Sarah Buss

 

Department of Philosophy

The University of Iowa

258 English-Philosophy Building

Iowa City, Iowa 52242-1408

Phone: (319) 335-1836

Fax: (319) 353-2322

e-mail

 

Employment

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, 1989-97

Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, The University of Iowa, 1997-1999

Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, The University of Iowa, 1999-2005.

 

Education

Yale University, New Haven, CT
PhD in Philosophy, 1989


Yale University, New Haven, CT
BA in Philosophy, Summa Cum Laude, Distinction in the major, 1981

 

Fellowships and Awards:

Mellon Fellowship, Dissertation Support, Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1988-89

Prize Teaching Fellowship, Yale, 1987-88

Mary E. Ives Fellowship, for superior academic performance, Yale, 1986-87

Isabella and George Duncan Fellowship, for superior academic performance, Yale, 1985-86

Mary Cady Tew Prize, for scholastic excellence, Yale, 1984

Mellon Fellowship in the Humanities, 1983-86

Phi Beta Kappa, 1979

AOS: Ethics, Practical Rationality, Moral Psychology
AOC: Metaphysics

 

Articles and Books:

“Needs (Someone Else’s), Projects (My Own), and Reasons," Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).

 

“Valuing Autonomy and Respecting Persons: Manipulation, Seduction, and the Basis of Moral Constraints,” Ethics (January 2005): 195-235


“The Irrationality of Unhappiness and the Paradox of Despair,” Journal of Philosophy 51, no. 4 (June 2004): 167-96


“Personal Autonomy,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (March 2002), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personal-autonomy


“Introduction,” in The Contours of Agency (June 2001, MIT Press), pp. xi-xx


The Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, co-editor (June, 2001, MIT Press)


“In Defense of Appearances: A Reply to Marcia Baron’s ‘The Moral Importance of How Things Seem,’” Maryland Law Review 60, no. 3 (2001): 642-652


“Respect for Persons,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29, no. 4 (December, 1999): 517-550

 

“What Practical Reasoning Must Be If We Act for Our Own Reasons,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 4 (December 1999): 399-421


“Appearing Respectful: The Moral Significance of Manners,” Ethics 109 (July 1999): 795-826 (reprinted in two anthologies: Ethics for Everyday and Morality and the Market: Ethics and Virtue in the Conduct of Business)


“Justified Wrongdoing,” Nous 31, no. 3 (September, 1997): 337-369


“Weakness of Will,”Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78, no. 1 (March, 1997): 13-44


“Autonomy Reconsidered,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994): 95-121 (to be translated and reprinted in a French anthology (in the Textes Clefs series) on contemporary American work on autonomy)


"Autonomy:  Self-expression in the Passive Mode” (submitted)

 

Work in Progress

"What Does the Structure of Intentional Action Tell Us about Our Reasons for Action?" Critical Notice of Reasonably Vicious, by Candace Vogler (forthcoming in Mind)

 

“Reasons for Action: How to Reconcile the Autonomy of Reason with the Heteronomy of Reason”

The Superficial Unity of the Mind" (forthcoming in The Messy Self, edited by Jennifer Rosner, to be released as a special issue of The Massachusetts Review and published by Paradigm Publishers)

“The Normativity of Irrationality”

 

 

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