

This is a transcription of a previously unpublished manuscript of Wittgenstein's, composed almost entirely in English, MS 166 in von Wright's catalogue. While no dates are recorded in the body of the text, von Wright originally assigned it a date of "Probably 1935-6." Although he did not state his reasons, a number of considerations lend support to this date. First, the ideas set out here seem to be very much of a piece with the "Notes for Lectures on 'Sense Data' and 'Private Experience'" which were mostly written during the 1935-36 academic year. As the exposition in this piece is more clear-cut and didactic than most of the "Notes for Lectures," it seems unlikely that it was written before the "Notes." Second, Wittgenstein usually wrote in German during the 1930s and 1940s, except for the 1934-35 and 1935-36 academic years, when he made a sustained effort to write in English. The first drafts of many of the remarks on private language in the Philosophical Investigations, written down in German during 1937-38 (MSS 119-121) show no sign of being directly based on this manuscript or the "Notes for Lectures."

On the other hand, the manuscript's title, which Wittgenstein wrote at the very top of the first page, suggests that it was written for the British Academy's "Philosophical Lecture," an annual public lecture on a philosophical topic. While Wittgenstein never gave a lecture in the series, the minutes of the committee which chooses the Philosophical Lecturer record, under the date April 16th 1941, that "the section recommended that Professor Wittgenstein be invited to deliver the lecture for 1942. . . ." Later the minute book records "Professor Wittgenstein accepted, but was obliged to withdraw by pressure of other work." Of course, it is possible that the notes were written earlier and the title added in 1941. But the fact that Wittgenstein went to unusual lengths to explain his methods in this piece and assumed that his audience would take nothing for granted, without the asides in German and the extensive digressions characteristic of the "Notes for Lectures," strongly suggests that it was written for a general audience, rather than for his regular classes. In any case, it is clear that the manuscript must have been written by 1942, at the very latest, and it seems very likely that it was composed with the Philosophical Lecture in mind.

1. These discoveries are due to the work of James Klagge and especially the research of Dr. Anthony Kenny, President of the British Academy.

Very few editorial alterations have been made; they have mainly been a matter of correcting spelling and grammar and completing abbreviated words. Material that was crossed out has been omitted, but where Wittgenstein wrote in an alternative above the original text and crossed out neither, both are shown, with the later alternative enclosed in single slashes: "/". Occasionally, Wittgenstein used double slashes to mark alternatives within the body of the text: "//". Material that Wittgenstein later inserted has simply been included in the main text without comment.²

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2. The transcription was originally prepared in 1984 from a microfilm of the Wittgenstein papers at the University of California, Berkeley, and revised in 1988 after I had consulted Professor von Wright's photocopy of the manuscript. I would like to acknowledge the support of a Killam postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Alberta, which made it possible for me to visit Helsinki, and to thank Professor von Wright for his assistance and encouragement.

Notes for the 'Philosophical Lecture'

Privacy of experiences. This privacy a superpr[ivacy]. *Something like* privacy. What seems to be the essential characteristic of pr[ivacy]? Nobody but I can see it, feel it, hear it; nobody except myself knows what it's like. Nobody except I can get at it. Language game with the colour-chart. Let us imagine each man has a private chart (perhaps *besides* having a public one.) Imagine he points to green on his pr[ivate] ch[art] when "red" is said—why should we say he means by "red" the colour we mean by "green"? Privacy of feelings can mean: nobody can know them unless I show them, or: I can't really show them. Or: if I don't want to, I needn't give any sign of my feeling but even if I want to I can only show a sign and not the feeling.

Meaning consisting of the word referring to an object.

How a kind of object is hypostatized for a technique of use. This word refers to this → object that word to that → object. Explanation of the object referred to not by pointing but by explaining a technique. Colour-words, shape-words, etc.

Under what circumstances pointing can explain i.e. convey the use of a word. Not to a baby. *It* learns by being drilled. There is therefore no occult act of *naming* an object that in itself can give a word a meaning.

Words for colour and shape. Words for colour on one side of a line. What does "now" refer to or "this" or "I"? The private object. The naming of the private object. The private language. The game someone plays with himself. When do we call it a *game*? If it resembles a public game. The diary of Robinson Cr[usoe].

So we mustn't think that we understand the working of a word in lang[uage] if we say it is a name which we give to some sort of pr[ivate] experience which we have. The idea is here: we *have* something it is as it were before the mind's eye (or some other sense) and we give it a name. What could be simpler? One might say /could put it roughly this way/: All ostensive definition explains the use of a

word only when it makes one last determination, removes one last indeterminacy.

The relation between name and object. Lang[uage] game of builders. What is the relation between names and actions names and shapes? The relation of ostensibly defining. That's to say, in order to establish a name relation we have to establish a technique of use. And we are misled if we think that it is a peculiar process of christening an object which makes a word the word for an object. This is a kind of superstition. So it's no use saying that we have a private object before the mind and give it a name. There is a name only where there is a technique of using it and that technique can be private; but this only means that nobody but I know about it, in the sense in which I can have a private sewing machine. But in order to be a private sewing machine, it must be an object which deserves the name "sewing machine," not in virtue of its privacy but in virtue of its similarity to sewing machines, private or otherwise.

Now why do we say: My feelings are my private property? Because only I am directly aware of my pain. But what does that mean. I suppose to be aware of pain means to feel it, and isn't it "my" pain because I feel it? So what does it mean to say only I feel my pain? We have, so far, not given any sense to the phrase "I feel his pain" (except in the sense I feel the same kind of pain, or perhaps I vividly imagine his pain) and therefore no use to the phrase "I feel my pain" either. (I don't say that we couldn't arrange for a sense for these phrases.) We could of course use the prop[osition] "A person is directly aware of his pain only and indirectly aware of the other man's" as a grammatical rule /determination¹/ to the effect that if I say of N "N, directly aware of pain," this means "N has pain," whereas "N is indir[ectly] aware of pain" is to mean: "N is aware of the fact that someone else has pain." (And this I'm inclined to call the healthy use of these phrases.)

Here too however the expressions "directly aware" and "indir[ectly] aware" are *extremely* misleading. What gives us the idea that the person who feels pain is aware of an object, as it were, sees it, whereas we are only told that it's there but can't see it? It is the peculiar function of the verbs like feeling, seeing etc. But before explaining what I mean I must make a preliminary remark. For I know that some of you will think this is the worst kind of verbalism. So I must make a general remark about grammar and reality. Roughly

1. Bestimmung.

speaking, the relation of the grammar of expressions to the facts which they are used to describe is that between the description of methods and units of measurement and the measures of objects measured by those methods and units. Now I could describe the shape and size of this room by giving its length, breadth and height in feet and just as well by giving them in meters. I could also give them in microns. In a way, therefore, you might say that the choice of the units is arbitrary. But in a most important sense it is not. It has a most important reason lying both in the size and in the irregularity of shape and in the use we make of a room that we don't measure its dimensions in [microns]² or even in m[illi]m[eters]. That is to say, not only the prop[osition] which tells us the result of measurement but also the description of the method and unit of measurement tells us something about the world in which this measurement takes place. And in this very way the technique of use of a word gives us an idea of *very* general truths about the world in which it is used, of truths in fact which are so general that they don't strike people, I'm sorry to say, and philosophers, too. And so I will turn to some points in /features of/ the technique of use of expressions like "feeling pain." The first point is this: that this verbal expression is, in the first person, used to replace an *expression* of pain. So that if some people say that "having pain" in the end refers to pain behaviour we can answer them that "I have pain" does not refer to pain behaviour but *is* a pain behaviour. It corresponds to a cry of pain, not to the statement "I am crying." "But surely you distinguish between my pain behaviour when I just behave that way and have no pain and my pain behaviour in the opposite case." If you mean, do I admit the fact that people sometimes behave as though they have pain whereas they haven't, I do. But I wish to say that you can't explain that difference by saying that if he has pain there is behind his expression /behaviour/ a certain something present which he expresses by his behaviour. If instead of "a certain something" or some such phrase you're bold enough to say "pain," then the statement becomes tautologous. If you want to avoid the mention of pain because this already presupposes that we know what is behind his expression then it doesn't help you to say "a certain feeling" or "a certain something" for how do you know that you are allowed to call it a feeling or even a something? For the word "something" has a public meaning if it means anything at all.

2. Here Wittgenstein uses the Greek letter mu, μ , the standard scientific abbreviation for a micron (a millionth of a meter).

And then if you risk saying that he *has something* you might as well say all you know /mean/ and say that he has pain. The point is that an essentially private object can't *justify* the use of a word, neither for the others *nor* for him. The private object does not only not enter the public game but it can't enter a private *game* either. You can see this, e.g., if you replace the one private object which is to justify his use of a pain expression by a series of different objects which he *has* at different times when he says he has pain. "But surely the use of the word pain is based on the fact that he 'recognises' his private object as always being the same on those occasions!" What's he mean in this case by being the "same," or by "recognising"? Neither he nor we have ever learnt to apply these words to his private object. Supposing instead of "he recognises the object" we said more cautiously "he believes he recognises"—but then we ought to say that he believes that he believes he recognises and so on ad inf[initum]. In other words: if this object is as private as we want it to be we have no reason to call it one object rather than 100 objects, we have no reason to apply the word object at all, and no more has he.

(This paper if it is in the least as I think it ought to be, should at first sight be very confusing indeed. For in this case it apparently consists of a mixture of trivialities and paradoxes and why I should say them seems pretty unclear.)

For to say that he has a private object means that we shall regard no description which he may give of it as really telling us what it's like. We assume that when he was taught our language the privacy of the object made it impossible to teach him the application of language to this object. "But what if he just had *guessed* the right application?" But which *is* the right application? There is nothing to guess at. "But couldn't he, if only by chance, have stumbled on the application analogous to the public one?" But what are we in this case to call analogous?

If you cheat others, at least don't cheat yourself; and if you don't cheat yourself—why should you cheat the others?³

3. This sentence was originally written in a simple letter-substitution code (a = z, b = y, etc.). While the autobiographical coded passages quoted by Brian McGuinness in *Wittgenstein: A Life* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, and London: Duckworth, 1988) and Ray Monk in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* were presumably written in code with the aim of concealing them from a casual reader (see McGuinness, p. 212), in this case it is more likely that the point of the device was to indicate that this passage was not intended as part of his lecture.

In fact the private object is one about which neither he who has it nor he who hasn't got it can say anything to others or to himself.

"But what you say always sounds as though you wished to deny the existence of pain, as opposed to that of pain behaviour." But what could it mean to deny the existence of pain, except to deny that people have ever felt pain; or to deny that it makes sense to say that someone has pain? What I do deny is that we can construe the grammar of "having pain" by hypostatizing a private object. Or: The private object functions all right only as long as its grammar is entirely constructed to suit the grammar of the common objects in question. And it becomes an absurdity if its nature is supposed to explain that grammar.

We can express this as follows: There is no *justification* for an utterance of pain in the sense in which there is for my saying that someone else is in pain. There is no essentially private justification for I couldn't know whether anything that is essentially private *is a justification*. There is something in front of me which justifies me in saying there is a table in front of me.

As introduction:

Word referring to an object. Using a word analogously to certain cases. Equality and the criteria of equality. Imagining making an image and making *use* of the image.

Recognising the object as the same you had before. But if we use the words "recognise" and "same" he must be *justified* in saying that he recognises the object as the same. Can his recognition be infallible? No, for he may be /can go/ wrong in the use of the word "same." // No, for we may say that he goes wrong in the application of the word "same." // He recognises; but suppose he went wrong, would it make any difference? But what is it like to be right in this case?

We can't, e.g., discuss the question, when he is justified to use the *same* utterance twice. If we imagine anything that we should call a justification, some private regularity, it seems to be something which, if we saw it, we should call a regularity. But what would, in our case, mean "seeing his private regularity"? We haven't given it any sense. That is, we have indeed given the expression "to feel what he feels" sense, but with particular criteria for the identity. If we now talk of identity and don't wish to use *these* criteria we are left without any, unless we give fresh ones. And of course I know perfectly well that we

are thinking of criteria similar to the ones of physical objects, only we can't apply any such criteria in our case and *that's* what we mean by talking of the privacy of the objects. Privacy here really means the absence of means of comparison. Only we mix up the state of affairs when we are prevented from comparing the objects with that of not having fixed a method of comparison. And in the moment we would fix such a way of comparing we would no longer talk of "sensations."

But suppose I say: "I have the same sensation now as five minutes ago"—what criterion of identity am I using?—What criterion am I using for determining that what I feel is pain, or that what I see is red? None. There are criteria which can convince me that I am using the word "red" or "pain" as they are normally used in English. I can point to something and say: "The colour of this you do call 'mauve,' don't you?" etc.

That's to say: In "I feel what I felt 5 min[utes] ago" I have no justification analogous to the case for calling the sensations identical apart from my justification of my use of the words employed in *other* contexts. And this means: I can't justify my saying this, either to others or to myself. Or rather it's better to say that I can justify saying this in such and such a sense but not in one analogous to. . . . It is as when we compare games and say: "In this ball game there is nothing corresponding to the net in tennis."

Memory can be compared with a storehouse only so far as it fulfills the same purpose. Where it doesn't, we couldn't say whether the things stored up may not constantly change their nature and so couldn't be said to be stored at all.

"But don't we say two sensations are equal when we find them equal and isn't finding them so the justification for saying it?" But how do we recognise "finding two sensations equal"?

He learns to use the word, and then, whenever . . . , he says ". . ." What are the circumstances under which he then says ". . ."? Could we then say: . . . and then whenever he feels pain he says ". . ."? or: . . . and then, whenever he has a certain feeling he says [". . ."]? or: . . . and then, whenever he has a something particular he says ". . ."?

"But if he is truthful, why shouldn't we take his word for it that he sees red?" But we do! That's to say, we believe that he is not telling us a lie. —"But if he is intelligent as well, why shouldn't we believe that what he has before his mind's eye is red." We do,—according to the method of comparison applicable in this case. "Then where do you

disagree with us?" —When you talk about something incommunicable, private.

"You seem to deny the existence of something; on the other hand you say you don't deny any existence: why should it *seem* as if you did? You seem to say 'There is *only*. . .' You deny, it seems, the background of the expression of sensations. Doesn't the expression point to something beyond itself?" —If we see the feeling as a background to the expression then we can always assume that we are wrong in thinking that this background doesn't change; we can assume that our memory at each instant cheats us and that we use the expression *bona fide* to express something different each time. So that one might say: It doesn't matter *what* is behind the expression so long as it is a *bona fide* expression of it.

Our answer is: Why do you think that a cry would be the *expression* of the background if there were one? In what sense would the cry *for me* point to such a background? Aren't you assuming a *language game* which in this case is not played? You bring in the idea of expression and background because you look at the game that's actually played through the schema of another game.

"A cry *with* and a cry *without* something."

The grammar of an expression can't be investigated by transforming the expressions, particularly when they all make use of the same picture. You have to remind yourself of the use to get out of the rut in which all these expressions tend to keep you.

The whole point of investigating the "verification," e.g., is to stress the importance of the use as opposed to that of the picture.

In this way we have to *investigate* the use of "cry with . . ." and "cry without . . ." although of course there are plenty of pictures ready taken from other uses of "with" and "without" but the pictures which come most readily in our mind are just the ones which confuse us.

Comparing measuring time with measuring lengths. To get rid of the confusing picture remind yourself *exactly how* we measure time. The difficulty here is that those pictures are terribly insistent, forcing us to see everything in their likeness.

Words with and without sense.

The application of a word (say "with") compares *this* case with other cases. But we're just questioning how far this comparison holds. So we must remind ourselves of facts which these words don't suggest. "But, surely, I know what pain is and that I always have just that when I say 'I have pain.'" Doesn't it strike you as odd that you should

know so well what pain is, now, when you haven't got it? This rather suggests that you don't need to recognise any private object to know the meaning of pain. Nor can you say: To understand the word "pain" it's necessary to recognise pain when it does come. For who is to say whether you do recognise it, unless recognising here means feeling (uttering) recognition, not recognising rightly. In this sense I could be said to recognise Smith as being Jones.

"But you can't *describe* the phenomenon of people feeling pain by describing their pain behaviour. You *do* know there is more to it than that. In your own case you know that all that happens isn't that under certain *external* circumstances you do and say such and such things." —In your own case you know that what's meant by feeling pain is entirely independent of external circumstances, and as to internal ones the only one that matters is *feeling pain*.

How would I justify my pain-behaviour in order to show to someone that I wasn't just acting in this way? I would add more expressive behaviour.

"But when I in my own case distinguish between, say, pretending that I have pain and really having pain, surely I must make this distinction on some grounds!" Oddly enough—no!—I do distinguish but not on any *grounds*.

"But if you say this aren't you saying that all the phenomenon of human pain is a phenomenon of behaviour?"

If we assume a justification behind the expression of feeling and if we then try to describe this justification, it turns out that it isn't a justification after all, that we have to say things about it which take away its character of justification.

It is as though I said: this man is N's guardian and then said things about the way he functions which are incompatible with his being a guardian to N.

"This feeling of mine, however you call it, justifies my behaviour." —This already presupposes that you can use the word "feeling."

Common idea: a word has meaning by referring to something.

There is a connection between a w[ord] and an object. What sort of connection? Is it something like this: The w[ord] reminds us of the obj[ect]? What happens when a thing reminds me of something? Seeing M reminded me of his father. Let's say, roughly, seeing M produces in me thoughts about his father, or images of M's father.

(Remark) The sentence "I imagine so-and-so" is not a *description* of a picture before my mind's eye. Ask yourself: do you recognise him from the picture before your mind's eye? Would you say: "I see a man with white hair etc., I suppose I'm imagining N but perhaps it's only someone who looks very much like him"? There is (however) a use we make of pictures which resembles much more that which we make of the product of our imagination: E.g. we describe the position of objects in a street accident and say while drawing: "This (line) is [the] street, this (square) is the overturned car, this (cross) the policeman at the corner, etc." Here too we are using sentences of the same form as those which would describe what we believe a picture represents, whereas their use is to give a picture an interpretation. —It is useful here to imagine that a man imagines by means of drawing or painting, sketching or even by producing a cartoon film. If you said that in order to draw he must already have a mental picture which he copies, the answer is that the mode of projection used to copy his mental picture is not determined and the latter therefore might be *anything*, so that in fact all that gives us a right to speak about a mental picture is the fact that we are inclined to call a (non-mental) picture a representation of a mental one.

"Is there then no such thing as a mental picture?" The proper answer to a question thus worded would be //is//: "People at times have mental pictures /images/." But this isn't really the sort of answer we wanted. We meant to ask: have we a right, under the circumstances under which it is normally said that a person /man/ has a mental image, to say that he has such an image or picture? Have we a right to say that someone married money? This may mean did he "marry money" or is the expression an appropriate one. Think of the ways in which such a question is decided? —Suppose we ask the question: are people murdered in tragedies or aren't they? One answer is: In *some* tragedies some people are murdered. Another answer: "people aren't *really* murdered on the stage and they only pretend to murder and to die." But the use of the word pretend here is again ambiguous for it may be used in the sense in which Edgar pretends to have led Gloucester to the cliff. //But you may say: Oh no! Some people really die in tragedies, e.g., Juliet at the end of the play, whereas before she pretended to have died. //"Oh no, they don't all pretend; Edgar pretends to lead Gloucester to the edge of the cliff /be a peasant/ he is really Gloucester's son //Gloucester is *really* blind."// We shall say the

words "really," "pretend," "die," etc., are used in a peculiar way when we talk of a play and differently in ordinary life. Or: the criteria for a man dying in a play aren't the same as those of his dying in reality. But are we *justified* to say that Lear dies at the end of the play? Why not. And, analogously, that there is no reason for objecting to saying we have /see/ mental pictures does not mean that we [know] the criteria for the existence of a non-mental picture are the same as those for the existence of a mental picture. One may even say that the former and the latter criteria need not even be similar, as one may say that the criteria for the death of a person in the play and outside a play are utterly dissimilar, though there is of course a connection.

Back to the function of words! We could imagine a use of language in which the words were used to bring images before our minds, an image for each word, or some thought concerning the object mentioned. As when we read a list of names of people whom we know and reading, imagine them or think various thoughts about them. And to amplify the idea, I can assume that the person who reads the list actually sketches the people or writes down sentences about them. This is obviously not the way the words in a sentence normally work. For again we might imagine a particular use of sentences in which their purpose is to make the reader draw a certain picture. One is inclined to think that understanding a sentence must consist in something at least *similar* to having a picture of the "fact the sentence refers to" before one's mind. What is true in this is that there is a connection between the capability to produce such a picture and understanding. But the idea that understanding means producing such a picture or something similar, is quite wrong. When we philosophise we are constantly bound to give an account of our technique of the usage of words and this technique we know in the sense that we master it, and we don't know it in the sense that we have the very greatest difficulty in surveying it and describing it. Thus we are inclined to look for an activity when we are to give an account of the meaning of a verb. And if some /an/ activity is closely connected with it we tend to think that the verb stands for this activity. The use of the word "understanding," however, is such that it is very misleading to say it refers to an activity. Lots of activities are signs that we have understood. The technique of use of the verb "understanding" is most similar to the technique of use [of] the verb "to be able to." In particular in such cases as: "to be able to play chess." "Aren't you

trying to make the distinction between understanding as a disposition and understanding as an action?"⁴

A phil[osophical] problem can be solved only in the right surrounding. We must give the problem a new surrounding, we must compare it to cases we are not used to compare it with.— —

If we describe the lang[uage] game of fetching coloured things, it might seem that we only describe it superficially, because the real game is played with impressions, and these we haven't mentioned at all in our description. It seems as if we hadn't really gone to the bottom of it.

We always forget that "impression" is a peculiar grammatical form, and that we could describe phenomena without using just this form.

Talking about impressions already means to look at phenomena in one particular way, i.e., to *think* about them in one particular fashion.

"What does green look like to me? —It looks like this → to me."—

"This is the colour impression which I'm calling 'green.'"

Am I *sure* I'm talking about my private *impression*? And how can I be sure—? Do I *feel* that I'm talking about the impression? What happens? I look at a green patch, I concentrate my attention on such a patch and I say these words. But on what kind of a patch? Not on a green one. On one which seems to deserve the name "green"?

It is not true that I see impressions before me and that they are the primary objects.

In the sense in which I can't explain "what green looks like to me," I can't say that I know what it looks like either.

Swapping experiences.

Having a particular use of the word in mind.

4. Here, the word "No" follows immediately in the text, but it has been crossed out.

The difference between "Now I know the formula" and "Now I can go on."

The difference between saying the formula and saying "Now I know the formula."

The importance of the if-feeling.

The "conditional feeling" not unlike seeing a vowel coloured.⁵

5. The last nine pages of this notebook contain transcriptions, in Russian, of five poems by Pushkin; the titles of the poems are usually translated as "Elegy," "Prophet," "The Upas Tree," "Demons," and "Remembrance." See A. S. Pushkin, *Sobranie sochinenii v 6-ti tomakh* Izdatel'stvo "Pravda" (Moscow, 1969), vol. 1, pp. 330, 257, 293, 328, 285. English translations can be found in *Pushkin: A Laurel Reader*, ed. E.J. Simmons (New York: Dell, 1961) pp. 55, 41, 44, 55, and 47.

James Klagge has suggested that Wittgenstein may have written out these poems as a personal response to the sudden death, on October 11, 1941, of his dear friend Francis Skinner. Skinner had studied Russian with Wittgenstein and had taken a special interest in Pushkin. For more information on their study of Russian, see the account by their Russian teacher, Fania Pascal, in "A Personal Memoir," *Recollections of Wittgenstein*, ed. R. Rhees, esp. pp. 15-21. For more on their interest in Pushkin, see Theodore Redpath, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Student's Memoir* (London: Duckworth, 1990) pp. 28-29.

WITTGENSTEIN'S EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE 1920'S AND 1930'S: FROM THE "PICTURE THEORY" TO "PHILOSOPHICAL PICTURES"

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The "Remarks on Logical Form," written shortly after Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge in January 1929, give us a very clear idea of some of the main issues that occupied him at the time. There, he says that it is "the task of the theory of knowledge" (*RLF*, p. 163) to analyse propositions into atomic propositions and their constituents. His method is familiar from the *Tractatus*: one looks for a symbolism which avoids the misunderstandings generated by ordinary language. He explains the nature of the relationship between ordinary language and the new symbolism by means of the following simile:

Let us imagine two parallel planes, I and II. On plane I figures are drawn, say, ellipses and rectangles of different sizes and shapes, and it is our task to produce images of these figures on plane II. Then we can imagine two ways, amongst others, of doing this. We can, first, lay down a law of projection—say that of orthogonal projection or any other—and then proceed to project all figures from I into II, according to this law. Or, secondly, we could proceed thus: We lay down the rule that every ellipse on plane I is to appear as a circle in plane II, and every rectangle as a square in II . . . In order to get in a single instance at the determinate shape of the original we would have to know the individual method by which, e.g., a particular ellipse is projected into the circle before me. The case of ordinary language is quite analogous. If the facts of reality are the ellipses and rectangles on plane I the subject-predicate and relational forms correspond to the circles and squares in plane II. These forms are the norms of our particular language into which we project in *ever so many different ways ever so many different* logical forms. And for this very reason we can draw no conclusions—except very vague ones—from the use of these norms as to the actual logical form of the phenomena described. (*RLF*, pp. 164–5)

This suggests that a fully analysed language would reproduce the full variety of logical forms, just as the first law lets us reproduce the full variety of ellipses and rectangles. But what is it that is represented? What do the ellipses and rectangles on plane I correspond to in the real world? Wittgenstein's reply is that

If, now, we try to get at an actual analysis, we find logical forms which have very little similarity with the norms of ordinary language. We meet with the forms of space and time with the whole manifold of spacial [sic] and temporal objects, as colours, sounds, etc., etc., with their gradations, continuous transitions, and combinations in various proportions, all of which we cannot seize by our ordinary means of expression. (*RLF*, p. 165)

In other words, the phenomena in question are experiential. The subsequent train of argument, which concerns the analysis of colour propositions is one of the few passages from this period to have attracted attention in the secondary literature. But the controversy over the nature of the colour exclusion argument has led commentators to overlook the question one should ask first: Why did Wittgenstein hold that analysis is concerned with experiential phenomena? For here we face a series of confident steps in thin air, a radical discontinuity: he was so sure of his ground that he thought a justification either unnecessary or impossible. The experiential character of the "phenomena" is simply taken for granted. And so an interpretation of this passage calls for a certain kind of double vision. It must first convey the philosophical picture which made it possible for the author to regard this move as "seeing something closer up and in a more definite manner," (*WVK*, p. 184) but it must also explain how the picture came to be taken for granted.

In the absence of any systematic exposition of this view, we must piece it together from those passages where Wittgenstein lapses into trying to say the unsayable. There is, of course, a certain irony here: Wittgenstein tells us to look at the common form of language and the phenomena, yet we have no alternative to looking at words such as these:

We do not notice that we see space perspectively or that our visual field is in some sense blurred towards the edges. It doesn't strike us and never can strike us because it is *the way we perceive*. We never give it a thought and it's impossible we should, since there is nothing that contrasts with the form of our world.

What I wanted to say is it's strange that those who ascribe reality only to things and not to our ideas [*Vorstellungen*] move about so self-evidently in the world as idea and never long to escape from it.

In other words, how very self-evident the given is. (*PR*, § 47; *BT*, § 91, pp. 428–9)

But how did Wittgenstein arrive at this conviction? The *Tractatus* maintains that language and world must be isomorphic. But this Kantian thought about the conditions for the possibility of language leaves open a wide range of alternative views concerning the nature of language and the world. Indeed, its very generality lends itself to a certain scepticism about our ability to identify their common structure: it might, for all we know, be far too complex. For if one literally examines a proposition and the fact that it represents, looking for the common structure, one is likely to feel at a loss: what *counts* as getting at what they have in common? Certainly, my saying my watch is on the table when my watch is on the table is true, and this is so because certain objects stand in certain relations. But how are we to say what that relationship consists in? The apparent intractability of the task convinced the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* that it was an unnecessary sidetrack.

The "Remarks on Logical Form" suggest a new strategy: since language and the world have the same structure, it will be enough to make out the structure of either. As the surface structure of our language conceals its deep structure, we must turn to the structure of the world. By comparing the facts in the world and the facts of language with geometrical figures, whose form is clearly visible, Wittgenstein suggests that we just have to look at the world to see the relevant similarities and differences. In this way, the idea that the world is analogous to a two dimensional coloured array, somewhat like what one experiences from the front row of the stalls in the cinema, presents itself as a given. The idea that immediate experience is a direct, non-linguistic presentation of the true nature of the world must thus have struck Wittgenstein as a compelling solution to his methodological problems. The answer to our questions about the final level of analysis would be right in front of our eyes.

All that would be left for the philosopher to do would be to find the "appropriate symbolism," one which describes the phenomena as directly as possible. This is what Wittgenstein meant by "phenomenology." In the "Remarks on Logical Form" he says that

. . . we can only substitute a clear symbolism for the unprecise one by inspecting the phenomena which we want to describe, thus trying to understand their logical multiplicity. That is to say, we can only arrive at a correct analysis by, what might be called, the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves, i.e., in a certain sense *a posteriori*, and not by conjecturing about *a priori* possibilities. (*RLF*, p. 163)

Wittgenstein comes closest to explicitly describing the picture of language which lies behind his new conception of analysis when he compares experience to a picture on a movie screen, language to the film in the movie projector. In a discussion of immediate experience in the Big Typescript, he writes:

Phenomenological language: the description of immediate sense perception, without hypothetical additions. If something, then it must surely be depiction by means of a painted picture or be some such description of immediate experience . . . (An approximation to this would be a representation in film.) (*BT*, § 101, pp. 491–2; Cf. *PR*, § 67–8)