Solicited Advice and Lobbyist Power: Evidence from Three American States
Legislative Studies Quarterly XXIV:113-124

The work of William P. Browne and Won K. Paik (1993) suggests that legislators act as "unrestrained entrepreneurs" in an unstructured legislative environment. As a result, legislators rely heavily upon lobbyists for information and advice. Using data from a survey of 595 lobbyists in three American states, this paper asks: What determines whether or not and how often a lobbyist is approached for advice by policymakers? My findings suggest that full-time, experienced lobbyists have the largest "advice advantage." However, female lobbyists, as well as those who work for governmental bodies, also appear to have an advice advantage. Ultimately, these findings provide insight into what makes some lobbyists more influential than others.

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