and meaning-making are intensified through the proliferation
of mass media images and information. The electronic media has exaggerated
particular cultural trends and processes during the twentieth century.
The particular characteristics of electronic communication have rendered
the problem of cultural dispute, dissonance, instability, and transition
more acute; it has also vastly extended the available resources for imagining
and meaning-making. Previously distant human cultural formations have
been brought into greater propinquity, creating the circumstances for
a proliferation of cultural discourses. These proliferating discourses
stimulate ever-increasing possibilities for new meanings and new non-meanings
or communication gaps.
Richard Johnson’s notion of culturalism sought to describe a certain
theoretical coherence amongst the Birmingham cultural analysts and their
followers. According to Johnson, culturalists believe that a social group’s
behavioral and social patterns could be revealed through the analysis
of textual production and documented practices. While this centralization
of the concept of culture is highly significant for those seeking a cogent
rendering of human behaviors, aesthetics, and ideas, Johnson’s
concept of culturalism fails to appreciate adequately the complex nature
of culture and the broad problematics of meaning-making as we have discussed
it in this paper. In particular, culturalism only partially acknowledges
the relationships between meaning and non-meaning, ideology and subjectivity,
social reform, and social imagining.
The concept of “transculturalism” is offered as an advance on Johnson’s
original notion. Transculturalism mobilizes the definitions of culture outlined
above through the expression and deployment of new forms of cultural politics.
To put it simply, transculturalism adapts and extends both Gramscian and Foucaultian
analysis in order to create a more critically potent and theoretically consistent
mode of cultural investigation. Transculturalism can be characterized in the
• Transculturalism is distinguished, in particular, by its emphasis
on the problematics of contemporary culture, most particularly in terms
of relationships, meaning-making, and power formation. However, transculturalism
is as interested in dissonance, tension, and instability as it is with
the stabilizing effects of social conjunction, communalism, and organization.
It seeks to illuminate the various gradients of culture and the ways
in which social groups “create” and “distribute” their
meanings. Equally, though, transculturalism seeks to illuminate the ways
in which social groups interact and experience tension. It is interested
in the destabilizing effects of non-meaning or meaning atrophy. It is
interested in the disintegration of groups, cultures, and power. In other
words, transculturalism emphasizes the transitory nature of culture as
well as its power to transform. Transculturalism looks in particular
toward the ways in which language wars are historically shaped and conducted.
These language wars create the conditions of stability and instability
as individuals and groups congregate, communicate, and seek to assert
their material and semiotic interests over others.
• Culture is formed in and around “language wars” which
operate through all social levels and which may be more or less severe
in terms of semiotic, personal, and material outcomes. Language wars
are an inevitable part of human engagement; they are constituted through
what Stuart Hall calls the “struggle to signify.” Individuals
and social groups engage in language wars as they attempt to communicate,
form community, maximize personal gratifications, or create boundaries.
In other words, language strategies may be deployed in order to constitute
personal or social assemblages; they may also be used as a direct assault
against other individuals and assemblages in order to manage, control,
or destroy them.
• Transculturalism does not seek to privilege
the semiotic over the material conditions of life, nor vice versa.
Rather, it accepts that
language and materiality continually interact within an unstable locus
of specific historical conditions. However, our access to and knowledge
of these material and historically defined conditions are necessarily
filtered through an engagement with language and language wars. Transculturalism
locates relationships of power in terms of language and history.
• Language wars have become more prolific and intense through the increasing
propinquity of social groups, including propinquities created by the
massive movement of people, information, and televisual images across
the globe. Clearly, transculturalism engages with the broad field of
debates surrounding globalization and internationalization. Transculturalism,
however, identifies these multiply flowing processes in terms of a
broadly contested and uneven distributions, disjunctures, and concentrations.
Network and culture jamming, WEF protests, religious localisms, and
the re-assertion of national sovereignties are all part of the language
wars with which the counter-surges of economic and corporate globalism
• Power is ubiquitous and always implicated in meaning-making;
however, meanings are fundamentally fluid and impossible to control in
absolute terms. People create meanings through their various social assemblages
and everyday practices. These social assemblages may intensify and expand,
forming concentrations of power nodes (institutions, structures). These
nodes and assemblages attempt to fix power and their meaning through
various strategies of domination, including the formation of hegemonic
and ideological discourses. This attempt to fix power and meaning, however,
is critically divorced from the everyday practices and processes of meaning-making
in which all subjects are engaged. The process of fixing transgresses
the inevitable dynamic of meaning-making; signifiers are strained beneath
the ossifying force of fixity, eventually splintering, fissuring, and
separating in a process of dissociation. These dissociating signifiers—ruptured
meaning, non-meaning, abandoned meaning—become the raw materials
for the everyday meaning-making of social practitioners. The ossifying
walls of the institutional meanings become brittle and the foundations
of power collapse. New cultures and new meanings break out within the
fissures and echoes of the structures that seem to contain them.
• The transcultural critic cannot, however,
stand idly by awaiting the implosion of these concentrations of power.
As noted, culture and
power nodes are formed out of language wars which necessarily produce
a broad range of semiotic and physical casualties. In order to limit
the damage caused by nodalization, transcultural critics must also be
actively engaged in language warfare, bringing to bear our own knowledge,
ethics, contentions, and beliefs. In particular, we must elucidate the
processes of meaning formation, deconstruct their sources and identify
nodalizations and the brutish infamies of social and cultural injustice.
Transculturalism, that is, requires the critic to be actively engaged
in deconstruction and re-construction.
• In this sense, the methods of the transcultural
critic are varied and multi-targeted. It must engage in the intellectual
structuralism and cultural civics. It must engage in mediated and other
aesthetics, noting that all social artifacts and practices constitute
meaning production. In this way, de Certeauian and postmodern conceptions
are incorporated into a broad visceral politics, which engages fully
in all representational forms, including those shaped through human relationships,
the body, and identity formation.
• For the transcultural critic difference is
to be both welcomed and feared. Difference that is hideous or brutal,
or which rejoices in
the infamy of hurt or the intellectual containment of others, is to be
repudiated. Transculturalism is not a capitulative or celebrational separationism.
It is an engagement in language war, a radical disposition which participates
in all modes and levels of social dialogue. It involves itself with community
action, jamming and debates with the state. It is neither faithful nor
faithless, but steers its path through the minutiae and the macrocosms
of various cultural assemblages, claims, and power nodes.
• And finally, transculturalism is deeply suspicious of itself
and of all utterances. Its claim to knowledge is always redoubtable,
self-reflexive, and self-critical. Transculturalism can never eschew
the force of its own precepts and the dynamic that is culture. Transculturalism
chooses the best option, action, or perspective from the matrix of claims.
It recognizes the implausibility of a durable knowledge and the impossibility
of truth beyond the moment. It deals, therefore, in options, perspectives,
and strategies. The cultural patterns it encounters and illuminates are
a manifestation of the transitory—meaningful only in a localized
and erstwhile manner.
9/11 and the Afghan War: By Way of Conclusion
The assault on the World Trade Center represents
a stunning and terrible escalation of language war. Innumerable commentators
have found their
explanation for the atrocity in terms of a discourse of “terror.” Beyond
the immediate sufferings of the victims and their loved ones, the force
of public, media, and state attention has been directed toward the identification
and punishment of these “terrorists.” Identification in this
sense refers both to the location of perpetrators and the ascription
of characteristics and meanings. This process of identity ascription,
as the cultural studies community understands very well, is a form of
what Lacan calls a “double entry matrix”: that is, the identity
of the ascriber reflects across the identity of the ascribee (and vice
versa). It is not at all surprising that each side of the language polemic
refers to the other as “demonic,” while identifying themselves
as innocent, heroic, and victim.
Clearly, these language wars are associated more broadly with a long
history of territorialism, suffering, and retribution. Numerous critics
Sontag, Chomsky) have pointed to the critical deficiencies of American foreign
policies, especially in the Middle East. America’s support for the oppressive
regime in Saudi Arabia, US bombing in the Sudan, continuing sanctions against
Iraq, the conscious neglect of the Palestinian problem, and the ongoing and
destabilizing effects of CIA activities in the region are all clearly implicated
in both the assaults of 9/11 and the reprisal attacks on the Taliban, Al Qaeda,
and Afghanistan. As Susan Carruthers has argued, however, state policy cannot
be isolated from other critical cultural elements; in particular, Carruthers
argues, the confluence of state policy, public consent, and the media appear
to have become a pre-condition of contemporary military warfare. In this sense,
just as the media was directly implicated in the process of meaning construction
during the Gulf War, public understanding and attitudes toward 9/11 and the
Afghan war are clearly associated with media and the historical cultural conditions
within which the rubric of state policy is formed (see Taylor, Norris, Baudrillard,
Noam Chomsky, in fact, suggests that the media complicitly surrenders its critical
function during times of crisis in order to support national stability and
It is entirely typical for the major media, and the intellectual classes
generally, to line up in support of power in a time of crisis and try
to mobilize the population for the same cause. That was true, with almost
hysterical intensity, at the times of the bombing of Serbia. The Gulf
War was not at all unusual. (30)
This view is corroborated by Young and Jesser who
argue that “opinion
polls have shown overwhelming popular support for constraints on the
media during recent limited conflicts” (11). The surging popularity
of President Bush and the oft-cited 80 percent public support for the
reprisal policies might seem further to substantiate this “consensus” of
media, state, and public.
There is insufficient space in this essay to interrogate these analyses
in any great detail; however, I want to suggest, by way of conclusion,
transcultural reading of the 9/11 calamity would accommodate such interrogations
while focusing on the transient, agonistic, and unstable cultural conditions
in which the “war” is being waged. In this sense, the transcultural
method doesn’t begin its analysis with specific assumptions about state
authority and the capacity of social elites, including the media, to “manufacture
consent.” Rather, transculturalism is interested in the specific instances
and various gradients of power, including its formation, external and internal
challenges, and impetus to defoliation or deconstruction. The task of criticism
and reform is thus enabled by a more complete rendering of the cultural elements
which are informing operations of policy, the media, and public opinion.
At their most obvious and as we have noted above, these language wars have
centered on disputes over forms of self-ascription; the respective sides of
the war define themselves in terms of an heroic crusade and the protection
and “liberation” of self-determined cultural values. Less obvious,
perhaps, are the ways in which the whole notion of the “United States” (and
its constituent semiotic order) is both culturally constituted and simultaneously
subject to discursive counter-claims and dispute. In this sense, the World
Trade Center becomes implicated in both a direct material assault (economic,
spatial, biological), as well as in a far more redolent and intense conflict
over meaning. Built in 1972 by the Rockefeller dynasty, the World Trade Center
was configured as an ensign of American enterprise and the capitalist dream.
This propagated meaning seemed to inscribe itself more fully on the American
imaginary following the terrorist bombings of 1993. The twin towers came to
represent an heroic and defiant heritage, proudly defining the Manhattan skyline
in terms of a US economic, political, and moral primacy. Amid the swarm of
American economic and cultural exports, the twin towers might be identified
as the center of New York, which is the center of America and the globe. But
it is precisely this sort of “export of image” which renders the “United
States” vulnerable to appropriation, adaptation, re-inscription, and
critical semiotic dispute. It is quite clear, therefore, that the Trade Center
assailants attached very different meanings to the towers and to the US generally
than those intended by a remarkably introspective and insular American discursive
hegemony. The Trade Center and the “United States” have been offered
to the world, but the complexity of that world simply shatters the discursive
borders that the American authorities (consciously or not) might seek to impose.
America’s power to coerce, its “strength,” is critically
limited by the freedom of others in the global “community” to make
of their culture whatever they will—that culture includes the torrent
of elements, actions, and texts that the US so unrestrainedly delivers to the
world but whose meanings are open to dispute.
Clearly, George Bush’s “shock” that anyone could “hate
America” betrays an extraordinary solipsism and incapacity to understand
this point. The broad global dissemination of American commerce and culture
seems to obscure the complex and often contradictory attitudes that this global
presence engenders. American foreign policy is textured by this same problematic,
the same cultural ambit. As the peoples of the Middle East dispute over territories
that have been defined by colonial cartographers, liberation movements, and
international arbiters, they aspire to a conflux of contending and contiguous
values drawn from a broad spectrum of cultural sources. Accordingly and as
Edward Said has constantly argued, the values of “freedom” and
self-determination that Bush, the free press, and First World authorities would
bring to the region are unquestionably resonant for Middle Eastern peoples:
protection from terror is as important to Al Qaeda as it is to the people who
had been working in the Trade Center buildings on 9/11. However, as Said also
maintains, the methods of delivery and the precise definition of these liberational
values needs to accommodate the specific cultural characteristics of the peoples
who are creating their lives and cultures within their specific social and
historical contexts. The reduction of the Trade Center to rubble represents
the communicative disjunctures and problems of contiguous cultural meaning-making
as much as it is symptomatic of the inadequacies of American foreign policy,
airport security, or CIA intelligence gathering.
This problematic of meaning-making and cultural contiguity is a critical factor
in the formation of language war and power. However, as we have noted, a configuration
like the “United States” seeks to form itself as a super-text,
overriding and resolving the problematic through the imposition of a nodal
and extraneous symbolic order. The much-vaunted consensus of state, media,
and public attitudes toward the 9/11 and Afghan war might seem to support an
assertion that a symbolic order is being re-asserted against the threat of
external challenge. Our argument thus far would claim, on the contrary, that
the divide between external and internal threat is obscured in a global cultural
context. American culture is necessarily de-bordered by its presence and integration
with other world cultures; challenges by Al Qaeda and others are formed through
the integration of America into Middle Eastern cultural imaginings. Similarly,
the agonisms which challenge American hegemony in world affairs may also be
forged through trans-border affiliations, for example, between Muslims in the
Middle East and Left or liberal intellectuals in America. For many of these
American intellectuals, their embodiment in the “United States” is
conditional and necessarily “amorphousized” by these identifications
and contiguities with “external” peoples. Beyond these “external” challenges
to the nodalized “United States,” we would suggest further that
the notional consensus of state, media, and public is both precarious and dubious.
In fact, the carefully managed theatricizing of 9/11 and Afghan through what
Luow refers to as a PR-izing of war, clearly demonstrates that the American
authorities themselves recognize that public opinion is fundamentally volatile
and transient. While critics like Noam Chomsky and Neil Postman have claimed
that this volatility masks a more encased or essential gullibility, recent
theorization on audiences and media consumption would suggest that such views
profoundly underestimate the creative and liberational capacity of viewing
publics (see Morley, Ang, Lull). In fact, the media-ization of politics and
war illustrates a clear tension between the vulnerability and creativity of
audiences-as-citizens. This tension is clearly associated with the processes
of cultural televisualization (see Lewis 419-448): that is, the transformation
of reality through televisual imagery. The volatility of public opinion reflects,
therefore, the transient nature of imagery, the imprecision of mediated politics,
and the disjunctive and incomplete character of televisual knowledge.
The pursuit of Osama bin Laden and his network needs ultimately to be placed
within this cultural context. While we might suspect America of ulterior motives
in the Middle East, most especially associated with oil interests, there remains
a fundamental contradiction in the bin Laden pursuit and the “consent” of
the American public to an execution without trial, deliberation, evidence,
or judgement. Moreover, this pursuit and pre-emptive “punishment,” which
necessarily involves the invasion of a sovereign territory and the deaths,
maiming, expatriation, and starvation of thousands of innocent Afghan people,
clearly transgresses the fundamental principles of democracy and freedom. The
legitimation of this transgression is, as Zolo warns, a condition of media
or televisual politics. Indeed, just as the World Trade Center had been subjected
to the extremes of language warfare, bin Laden himself has been inscribed with
meanings that reach well beyond the specific character of the crime of which
he is accused. This identity politicking is shaped through the US president’s
calculated but vaguely hysterical invocation of the Wild West and the Wanted
Dead or Alive posters, a calling to frontier America which has itself been
constituted through an hyperbolized Hollywood heroic, the sort of deadly madness
evident in characters like Lt. Colonel Kilgore in Coppola’s Apocalypse
Now. This referencing to American film and TV culture, in fact, inflates the
meanings of 9/11 to such a degree that the intensity and constituent order
of the event seem simultaneously to defoliate, shred themselves in an absurd
gesture of violence that has already been seen, configured, and digested. Even
as the airliners crash into the towers and the glass walls begin to implode
in fire and dust it is as though the movie has already been screened a thousand
times before. This is not merely fatalism, but a resonance of a self-obsessed
televisual culture which has drained its imaginings into a deluge of self-explorations,
introspections, and heroic self-assertions. Bush calls on the Wild West and
the hero in the white hat because that is where America has already been, its
culture already self-amazed, flagellated, and disseminated across the world.
It is this dimension of exhausted or dissociated meaning (non-meaning) which
threatens the cultural configuration of the “United States” from
within its own hegemonic impulses. This is not to risk a suggestion that 9/11
and the Afghan war “did not take place” as Baudrillard does of
the Gulf War (see Baudrillard, Norris); it is rather to cast serious doubt
over an excessive intellectual investment in notions like “semiotic order” and “consensus” as
an absolute truth-condition without reference to countervailing immanent irruptions.
It is to suggest, in fact, that the textual configuration of the “United
States” is extremely volatile, transient, and subject to its own internal
agonisms and propensities for deconstruction and defoliation. Bush’s
2002 State of the Union Address, though propagated as a declaration of a linguistic
and material order, indicates how quickly the consensus will unravel under
the pressure of inevitable language war. The role of the transcultural critic,
as I have suggested in this paper, is to participate in the persuasion games
and language wars which surround and irradiate through these assertions of
power. This is not “to speak on behalf of others,” but rather to
elucidate constituencies of discursive and material nodalization, exposing
them to the conditions of analysis and critique. There can be no guarantees
or principles of judgement beyond the claims of possibility. Our aim is to
limit the damage created by nodalizing and agonistic processes and to provide
new imaginings for new possibilities in the human experience. To this extent,
Susan Sontag asks that America become “something more than strong” as
it emerges from the ashes of Ground Zero. A broadened rendering of this “something
more” might embrace the possibilities for peoples and groups across the
globe. In this task, cultural studies should provide some invaluable guidance.
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Jeff Lewis is Senior Lecturer in media and cultural studies in the School
of Applied Communication, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. He is
the author of Cultural Studies (Sage, 2002). E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org.
Iowa Journal of Cultural Studies 1 (Spring 2002)
Copyright © 2002 by the University of Iowa